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Dansk resumé: 
Hvem er medlemmerne af  den mest magtfulde gruppe i det danske samfund? Det er det centrale 
spørgsmål i denne afhandling. Med netværksanalyser finder og undersøger vi kernen af  det danske 
magtnetværk – magteliten – og erhvervselitens inderkreds. Med korrespondanceanalyse undersøges 
forskellene internt i erhvervslivets top. 
Betydningen af  hvordan eliten defineres eller identificeres diskuteres op imod den dominerende tilgang til 
nationale elite studier. I positionsmetoden defineres elitens størrelse og sammensætning på forhånd. Vi 
fremlægger en ny data sensitiv metodik, der identificerer en sammenhængende elite ved hjælp af  social 
netværks analyse. Det giver muligheden for at analysere på sammensætningen af  eliten og afgøre i C.W 
Mills ånd,  hvad de afgørende institutionelle ordner i Danmark er.  
Når man skal identificere grupper ved hjælp af  social netværks analyse eller analysere forskellene i en 
korrespondanceanalyse er det afgørende hvordan man teoretisk og metodisk forstår sociale afstande. I en 
korrespondanceanalyse har alle individer en afstand til hinanden, men det forholder sig væsentligt 
anderledes i social netværksanalyse. Her er de sociale afstande grundlæggende binære, enten er der to 
personer forbundet direkte eller igennem andre eller så er afstanden imellem dem uendelig. Det har stor 
betydning for hvor mange individer man kan inkludere i analysen uden at resultaterne bliver markant 
anderledes. Derfor er social netværks analyse bedre til at identificere en elite, fordi individer der er isolerede 
eller perifære ikke nødvendigvis har indflydelse på gruppeindelingerne. Uden denne egenskab kunne man 
ikke benytte så relativt meget data som vi gør i vores datasæt, Det Danske Elitenetværk.  
De 100 vigtigste danske topdirektører kortlægges i den første og anden artikel. I den første artikel vises 
hvilke karriereveje, der leder til toppen af  erhvervslivet sammenlignet med Tyskland, Frankrig og 
Storbritannien. Med klyngeanalyse findes 4 typiske karriereveje for danske direktører, der dog alle går 
gennem mange år i erhvervslivet: firmaets mand, arvingen, eksperten og sælgeren, hvor den sidste er 
særegen for dansk erhvervsliv. Danske topdirektører stammer ligesom deres udenlandske kolleger i høj 
grad fra den øvre middelklasse eller overklassen, ofte fra direktørhjem. Men topdirektørerne er meget 
forskellige, når det kommer til uddannelsestyper og længde på tværs af  lande. Det tyder på, at det er mere 
afgørende at passe ind i den nationale erhvervskultur end at have kvalifikationer og erfaringer, der passer til 
ledelse på tværs af  lande. 
Topdirektørernes nuværende status og netværk kortlægges i den anden artikel. Det viser sig at høj status i 
form af  omtale, royale anerkendelser som ordner og invitationer til bal og ledelsespriser hænger endog 
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meget tæt sammen med, om direktøren inviteres ind i de netværk, der forbinder dem med andre dele af  
magteliten. Selv blandt de 100 vigtigste direktører er der store forskelle i, hvor stor prestige, man har og 
hvor godt man er integreret med de øvrige magtmennesker. 
Sammenhængen mellem netværk og status gjorde det oplagt at se endnu nærmere på det danske 
magtnetværk. Vi indsamlede en stor database bestående af  5.233 netværk med 62.841 poster besat af  
37.750 mennesker. Databasen indeholder virksomhedsbestyrelser, bestyrelser og underudvalg i 
organisationer med høringsret, ledende organer i statslige institutioner, kommissioner, udvalg, råd og nævn, 
fondsbestyrelser, andre netværk og begivenheder som kongelige baller. Indsamlingen er udførligt beskrevet 
i den femte artikel. 
Bestyrelsesposterne i de 1.037 største danske virksomheder bruges til – med udgangspunkt i Michaels 
Useems teori - at finde en inderkreds i den danske erhvervselite i artikel 3. Her findes 171 mennesker, der 
ikke bare sidder på de centrale poster i dansk erhvervsliv, men også langt hyppigere end de øvrige 
bestyrelsesmedlemmer har poster i andre prestigefyldte eller magtfulde magtnetværk så som 
erhvervsorganisationer, statslige råd og nævn, universitets- og kulturbestyrelser, eksklusive netværk som 
VL-grupper, fonde og royale begivenheder. Inderkredsen ligner desuden direktørerne i kraft at have 
eksklusiv social baggrund, samme smalle uddannelsesbaggrund og dele livsstil med hinanden. Det giver 
denne gruppe alle muligheder for at være den politisk aktive del af  den økonomiske elite eller 
kapitalistklassen om man vil. 
Hvor artikel 3 om inderkredsen fokuserer på individerne ser artikel 4 på de 1.0037 største danske 
virksomheder og hvilke egenskaber der har betydning for om en virksomhedsbestyrelse har forbindelser på 
tværs af  sektorer. Der er meget stærke korrelationer mellem omsætning og hvor mange forbindelser 
virksomheden har indenfor syv forskellige sektorer. Men det er primært de 250 største virksomheder, der 
forbinder med andre sektorer. Det vises også at udover økonomisk størrelse så har det også en positiv 
betydning hvor omtalt en virksomhed er, om det er en finansiel virksomhed, om den er den største 
virksomhed indenfor sit felt og om den er en del af  andelsbevægelsen. Modsat er danske afdelinger af  
Global 500 virksomheder væsentligt dårligere integreret i den danske elite. 
For at kunne identificere magteliten i Danmark udvikles der i artikel 6, en ny metode, der anvender k-kerne 
dekomposition. Ved at tage alle potentielt magtfulde netværk med og herefter udvikle teknikker til at vægte 
de meget forskellige typer af  netværk – lige fra virksomhedsbestyrelsens alvorlige atmosfære til pragten ved 
det kongelige bal – bliver kernen af  netværket ikke bestemt af  forskerens fornemmelse for magt, men af  
hvem der faktisk interagerer mest i magtnetværket. På den måde findes en magtelite på 423 personer. 
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Disse 423 mennesker og deres netværk kortlægges så i den sidste artikel. Først vises, hvordan det for alle 
sektornetværk gælder at det at have centrale poster i et sektornetværk, fx statslige institutioner, råd og 
nævn, betyder at man også oftere har centrale poster indenfor et andet sektornetværk, fx fagforeninger. 
Desuden bliver det klart, at de centrale poster i netværket akkumuleres blandt meget få personer. Herefter 
ser vi nærmere på magtelitens sammensætning. Over halvdelen er enten fra det private erhvervsliv eller fra 
erhvervsorganisationer. Men både fagforeningsledere, topembedsmænd, politikere – især med 
ledelsesposter, altså ministre og borgmestre – og videnskabsfolk, særligt universitetsrektorer og økonomer 
er med i kernen af  magtnetværket. Kerneaktørerne i den danske model er alle tilstede. Retsvæsen, 
kulturadministratorer og  mediechefer udgør meget små minoriteter, mens de gejstlige, kunstnere samt 
journalister og andre mediepersonligheder er helt udenfor. Men ikke kun sektortilknytning betyder noget. 
Ved at se på enkeltpersoner forklares det, at for at blive en del af  kernen, så må man spille på dennes 
præmisser, hvilket grundlæggende betyder at acceptere sine med- og modspilleres  ret til at være der. 
Endelig ses der nærmere på magtelitens kendetegn. Næsten alle de 423 er ledere, tæt på halvdelen kommer 
fra kun 8 universitetsuddannelser og det store flertal klumper sig sammen i helt bestemte områder. 
Magteliten foretrækker særligt at bo nord for København tæt på skov eller vand. Magtelitens lukkethed 
vises ved, at færre end en ud af  fem – 19 % - er kvinder og at den sociale rekruttering er meget skæv. 94 % 
af  de fra magteliten, vi kender den sociale baggrund på, kommer fra samfundets mest privilegerede 20 %. 
Og mere end dobbelt så mange har forældre nævnt i Blå bog, som der kommer fra de resterende 80 % af  
den sociale rangstige. Med andre ord bindes kernen af  magtnetværket ikke blot sammen af  deres tætte 
netværk, men af  at dele livsstil og erfaringer. De udgør, trods de interne modsætninger, en sammentømret 
gruppe, der koncentrerer magten indenfor kongeriget på få hænder. 
Studierne af  de danske topdirektører, inderkredsen i dansk erhvervsliv samt de største virksomheder viser 
altså samstemmende at en meget lille gruppe koncentrerer og akkumulerer en voldsom mængde ressourcer 
helt i toppen af  det danske samfund. Denne gruppe er på kryds og tværs bundet tæt sammen i et 
vidtforgrenet netværk. Kernen i dette netværks sammenhængskraft øges af  den store lighed – både hvad 
angår livsstil og social baggrund – der findes både blandt topdirektører og i hele magteliten.  
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English Summary 
Who are the members of  the most powerful group in the Danish society? To answer this question, we 
explored the elite through two different methodological approaches. Using correspondence analysis, we 
charted the oppositions structuring two exclusive groups, the 100 most important Danish CEOs and the 
1,527 elite individuals identified in the Danish Power and Democracy Study in 1999. Through social 
network analysis, we identified and explored the integration of  a core of  the power network in Denmark – 
the power elite - and the inner circle of  the corporate elite. 
The importance of  how the elite is defined or identified is discussed in relation with the most widely used 
method for the study of  national elites. With the positional method the size and composition is defined as 
the data is constructed. We propose a new data sensitive method that identifies a cohesive elite with social 
network analysis. This lets us analyse the composition and like C.W. Mills identify the key institutional 
orders in Denmark.  
How you theoretically and methodologically define and measure social distance is crucial when you try to 
analyze or identify groups with social network analysis or multiple correspondence analysis. In a 
correspondence analysis all individuals are given a distance to each other. In social network analysis it is 
very different. Here the social distances are binary, two people are either connected directly or through 
others or they are unconnected and then the distance between them is infinite. This is important for how 
many individuals you can include in your analysis without changing the results dramatically. This is one of  
the reasons social network analysis is very good at identifying an elite, because isolated do not influence the 
detection of  groups. Without this property of  social network analysis we would not be able to use the 
relatively large and inclusive dataset, The Danish Elite Network, to identify the elite. 
The first and second articles map the 100 most important Danish CEOs. In Article I, we show which 
career trajectories lead to the top managerial positions, compared with Germany, France and the UK. Four 
typical career paths are identified using cluster analysis: the organisational personnel, the inheritors, the 
experts and the salespeople. Of  these, the last is typical of  Danish business; however, all of  these pass 
through many years in the business world. Like their foreign counterparts, Danish CEOs hail mostly from 
the upper–middle class or the upper class, often from homes in which the father himself  was an executive. 
However, when it comes to types and level of  education across countries, the top managers are very 
different. This suggest that it is more important to fit into the national business culture than to have 
qualifications and experience useful in management across countries. 
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The status and prestige of  the top CEOs are charted in Article II. High status levels are tied very closely to 
whether or not the manager is invited into the network, tying them to other parts of  the power elite. Such 
status takes the form of  media coverage, royal recognition in the form of  decorations and invitations to 
royal balls, and leadership prizes. Even among the top 100 CEOs, there are substantial differences in the 
levels of  prestige and the degree of  connections to other powerful individuals. 
The association between network ties and status highlighted the need to further explore the Danish power 
network. A large database was constructed from 5,322 affiliations, with 62,841 positions held by 37,750 
individuals. The database contains corporate boards, boards and subcommittees in organisations officially 
recognised by the state, boards of  state institutions and commissions, foundations boards, other networks, 
and events such as royal balls. The database is described in depth in Article V. 
Article III describes how, from the positions on the boards of  the 1,037 largest Danish corporations, we 
identified an inner circle of  the Danish corporate elite corresponding to Michael Useem’s inner-circle 
concept. We identified 171 individuals sitting not only in the central positions in the Danish corporate 
world, but also frequently in other prestigious or powerful networks, such as business organisations; state 
committees; boards of  education, research or culture; exclusive networks such as the groups under the 
Danish Management Society (VL); foundations; and royal events. The inner circle are similar to the top 
CEOs in having prestigious social backgrounds, the same narrow educational profile, and sharing lifestyles. 
This leaves this group with every possibility of  being the politically active part of  the capitalist class. 
In order to identify the power elite in Denmark we develop, in article 6, a new method that uses k-core 
decomposition. The analytical strategy makes it possible to approach the size and composition of  the elite 
empirically. By including all potentially powerful networks and developing weights to handle the 
heterogeneity of  these diverse networks – ranging from the serious atmosphere of  the corporate board 
meeting to the splendour of  the royal ball – the core of  the network is decided not by the researchers’ 
preconceptions and assumptions about the nature of  power, but by who actually interacts most frequently 
in the power network. In this way a power elite of  423 individuals are found in the core of  the power 
network. 
These 423 individuals and their networks are charted in the Article VII. First, we show how, for all of  the 
sectoral networks, central positions in one of  the sectoral networks (e.g. central state institutions and 
committees) leads to central positions in other sectoral networks (e.g. unions). Furthermore, central 
positions are accumulated by a very small group. When looking at the composition of  the power elite, 
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more than half  come from either business or business associations. However, also part of  the core of  the 
power network are union leaders, senior civil servants, politicians – especially those with leadership 
positions such ministers or mayors – and scientists, especially university principals and economists. The key 
actors in the corporatist Danish state are all present. The juridical system, administrators of  culture, and 
media directors are tiny minorities, whereas the clergy, artists and journalists or other celebrities are 
completely excluded. But not only is affiliation to a certain sector important. By looking at particular 
individuals it is shown how, to become part of  the core of  the elite network, one must play the game of  
the power elite, essentially by accepting the legitimacy of  claims to power of  all the other members of  the 
power elite. Finally, we explore the social characteristics of  the power elite. Almost all of  the 423 hold a 
position of  authority at the top of  an organisation. Close to half  come from just eight university programs. 
The vast majority cluster in the gilded ghettos, in particular near the sea and parks in Northern 
Copenhagen. The social closure of  the power elite is evident in the gender profile (less than one in five 
[19%] are women) and the highly selective social background. More than 90 % of  those in the power elite 
for whom we have social background information come from the most privileged 20% of  society. Power 
elite members who have parents mentioned in Kraks Blå Bog (the Danish equivalent of  Who’s Who) 
outnumber the remaining 80% on the social ladder more than two to one. Thus the core of  the power 
network is tied not only by their interwoven network, but also by shared lifestyles and experiences. In spite 
of  internal differences, they compose a cohesive group that concentrates power in Denmark in the hands 
of  very few indeed. 
The studies of  the Danish top CEOs and the inner circle in Danish business, together with the largest 
corporations and the power elite in Denmark, presented in this disseration all show that a small group 
concentrates and accumulates a large volume of  resources at the very top of  Danish society. This group is 
densely interlocked in a widespread network. The cohesion of  the core of  this network is strengthened by 
the similarities in lifestyle and social background of  the top CEOs and in the power elite as a whole. 
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Introduction: Identifying the elite 
 
Few things are as important to a society as how and by whom it is governed. Countless are the struggles 
over dominance. Few ambitions of  man have made a trail of  more sorrow and suffering than the 
ambitions of  elite families. Most wars have not been the result of  spontaneous sparks of  hatred among 
common folk, but the results of  unmet ambitions of  elite families insulted by power claims by other elite 
families. If  the status struggles become violent, struggles between elite factions can split a society into 
pieces. As Pareto(1991) notes, ‘history is the graveyard of  aristocracies’. No country other than Pareto’s 
Italy could better exemplify that nations rise and fall with their elites. 
Nevertheless, according to Roberto Michels (1949), not all elites go down with a struggle. Incumbent elites 
will often incorporate challengers from competing elites into a united faction, creating an amalgam of  the 
old and the new. The character of  elites is therefore not a given dictated by economic factors, religious 
practices or ethnicity; it is instead the sum of  former struggles. The elite are a mirror of  the particular 
history that formed that particular nation-state. There is considerable national and historic variation in the 
composition and character of  national elites. In China, the communist party is the single, all-dominant 
organisation, from which even the new capitalist class is recruited. In Egypt under Mubarak, a large part of  
society was controlled by the Egyptian army either directly or by former military leaders who were 
appointed to leading positions (Nassif  2013). Hundreds of  years after the social upheavals that gave birth 
to parliamentary democracies in Europe, several European countries are still, formally, monarchies. In 
these countries, it is common that the royal families play central roles in the formation of  elite networks, 
act as contacts to foreign dignitaries and distribute symbolic goods in the form of  decorations. Many of  
the families are some of  the largest landowners in their respective countries. Even in the most modern 
societies in the world we still find nobility, and with it, inheritance of  social status and titles. 
If  competing elites can reach a peaceful agreement in an elite settlement (Burton and Higley 1987), all 
parties may keep some of  their power and privileges while giving room and influence to new members of  
the elite. In modern societies, there may be a tendency towards peaceful elite negotiations and the 
establishment consensually united elites. This can be by general taming of  economic elites, a process first 
described by Gaetano Mosca (1939) and revisited by Jeffrey Winters (2011), in which oligarchs settle 
disputes over land and wealth by way of  law and sack their hired guns, thus accept the role of  the 
sovereign state as the state with the monopoly on legitimate force. However, even if  the wealthy have 
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accepted demilitarisation, according to Winters, they are still the dominant faction within the elite. In the 
long run, wealth is a more exchangeable and reliable form of  power than, for instance, control over the 
mobilised masses. Through lobbyists, charity and structural necessity the wealthy elite are able to influence 
other elites and defend a structure that benefits the class of  the wealthy. 
But the idea of  an elite settlement, an agreement that is written into law and ending periods of  conflict, 
may underestimate the importance of  the day to day struggles over positions and dominance within an 
elite. These conflicts were analysed by Pierre Bourdieu (1996) and conceptualised in the notion of  the field, 
specifically in the field of  power. In the field of  power, agents from diverse fields struggle over the 
exchange rate of  their forms of  capital. The struggle over how much influence and privilege their specific 
resources are worth vis-a-vis the other elite members slowly changes the state of  the field and thereby, how 
and by whom society is dominated. 
Bourdieu was wary of  the ‘naive’ question of  who rules (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996), as it is the study 
of  populations instead of  positions within a structure. By studying the structure and positions within a 
field, we can get to the dominant principle of  domination within society and the ways in which it is 
legitimised. But in the same breath, he admits that it is only possible to investigate structure and positions 
in a field by looking at the characteristics of  the individuals within the structure. This places even more 
importance on the definition and selection of  the elite population, as it no longer answers merely who 
rules, but also how they legitimise their dominance. Pierre Bourdieu (1996) relied partially on what is called 
the positional approach in his studies of  elites However, he insisted that fields must be constructed in a 
reflexive process (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and that populations must be defined in a back and forth 
hermeneutic process (Bourdieu 2005:99). In this way, his methodological approach was quite similar to that 
of  C. W. Mills(1956). 
Mills (1956) defined the power elite, a concept similar to Bourdieu’s field of  power (Denord, Lagneau-
Ymonet, and Thine 2011), as the overlapping circles of  the key institutional orders. The central difference 
between the two concepts is the emphasis on actual interaction. The power elite meet, regularly, and 
through these meetings, they struggle over the right to dominance. Mills was criticised for relying on 
interaction in his definition of  the power elite, while in the eyes of  the critics not lifting the empirical 
burden of  showing their unity, for not defining the elite as a group and for not showing how it influenced 
decisions (Dahl 1958). All elite studies that rely on the positional method are vulnerable to this critique. 
Why should we assume that the people the researcher has lumped together in his or her dataset have 
anything to do with each other? 
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Mills did not work within the framework of  social network analysis, even if  he drew on concepts such as 
the social circle, which is within the vocabulary of  social network analysis. Even if  he had, the social 
network analysis of  the 1950s was neither theoretically nor methodologically sophisticated enough to solve 
the boundary specification problem (Emirbayer 1997) at the heart of  the study of  the power elite. Now, 
several decades later, there has been substantial progress in both group detection and centrality measures in 
social network analysis. By identifying the overlapping social circles proposed by Mills, it is now possible to 
use social network analysis to find the power elite. Moreover, this distinct group would be bound together 
by interaction, putting to rest much of  the criticism raised against Mills. 
By identifying the elite and with it, the key institutional orders, it is possible to see the state of  the field of  
power, to see the factions within the elite and examine the elite settlement. Which are the key institutional 
orders? Is there an emerging counter-elite? Is there a dominant faction within the elite? Are the elite 
unified? What is the social character of  the elite? 
When the power elite are defined, you can see their social character. As to the profiles of  the power elite: 
Where are they educated? Where do they live? How many come from elite families? How many women are 
included? What is their lifestyle? Is there a shared culture? 
The social character and how the elite are reproduced is, according to Raymond Aron (1950a, 1950b), one 
of  the central elements in the description of  any society. The change from aristocratic rule to bourgeois 
parliamentarianism is as much a change in social character of  the elite as a change of  constitution. 
Although the composition of  the power elite – its key institutional orders – is related strongly to its social 
character, they are two independent phenomena. First, when the educational profile of  the elite changes, it 
may signal a change in the techniques of  dominance. Second, if  the social background of  the elite is 
becoming more exclusive, even among union leaders, it is because the elite is closing itself  off  (Michels 
1949; Mosca 1939), a process that increases the distance between it and the general public. These changes 
may occur even without a change in the number of  union leaders, politicians and CEOs in the power elite. 
With the small welfare state of  Denmark as a case, this dissertation will attempt to address both questions 
about the composition of  the power elite and the social character of  its members. Three articles investigate 
the dominant fraction of  the dominant class, the corporate elite, within both a field-theoretical perspective 
and a social network analytical framework. From the outset, a new methodology based on social network 
analysis is proposed for identifying the power elite. In the final article, the Danish Elite Network 
comprising more than 5,000 affiliations, 60,000 positions and 30.000 individuals was used to identify a 
central core. The core of  423 people integrates the heads of  the most prominent organisations in 
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Denmark: the prime minister, the CEOs of  the largest corporations, members of  some of  the richest 
families, the union leaders, economists, and Her Majesty The Queen. This core, or power elite, is 
positioned centrally across all sectors within the network and is tightly knit by many diverse ties. The social 
profile of  this group is very exclusive, with a very high representation of  children of  the upper class. These 
findings run contrary to some of  the conclusions of  the most prominent description of  the Danish elite, 
the Danish Power and Democracy Study (Christiansen, Møller, and Togeby 2001; Christiansen and Togeby 
2007). They claimed that the Danish elite are relatively open, with no substantial ties between the sectors 
within the group. This dissertation shows that this description is inaccurate. The power elite have a very 
exclusive social profile and the cross-sectoral ties in the Danish elite are more than substantial. 
Naming and identification of  the elite is the first and most central step in the study of  power within our 
society. The way this is done frames all of  the following descriptions and analysis. Drawing on the 
theoretical frameworks of  Pierre Bourdieu and C. W. Mills, along with multiple correspondence analysis 
and social network analysis, this dissertation hopes to contribute to the methodology of  elite studies and to 
the description of  Danish society by both identifying and describing the power elite and the corporate elite. 
 
Dissertation outline 
In the following section, 'Defining or identifying the elite?', we will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of  
the dominant positional method for studying national elites. We contrast it with a discussion of  both policy 
discussion networks and the method for power elite identification that is proposed in Article 6: ‘The 
methodology of  identifying power elites’. The following chapter: 'Distances', investigates the differences in 
the conceptualisation of  distance within social network analysis and multiple correspondence analysis. The 
differences between the ways in which distance is used forms the basis for a comparison of  the different 
elite populations in this dissertation. The third chapter, 'Data and craftsmanship', looks at the data sources 
available for elite research and how this affects the role of  the elite researcher. The elite researcher is like a 
craftsman, a carpenter who pieces together a dataset from very diverse sources. In that process, he has to 
abandon some of  the traditional virtues of  the sociologist, such as anonymity. The chapter 'So what?',  
looks into some of  the political debates that may be informed by elite sociology and the findings presented 
within this dissertation. 
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Defining or identifying the elite? 
There is a fundamental difference between studies that derive their description of  elite groups from theory 
and studies that derive their description from data. The difference is one of  methodology and 
epistemology. Do we see theoretical descriptions of  an elite, such as those produced by C.W. Mills (1956) 
and Bourdieu (1996), as descriptions that should be reproduced or tested in other contexts? Or do we use 
the concepts as epistemological tools that tease out the particularities within each case? Should we 
investigate the role of  the military with the same thoroughness for the Danish case as in the American 
case? Or should we use the concepts of  key institutional orders more flexibly and expect to see something 
different in Denmark? 
In this dissertation, we do not test theories, but use them as tools and strategies to modify and adapt our 
methods to each particular case. By doing this we hope to create methods and construct data that are 
sensitive to the national particularities of  the Danish case, in contrast to approaches that rely on the 
reproduction of  theoretically derived elites. 
In the following section, we will discuss the dominant method within studies of  national elites, and its 
strength and weaknesses. (For a discussion of  the decisional and reputation approach, see Article 6.) By 
pointing out the limitations inherent in the positional approach, we briefly present the case for a new 
method that is able to produce results that are in line with C.W. Mills’ concepts of  key institutional orders 
and the power elite. The data-sensitive method, based on social network analysis, is able to produce results 
that are comparable across countries and time-periods. 
 
The positional approach 
The positional approach is the most common method of  studying national elites and has been used in 
countries such as Denmark (Christiansen and Togeby 2007), Sweden (Statens Offentliga Utredningar 
1990), Norway (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002), Finland (Ruostetsaari 2013) and Germany (Hoffmann-Lange 
1987). Ursula Hoffmann-Lange (2006:4) describes the process in the following way: 
The positional method starts out from the formal structure of  authority. It implies several steps. 
In a first step, relevant sectors have to be defined. Politics, public administration, business, 
pressure groups, media, and academia belong to the sectors that are mostly considered as being of  
primary importance. The next step involves the decision on the most important 
institutions/organizations within these sectors. They have to be determined according to sector-
specific criteria (e.g. political decision-making authority, organizational membership, capital 
turnover). The third step involves the identification of  top leadership positions within each of  
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these organizations, and the present incumbents of  these positions are eventually selected as 
constituting the elite. 
The researcher chooses the sectors and the ranking principle for each sector. In this way, the positional 
approach is in line with Pareto (Khan 2012). Once the ranking principle has been established, the 
researcher chooses how many organisations from each sector should be part of  the elite. Finally, the 
researcher selects the positions within the organisations that are to be included. Each of  these steps 
requires intense scrutiny and many theoretically informed decisions. 
The Danish case can be illuminating for the difficulties that are inherent in the positional approach. By 
listing some of  the numerous choices that lie in the construction of  the dataset, we will arrive at the 
fundamental problem with the positional approach: Should the church be included in the elite? If  so, how 
many? Only the ten bishops? Should we include leaders of  other religious communities? The health sector 
in Denmark is very large, so should we include leaders of  the largest hospitals? The head nurses? The most 
proficient doctors? If  so, how many doctors? How should they be ranked? By their number of  patients? 
Their number of  scientific articles? Their salary? Should the board of  the hospital be included? The 
chairman or the entire board? Do they have an independent strategy or is it all directed by the state? If  not, 
then what? 
There are no ready answers to these questions and it is reasonable to think that different researchers would 
give very different answers to them. The profusion of  decisions leads to ad-hoc decisions as the researcher 
‘runs out of ’ theory to base decisions on. As a result, differences between studied populations could be due 
to national variation, but they could also be due to theoretical decisions, or worse, ad-hoc decisions. Adding 
to this, similarities between countries could also be explained by conventional thinking among elite 
researchers. If  the included sectors tend to be the usual suspects, then we could fear that substantial 
national variation goes undetected. In a Danish context that could be the relatively large influence of  co-
ops, union-led finance and farmers’ associations. 
It is a virtue of  the positional method that it relies heavily on the formal positions within organisations. In 
this way it is in line with John Scott's emphasis on positions of  command and the crucial role of  
organisations for the elite (Scott 1996), but the question of  which positions to include from each 
organisation is of  great importance, as the sample can easily become both too restrictive or too inclusive. 
If  the population is restrictive, we may miss individuals who are central within the elite because they hold 
several positions, none of  which by themselves would qualify individual for inclusion. These 
multipositional individuals could wield considerable influence, especially as bridges between otherwise 
unconnected sectors. These multipositionals would often be former politicians, CEOs or top bureaucrats. 
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Their connections to other powerful players make them valuable additions to any board, and they are the 
obvious candidates for positions in public commissions. They play an integral part of  the integration of  
the elite. 
Even with this criticism of  the positional approach in mind, there is still good reason to use the positional 
method for studying sub-elites. The differences between the social characteristics of  the different sub-elites 
can be mapped out in a field in which it is possible to identify the primary positions and oppositions 
(Hjellbrekke et al. 2007; Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2009). It is important to be aware that descriptive analysis 
of  the characteristics of  the entire populations should be avoided (Hoffmann-Lange 2006), but the 
questions of  both size and composition of  the elite remain unanswered by the positional approach. This is 
what the social network analytical approach promises to answer. 
 
The social network approach 
Social network analysis has been an integral part of  elite and power studies for a long time (Domhoff  
1978; Scott 1991), used to find the connections between otherwise disconnected elites. In social network 
analysis, the theoretical definition of  the elite lies in the construction of  the network. What counts as ties 
and what counts as nodes? Are the ties binary or do they measure tie strength? Which method for 
measuring centrality or communities is going to separate the elite from the non-elite? 
Within social network analysis, there are several traditions in the study of  elites, of  which corporate 
interlocks studies (Mizruchi 1996) and policy discussion networks are the most important. Interesting 
studies have been conducted on policy discussion networks (Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz 1977), 
where a sample of  respondents identified via the positional method are asked to name the people with 
whom they discuss political issues. People outside the original sample who are named are then included in 
the sample. In this way, the size and composition of  the elite are derived from the data, not as direct result 
of  the researcher’s decisions (Moore 1979). Even with all the merits of  policy discussion networks, the 
methodology is burdened by three flaws that may account for the relatively few studies in this vein. First, 
relying on the participation of  elite individuals in the data collection is a great barrier. They are very busy, 
so it is increasingly difficult to get appointments, and because it is nearly impossible to guarantee 
anonymity, their answers may not always be candid. Second, because ties are between people who discuss 
policy, politicians are naturally central within the network. But there are many other forms of  power and 
influence than that which tries to influence what is generally understood as politics. Within politics, we also 
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find clear hierarchies and only a few politicians are actually influential in forming policies, but in a network 
that focuses on political decisions, lower-level politicians may appear more central than their influence 
justifies. Third, the number of  ties and with it, the density of  the network, is also is a function of  the 
number of  people the respondents are allowed to mention and how many they remember. The size of  the 
elite is therefore in part derived from the length of  the interview or the survey-name generator. 
 
Identifying the power elite 
In Article 6, we propose a new methodology for identifying power elites that includes a data collection 
strategy, a weighting procedure and a group-identification algorithm. The method is described in much 
more detail in that article and the data collection process is described in Article 5: The Danish elite network. 
The primary qualities of  the method are simple criteria for data inclusion, data-sensitivity, lack of  need for 
elite collaboration, reduced number of  arbitrary decisions, comparability, reproducibility and stability. By 
using a method that is able to handle fairly diverse and large amounts of  data it is possible to identify an 
elite that forms the core of  a network that is tied together by interaction. The composition and size of  the 
elite are not defined theoretically by the researcher, but are a result of  the data and the theoretically defined 
weighting scheme. 
There are also weaknesses, of  course. The weighting procedure is a theoretical model of  how integration 
works in groups. The model draws on studies of  the relationship between group dynamics and group size 
(Buys and Larson 1979; James 1951; Zhou et al. 2005). Based on only the number of  people in the 
affiliation and the number of  ties between two individuals, the model is very crude, so it supposes that all 
affiliations of  the same size are integrative in the same way. However, a strength of  this weighting 
procedure is that it can easily be transformed and corrected. For example, the inclusion of  a time 
dimension in the weighting scheme would be fairly unproblematic, given the right data. The weighting 
procedure could take into account how long a tie had been present and how long it had been absent. This 
would not change the procedure fundamentally. However, this might not be the case for other relevant 
types of  ties, most importantly, data on family ties and ownership (Bohman 2012). In the current simple 
model of  social integration, all ties are symmetric and undirected. Ownership, on the other hand, integrates 
more strongly from the owner to the employee than the other way around. Family ties are possibly very 
strong, but there is no way of  knowing if  they are bound by interaction like all the other affiliations. The 
family could be a family in name only. The same applies to ownership. Passive ownership might not 
integrate at all. 
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Even if  the crude weighting scheme is unsatisfying, it has proved itself  sufficient for the identification of  a 
small cohesive group comprised of  a large part of  what in the positional method would be regarded as the 
elite. But the identification of  a group that is both central and cohesive is not the same as a coordinated or 
powerful group. 
 
But do they decide? 
The classic critique of  elite sociology that relies on both the positional method and social network analysis 
is whether the identified groups influence important decisions. It is claimed that having the potential for 
influence and power is not the same as having power and influence (Dahl 1958). Proponents of  the 
decisional approach prefer to identify the elite by following key decisions; those who are able to influence 
the decisions are members of  the elite. Inherent in this line of  thinking is that the elite should dominate 
and members should therefore have their will established before they can be categorised as elite. This is in 
contrast to defining elites by power resources, as through the positional approach and ruling elite theory. 
The debate between people focusing on decisions and proponents of  a ruling elite theory ended in a long 
debate about concepts of  power (Domhoff  and Ballard 1968) that we will not dwell upon. It is the 
difference between potential power and the usage of  power that is essential to the methodology used in 
this dissertation. Can we assume that a person who is central within an affiliation network is using his 
power and winning? 
It is important to note that, whereas centrality is a correlate to social capital (Bourdieu 1986) and therefore 
a power resource, there are less abstract forms of  power in an affiliation network. The affiliations that 
make up the network may be mere social clubs where people network for ideas and contacts, but the vast 
majority of  the networks in corporate interlocks studies and in the Danish Elite Network (see Article 5) are 
far from social clubs. The vast majority of  the affiliations in the network have direct decision power over 
one or several organisations, while others formulate or advise strategies. In addition to their position within 
these affiliations, the individuals who make up the network also have their full-time employment. A 
minority of  the approximately 30,000 people in the network have jobs that are influential at the national 
level, but within the core of  the network this is very common. Therefore, the network is composed of  
influential affiliations and within the core of  the network are people who, in addition to their affiliation 
memberships, have jobs such as professors, CEOs, politicians and lawyers. 
On a similar note, it is important to dispense with a middle-class understanding of  power and decision-
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making. An average middle-class individual may only rarely, if  ever, make decisions of  any importance to 
society. In this sense, power is something extraordinary. This is not the case for the power elite. Decisions 
are part of  their everyday lives and their careers often last decades. Over this period, the influence they 
might have is substantial. Even if  important decisions may go against them, they can still influence a large 
amount of  relatively smaller decisions. 
Although the affiliations that connect the power elite are influential in and of  themselves, efforts across 
affiliations are not necessarily coordinated. Then again, the decisions produced within these affiliations 
are usually supported without dissent – within the affiliation. Hence, there is coordination and 
collaboration between elite members within the affiliations, but not necessarily across affiliations. This 
leaves relatively unanswered the big questions about a shared elite ideology, elite coordination and elite 
efficiency. 
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Summary of the papers 
The summaries of  the papers co-authored with Christoph Houman Ellersgaard are identical to the 
summaries in his dissertation (Ellersgaard in press). The same applied to the shorter summary of  papers at 
the end of  this dissertation. 
1. A very economic elite - The case of the Danish CEOs 
Published as Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman, Anton Grau Larsen, and Martin D. Munk. “A Very 
Economic Elite: The Case of  the Danish Top CEOs.” Sociology 47, no. 6 (2013): 1051–71. 
Taking the 100 most important Danish CEOs as an empirical case, this article shows how the career paths 
of  Danish managers are tied to the specific features of  the Danish economy. However, this does not mean 
that the social backgrounds of  the Danish CEOs are not similar to their German, French and British 
counterparts. Both now and historically, a very disproportionate number of  the managers in industrialised 
countries have come from bourgeois families. 
The educational backgrounds and career trajectories of  Danish CEOs are compared to their counterparts 
in Germany, France and the UK, using the framework of  Michael Hartmann (2007, 2010). Denmark is 
similar to Germany in that no elite universities can be identified, even though the Danish CEOs have a 
very specific educational profile. This can also be explained by the decline of  the Danish elite university, 
the Technical University of  Denmark. However, unlike in Germany, very high volumes of  institutional 
cultural capital in the form of  doctorates are not commonplace among Danish CEOs and university 
degrees do not appear to be the most essential requirement for entering top management. 
As in the UK, CEOs can move to the top by accumulating organisational capital in the corporation. 
Furthermore, as shown by multiple correspondence analysis and cluster analysis, about a third of  the top 
Danish CEOs follow a distinct path as salespeople, working in many enterprises and in sales or marketing 
before reaching top management. 
Theoretically, this article attempts to show the pathway to becoming a part of  the capitalist class through 
many years of  adaptation within particular institutions and organisations. Although elite universities do not 
seem to play a central role in producing a certain habitus, as was the case in the Bourdieu’s (1996) analysis, 
individuals in the few professions allowed to enter management have developed a specific way of  thinking. 
Furthermore, particularly for those not native to, or inheritors in the field, the habitus of  the future CEOs 
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is shaped by many years in the corporate world. Whether they start from the position of  expert or 
salespeople, all must work their way up the corporate ladder and become men of  the firm. In their 
employment, their career trajectories place them close to the values of  the corporation. Adding to this, the 
different reproduction strategies leading to the different career profiles of  CEOs in the above-mentioned 
countries show the arbitrary nature of  the skillsets needed to legitimise management, even in highly 
developed countries. The fact that only two of  the 100 top CEOs are women underline the social closure 
of  the management culture. 
Methodologically, the article uses MCA and cluster analysis to identify the specific forms and combinations 
of  capital important within the field of  management in Denmark. Following the discussion in Chapter 2, 
we base the differences on theoretically specified relations – career path, education and family background 
– and let these relations determine the structure of  the field. From the constructed field, we use cluster 
analysis to explore ideal types of  CEO career profiles. The ideal types – inheritors, organisational 
personnel, experts and salespeople – are derived by following a theoretically informed, descriptive 
approach. The clusters, identified by analysing the reproduction strategies and career trajectories of  the 
Danish managers, are interpreted in relation to the major European industrial societies. Here, the 
particularly Danish trajectory is that of  the salespeople, which has no equivalent in either France or the 
UK. 
2. Status and Integration in the Field of Power of Danish Chief Executives 
Published and translated into English from Larsen, Anton Grau, and Christoph Houman Ellersgaard. 
“Status og Integration på Magtens Felt for Danske Topdirektører.” Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Kultur- og Samfundsvidenskab 2012, no. 2–3: 9–30. 
The top 100 CEOs whose path to the top is explored in Article I, are in Article II explored with regard to 
their current position in the space of  top CEOs. Using Bourdieu’s notions of  symbolic, social and 
economic capital, we identify the internal hierarchy of  the top managers. The first main finding, however, 
is that, even among the top 100 CEOs, not everyone plays in the same field. Twenty-eight CEOs had 
neither participated in other prestigious networks nor been decorated by the Queen, and were thus 
excluded from key sources of  social and symbolic capital. This shows how, even among a very select group 
such as the CEOs of  the largest Danish corporations, it is not sufficient just to hold a commanding 
position to enter the prestigious networks. 
The space of  the top CEOs is explored through specific multiple correspondence analysis. However, the 
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space is highly hierarchical, with one strong principle of  opposition: the total volume of  symbolic, social 
and economic capital. It seems that these forms of  capital are accumulated through the Matthew effect, 
where possession of  capital helps in the further accumulation of  capital. The accumulation of  these forms 
of  capital does not tell only of  internal prestige among top managers; it also tells who is included in the 
field of  power. As for the network strategies of  the top CEOs, a secondary opposition is found between 
owners and managers. Whereas managers principally engage in networks and achieve prestige tied to the 
economic field, owners are more likely to engage with other subfields in the field of  power, having 
positions in academic institutions, on government committees or attracting royal decorations. This shows 
the freedom enjoyed by owners in not needing to legitimise their position in management to the rest of  the 
economic field, thus being able to convert their economic capital in the field of  power. 
The position of  a top manager cannot be understood from personal attributes alone. A central feature of  
the position of  the CEO is the economic strength of  his corporation. Even more important are the 
number of  employees and the symbolic status of  the firm, as seen in the number of  books with the 
corporation as subject. This shows the close relationship between the individual and the organisation or 
institution he or she leads when entering the social sphere of  the power elite. However, the social 
background and education of  the CEO also matters, as shown in the typical educational profiles of  the 
inheritors and the managers who feature in the core elite network identified in Article VII. 
Of  the CEOs studied in Article I, 46 were also identified as members of  the power elite in data five years 
later, in Article VI. Of  these, 42 appear among the 72 active CEOs in this analysis (for more on the 
relationship between the two analysis, see Larsen in press) As this article was written before the work for 
Articles III, V, VI and VII, the concluding remarks lay out the reflections leading to the research design of  
these articles by speculating on the size of  a potential power elite in Denmark. 
3. The Inner circle revisited – the case of an egalitarian society 
Co-authored with Christoph Houman Ellersgaard 
Submitted to Social Forces 
Michael Useem’s notion of  the Inner Circle (1984) proposed a key solution to understanding how the class-
wide rationality of  the capitalist class functions. By using the networks created in the interlocks of  top 
corporate boards, Useem argued how the dominant faction of  the economic elite in fact constitutes a 
social group. With this notion as a point of  departure, in Article III we explore whether or not a similar 
group can be identified in a very different setting, that of  egalitarian, corporatist Denmark. 
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Methodologically, the article also offers a new methodology for identifying the inner circle, one that is not 
solely based on numbers of  board memberships. By using the proximity measure developed for identifying 
social circles by Alba and Kadushin (1976) we identified the inner circle of  the Danish corporate network, 
which is in line with Useem’s theoretical and qualitative observations. An exclusive group of  171 inner-
circle members was found among the 6,154 executives and board members from the 1,037 largest Danish 
corporations. 
The presence of  this group and the heavy accumulation of  network centrality in the corporate network 
does indeed suggest the existence of  an inner circle in Danish business. But central positions in the 
corporate sector do not come at the expense of  inclusion in the networks of  other sectors (described 
thoroughly in Article V). On the contrary, inner-circle members are much more likely to participate in all 
other sorts of  powerful networks, in particular the most prominent of  these networks, than any other 
group in the corporate network. The inner circle is disproportionately active in the boards within business 
associations, the state councils and committees, the scientific and academic institutions, and the boards of  
cultural or media institutions. These boards each constitutes the most important positions in other 
subfields within the field of  power. Furthermore, social clubs and symbolic institutions such as 
foundations and royal balls constitute key networks integrating the entire elite. The inner circle thus also 
constitutes the politically active faction of  the capitalist class. Thus the inclusion criteria for the inner circle 
in some ways parallel the inclusion criteria for the field of  power. 
Much like the top managers described in Articles I and II and the power elite described in Article VII, the 
members of  the inner circle are a very select social group, of  whom more than three out of  10 have a 
known social background and grew up in the managerial class. When it comes to education, as for the 
power elite as a whole and the top managers in particular, the same select few programmes in business 
administration, economy and engineering dominate. Although women are over four times more likely to be 
included in the inner circle than in top management, they remain a tiny minority of  only 8 per cent. We 
argue that the cohesion and class consciousness of  the inner circle are further enhanced by the similarities 
in social origin, educational position and occupational trajectory. 
Of  the inner-circle members, 30 were also among the 100 CEOs analysed using data from five years earlier 
in Articles I and II. Of  these, only five were not among the 72 CEOs analysed as active individuals in the 
field of  top CEOs in Article II. Ninety-two of  the inner-circle members were also part of  the power elite 
found in Article VI; therefore, 106 of  the power elite members from the corporate sector were not part of  
the inner circle. This reveals one of  the weaknesses of  this study: that it uses only the ties made on 
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corporate boards, ignoring the multitude of  other affiliations that tie the corporate elite internally as a self-
conscious class. This means that the identification of  the inner circle can be somewhat inaccurate. 
However, because we explore the activities of  the inner circle in these other networks, the use of  position 
to identify ties in these networks would risk becoming a mere tautology. 
4. Who listens to the top? Integration of the largest corporations across 
sectoral networks 
To be submitted. 
Whereas the other articles in this dissertation focus primarily on the position and character of  the elite 
individuals, this article focuses on the organisational underpinning of  the network. Article IV asks the basic 
question: What characterises the corporations that are successful in integrating across sectors? This 
question is important as focusing on the individual could lead to the fallacy that the individual 
characteristics of  the director determine the extent of  its network. Although manners, tastes, education 
and the right pedigree are without doubt important factors for elite integration, they can only explain a 
fraction of  elite integration. Although it is impossible to discern how much of  a director’s connections 
should be attributed to his or her success or to the success and prominence of  the corporation that he or 
she leads, this study shows that cross-sector ties are made primarily by chairmen or directors of  the 250 
largest corporations. 
The important characteristics of  the corporations were investigated by integrating the network of  
interlocking directors of  the top 1,037 largest corporations by turnover and the affiliation network of  
seven sector networks. Inclusion in these networks (the networks of  business organisations, interest 
groups, science and education, culture, the state, royal events and affiliations, and leadership) was analysed 
within the field-theoretical framework of  Neil Fligstein (1996a). Fligstein proposed that the large 
corporations try to influence the written and unwritten rules that govern their fields (or markets) in order 
to stabilise the field and avoid competition. It is claimed that incumbent firms are the most active and 
organised and therefore are the most active in cross-sector networks. It is also shown that the position of  
the corporation within the economic field, its ownership, and the relationship of  the corporate owners to 
the field of  power are central to understanding cross-sector ties. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
symbolic capital of  being one of  the most honourable and prominent firms is more attractive to network 
partners than being an unknown corporation. 
The results show a single, fairly exclusive component of  475 corporations in the network of  interlocking 
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corporations. The seven other sector networks are generally more inclusive. The core of  the corporate 
network (well-connected corporations) is dominated by incumbent firms and also holds a large number of  
cross-sector ties. These corporations form the organisational underpinning of  the inner circle, found in 
Article III. Correlations between turnover and the number of  sector memberships held by the boards of  
directors show that, across all sectors, the correlation between size and integration is strongest among the 
top 250 corporations. This indicates that the economic field in Denmark is split into two classes, with the 
top 250 corporations well-organised in the corporate sector and holding many ties across sectors. But it is 
not only size that matters. Corporations tied to finance and the co-op movement are also more likely to be 
well-connected, having owners who are strongly tied to the most important sectors in the Danish 
economy: unions, the state, and business organisations. Those same sectors are identified as the key 
institutional orders in Article VII. The antitheses to these corporations are the subsidiaries of  the Global 
500 corporations, who are less integrated across all sectors. The role of  symbolic capital is investigated by 
way of  regression analysis. There are differences in the influence of  indicators of  economic and symbolic 
capital across the different sectors, but symbolic capital is important in all sectors. The integration of  
corporations in culture, the state and royal affiliations relies more heavily on symbolic capital than on the 
corporate network and business organisations. The independent effect of  symbolic capital indicates that 
the status hierarchy in the economic field is based not only on economic strength but on prestige and 
prominence. 
5. The Danish elite network 
Co-authored with Christoph Houman Ellersgaard 
Submitted to Connections 
This article serves a dual purpose. First, it gives an in-depth description of  the data used in article III, VI 
and VII. Second, submitting the article to the journal Connections allows us to share the data with scholars 
around the world. The dataset have the specific focus, explored in Articles VI and VII, of  identifying the 
core of  the elite network in Denmark. All potentially powerful or elite integrating networks were collected 
by applying an inclusion principle. However, as argued, all of  these networks have also had to provide 
complete lists of  attendance and take the form of  physical gatherings, thus being tied to the integrative 
effects of  interaction rituals discussed earlier. The sources and procedures of  gathering such extensive data 
are discussed. 
This article accounts for how we have identified and registered all potentially powerful Danish affiliations: 
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the largest Danish corporations, the most important state institutions, and organisations recognised 
politically by the state and other potentially powerful or integrative networks such as social clubs or royal 
events. Furthermore, we present the procedure for enhancing the reliability of  the data through checking 
for overlapping or embedded affiliations, and the name-matching procedure. 
As shown in Article III on the inner circle of  the Danish corporate network, where an inner circle (Useem 
1984) in the network of  corporate interlocks is identified through the use of  the proximity measure 
defined by Alba and Kadushin (1976), it is also possible to analyse smaller sub-networks within the Danish 
elite network or the role played by different organisations within the elite network. Indeed, the data have 
already been used by our students in various analyses at courses held at the Department of  Sociology, 
University of  Copenhagen. Sharing the data and the R software codes used to perform our analysis and 
weighting procedures, constitute an important step in generating democratic access to the study of  the 
elite. Furthermore, the reproducibility of  the analysis is thus greatly enhanced by this technical article. 
 
6. The methodology of identifying power elites 
Co-authored with Christoph Houman Ellersgaard 
To be submitted 
The central aim of  this paper is to provide a methodology to identify power elites. Based a notion of  the 
elite as central individuals across power networks, we provide a way to identify the core group of  the elite 
networks based on empirically observed affiliations, rather than by defining the elite a priori. The 
traditional ways of  identifying elites through the positional, reputational, decisional and related methods all 
rely on ad-hoc decisions based on the researcher’s assumptions. These ad-hoc decisions determine the size 
and composition of  the elite, which, as shown in Article VII, are actually key features of  the power elite. 
This article proposes and tests a three-step procedure for identifying the elite. The first step is to determine 
the composition of  the elite empirically, by constructing a large database (see Article V), using an inclusion 
principle. Using this principle, all potentially powerful or socially integrative elite networks were taken into 
account. 
The second step suggests using two types of  sociometric weights to account for the huge variations in the 
character of  the included affiliations, from the intimate decision-making atmosphere of  the corporate 
boardroom to the splendour of  the royal ball. The first and most important weight used a baseline 
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gathering size of  14, below which gatherings are regarded as equally integrative. From this point, the 
integrative effect of  affiliations gradually drops due to the weight. As the number from which the 
integrative effect drops is set to a weight constant, the effect of  altering the constant is tested, showing that 
the size of  the core group, logically, is enlarged as the effect of  the weight diminishes, but that the core of  
the network continues to be part of  the core. A second weight, reducing the effect of  sharing multiple 
common affiliations, was applied as well to reduce the effect of  some types of  organisations having 
densely interlocked multiple governing bodies. 
In the third step, the core group of  the elite is identified using k-core decomposition developed by 
Seidman (1983), by reinterpreting the extension made by Doreian and Woodard (1994). Looking not only 
at the direct contacts of  elite members, but also at their extended network, individuals within a certain 
reach are deemed to be connected. A power elite core of  423 individuals was identified, each of  whom was 
connected to at least 199 of  the other core members. There was no subgroup with a higher minimum 
number of  internal connections in the network. Each individual was given a coreness score that is the level 
at which it is peeled from the core. This number of  minimum degrees makes it possible to identify 
different levels of  power elite integration. The main advantage of  using k-cores is that it does not take into 
account all the included affiliations who turn out to be of  lesser importance. The size and composition of  
the elite network are thus practically independent from the number of  redundant networks included, 
allowing this to bypass many of  the ad-hoc decisions of  the four traditional methods of  identifying elites. 
The approach was tested in several ways. Results were compared to a population selected through the 
positional method, showing that many, but not all, key leaders are included, especially those from 
organisations, academia, business, politics and state administration, while the wealthiest, the clergy and the 
media are often excluded. The consequences of  not including data from each data source were also 
explored. The consequences of  excluding both central and peripheral networks were then tested. The 
method is very resilient to losing affiliations from the periphery, but is fairly vulnerable to losing central 
affiliations that connect many within core. Finally, the consequences for the size of  the power elite were 
tested by altering the affiliation size at which the weight takes effect or by altering the reach needed to be 
included in the core, showing how enlarging these enlarges the core size, thus underlining the importance 
of  sound theoretical arguments determining these constants. However, if  the arguments are valid, the size 
and composition of  the elite can shed light on central aspects of  society. 
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7. The power elite in the welfare state – key institutional orders of the power 
networks in Denmark 
Co-authored with Christoph Houman Ellersgaard 
To be submitted 
 
By reinterpreting C. Wright Mills’ notion of  the power elite (1956), the key representatives of  each societal 
sector are identified within the core of  the power network in Denmark. The power elite are characterised 
by three points: by simultaneously holding top positions in their respective institutional hierarchies; by 
having power resources valued by agents from other institutional hierarchies; and by forming a cohesive 
group tied by multiple shared affiliations. We argue that the composition and size of  this group reflects the 
relative importance of  different institutional orders and the concentration of  power within the limits of  
the nation-state. 
Using the methodological strategies developed in Article VI, we identified a core of  423 individuals. This 
core enjoys all the accumulative advantages associated with having large quantities of  social capital and 
status. This means that selection to the potentially powerful networks is skewed heavily towards those elite 
who are already-established, suggesting that egalitarianism is not a criteria when selecting decision-makers, 
even in a society heralded as having one of  the best practices of  state-building. This is also seen by the fact 
that members of  the power elite – and of  the most central boards in each sector – are invited to the central 
boards in networks of  other sectors. This logic of  inclusion in the network was explored, showing how the 
core is composed of  individuals who have affiliations in many different sectors, typically the most 
prestigious networks in these sectors. This shows the importance of  accumulating convertible capital and 
explains why media celebrities and artists are not part of  the power elite in Denmark. 
Even though they are tightly connected, this elite group in the twenty-first century Scandinavian welfare 
state includes leaders from the key institutional orders: business, state and politics, and unions, whereas the 
academic world, in particular economists, are among the few outsiders. Other sectors that could be 
perceived as being part of  the establishment, such as law, culture, media and the clergy, all have marginal 
positions at best. More than half  (221 of  423) of  this elite have a primary position in either the corporate 
sector or business associations, underlining the strength of  big business. The individuals in the core with 
ties to the corporate sector are to a large extent the same individuals identified as the most prestigious 
inside the economic field in Article II and in the inner circle of  the corporate network in Article III. 
32 
 
 
While spanning very different organisation, the power elite are integrated by factors other than their shared 
ties. The 423 have a homogeneous social profile based on, for example, gender, class background, 
education and residential patterns. For instance, less than 20% are women. The more elite individuals (15% 
–12%) are among the 0.2% of  Danes who have parents mentioned in Who’s Who, unlike the 81% coming 
from the working classes. Almost half  have attended just eight university programs (e.g. economy, law or 
political science) and the elite cluster in particular affluent areas around northern Copenhagen. This 
strengthens the cohesion and class consciousness of  this elite minority. 
We argue that the 423 core members of  the power elite are a committee for managing the affairs of  the 
power elite as whole. We discuss how the limits of  influence of  a national power elite such as the Danish 
may be narrowing because of  the rise of  transnational capital and the European Union, but the structure 
of  the power elite still reveals insights into which institutions have had the historical strength to become 
part of  the inner circles of  power. 
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Chapter 1: Distances 
The different methods that are used in the articles in this dissertation present, among many other things, a 
progression from one way of  thinking about distance in the first article, to a rather different way in the last. 
There is a movement from the distances in a field produced by multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to 
social network analysis (SNA) with its very different way of  dealing with social distance. In an MCA, all 
individuals and categories have a distance from each other, whereas distances in an SNA are very different. 
In SNA, unconnected individuals are separated by infinite distances. This and other differences between 
MCA and SNA and some limitations of  MCA are discussed in this article. We then discuss the progression 
evident in the shift in methods from Article 3, about the inner circle in the corporate network, to Article 6, 
where a new methodology for elite identification is presented. Both are within the social network analytical 
framework, but where Article 3 measures the social proximity between individuals (How many of  the people 
that I know do you know?), Article 6 measures social distances as the number of  people I need to go through 
to get to you. We will examine the arguments for and against both measures. Finally, we will compare the 
three different elite populations that are analysed in this dissertation: the top 100 CEOs, the 171 members 
of  the inner circle and 423 members of  the power elite. 
These discussions that circle around the concept of  distance are a way of  digging into the methodological 
issues at the heart of  the group identifications, but they are also describe the discussions that are at the 
heart of  descriptive sociology. How do we present the social world in the images we produce? What is the 
way the methods approach relations and how does it affect the groups that we identify? 
Relations in MCA and SNA 
This thesis has relied primarily on SNA and MCA. The two types of  analysis share many similarities. They 
are both descriptive in nature. They deal with relations and study structures. In this way they are different 
from substantialist approaches (Emirbayer 1997), where the individual and his or her properties are stable 
regardless of  their position in a greater structure. When MCA and SNA are mainly used descriptively it 
means they are used neither within a framework where the researcher tests clear hypotheses nor in 
simplistic models. In a simplistic model, the researcher reduces the analysis and categories used to the bare 
minimum to convey a clear answer to a hypothesis. It is, on the other hand, a virtue for descriptive analysis 
to handle and convey complexity and particularities within the data. This is especially the case for MCA, 
which is able to convey information on the relationships between a large set of  variables at once. In an 
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MCA you are allowed to have very specific and detailed information on, for example, the specific university 
program, such as economics at the University of  Copenhagen. In a regression analysis this level of  detail is 
hard to convey. Because detailed description is important, MCA and SNA rely heavily on graphical 
presentations. These enable both academics and non-academics to construct and participate in the 
interpretive narrative of  the analysis. Rather than testing non-intuitive models, graphs produced by both 
methods tell stories. 
Because they deal with the relationships between individuals or properties, MCA and SNA are relational 
(De Nooy 2003). In MCA, the position of  a category is defined by the correlation of  all other categories so 
that the category is understood not only in relation to the individuals in it but also in relation to all other 
categories. In SNA, the ties between individuals create a structure that forms the basis for several 
descriptive techniques, such as centrality measures (Freeman 1979), role structures (White, Boorman, and 
Breiger 1976) and clustering algorithms (Palla et al. 2005; Scott 1991). These techniques are informed by 
the total network structure and the position of  all individuals changes along with the smallest change in 
connections between individuals. Recently, the two methods are increasingly used together. Some 
researchers use centrality measures from SNA as supplementary or active variables in MCA analysis 
(Bühlmann, David, and Mach 2012), whereas others use MCA coordinates for SNA plots (D’Esposito, De 
Stefano, and Ragozini 2014). In the articles in this thesis the two methods are not used together. This is 
because the data requirements for such an analysis are considerable and two different populations are 
analysed. 
There is a progression in the way the two methods have been applied in the articles: MCA has been used 
on data collected with the positional approach; and SNA has been used for group identification. 
In the first article, ‘A Very Economic Elite’(Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Munk 2013), the analysis used is a 
specific MCA paired with hierarchical cluster analysis. The clustering algorithm identifies four distinct types 
of  career patterns among the top 100 directors in Denmark. The second article, ‘Status and Integration in 
the Danish Field of  Power Among Top CEOs’ (Larsen and Ellersgaard 2012), is based solely on specific 
MCA. Here, the use of  supplementary variables allows for an analysis of  the relationship between 
characteristics of  the CEO and the corporation that he or she heads. In the third article, ‘The Inner Circle 
Revisited’, SNA in the form of  a measure of  social proximity (Alba and Kadushin 1976) is paired with 
hierarchical clustering for the identification of  the inner circle of  the corporate network. In Article 4: ‘Who 
listens to the top? Integration of  the largest corporations across sectoral networks’, SNA and regression 
analysis indicate the relationship between characteristics of  the corporation and ties between the corporate 
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network and other sectors. In Article 6: ‘Identifying power elites – a social network analytic approach’, we 
use SNA in the form of  a k-core clustering algorithm on a weighted network to identify the size and 
composition of  the power elite. In Article 7: ‘The Power Elite in the Welfare State’, we use SNA to 
investigate the characteristics of  the power elite and their role in the entire network. 
There is a progression in methods from the first article to the last, but the most central change is from 
Article 3, about the inner circle, to Article 6, where a new method for elite identification is presented. We 
move away from hierarchical clustering and on to the k-core decomposition algorithm. This transition is 
based on several properties of  the methods that will be discussed in one of  the following sections. Central 
to the difference between the two methods is how the two methods understand the distance between two 
individuals. Distance and its relationship to similarity is also at the heart of  some of  the limitations of  
MCA. These limitations are of  some importance to the social imagery produced by the sociologist. 
Similarity, the masses, elites and the limits of MCA 
Sociology, especially descriptive and relational sociology, is focusing increasingly on the social imagery it 
produces, most importantly in its statistical graphics(Healy and Moody 2014). One of  the central appeals 
of  the MCA approach is its ability to produce dense and informative plots of  both categories and 
individuals (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). When looking at analysis of  the entire social space (Bourdieu 
1984), or the social space of  a local community (Prieur, Rosenlund, and Skjott-Larsen 2008), readers can 
try to position themselves in the space. This exercise is an example of  how sociology might combine the 
biography of  the individual with the social structure (Mills 1959; Savage 2013), but the approach has its 
limitations when it comes to elite research because unless the dimensions become unbalanced, the 
distances in the space have to be relatively small. 
Multiple cluster analysis can only handle data where the individuals are fairly equal. If  they are not equal 
then the relatively deprived tend to concentrate and the cloud of  individuals becomes skewed into a 
horseshoe-like shape (Baccini, Caussinus, and de Falguerolles 1994). In Bourdieu’s terms, the individuals 
must be playing on the same field (Lebaron 2009); then, only one dimension is present and the differences 
within the elite disappear. Often, this is assumed to be the result of  missing data on that which 
differentiates at the bottom of  the field, but that assumes that the bottom of  the field has a set of  ‘counter 
cultures’ with their own patterns of  recognition. This may be the case for some fields, but it runs contrary 
to the general theoretical framework of  elite sociology, which has a differentiated elite and a homogeneous 
mass that makes up the vast majority of  society (cf. Mills 1956). From this perspective you would assume 
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that power and capital accumulate exponentially and are fairly correlated. You would therefore assume that 
the bottom of  any specific elite subfield would most resemble the general masses and that they would not 
be as differentiated as those at the top of  the field. But studies of  the entire elite or the field of  power are 
less likely to be affected by this because there is a larger diversity in the forms of  capital (for examples see: 
Denord et al., 2011; Hjellbrekke et al., 2007)  
If  enough of  the those most similar to the masses are included in the analysis, MCA cannot distinguish 
within the top stratum. This problem arises very quickly, as can be seen by the analysis of  the composition 
and concentration of  symbolic capital among the top 100 CEOs in the Danish economic field. Figure 1 
presents two clouds of  individuals based on the dimensions found in Article 2. The strongest dimension, 
presented vertically, is the total amount of  symbolic capital in the field of  power. The second dimension 
shows the distinction between owners and directors. The map A includes all of  the top 100 CEOs 
according to corporate turnover. The map B has excluded the 28 CEOs who have no indicators of  
symbolic or social capital. They are all positioned at the centre and below origo. By removing those 28 
CEOs, the distance in strength between the two dimensions is reduced from (61% - 15%) 46% to (46% - 
22%) 24%. 
FIGURE 1. POPULATION SIZE AND CLOUD SHAPE 
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The second solution is by far the most balanced. Even though the interpretation of  the two analysis is the 
same, it is the preferred solution. The density lines in the two maps are fairly different, which shows the 
differences in the shape of  the two clouds. Map A has a large concentration below origo, whereas map B is 
more dispersed and ‘round’. Several things can be learned from this exercise, but first and foremost is that 
MCA is able to produce dimensions that have very stable interpretations. Secondly, we learn that the 
differences in symbolic capital among the top 100 CEOs are so large that the bottom third are completely 
excluded. This underlines the importance of  very strict selection criteria for the definition of  elite 
populations. If  the differences in this select group of  100 CEOs are too large, then it is very difficult, if  
not impossible, to analyse the entire social space and still keep the most distinctive variables active. This is 
clearly the case, as the amount of  individuals who hold the most privileged properties account for less than 
1% of  the population. This collides with the methodological rule that any category (or modality) must be 
held by 5% of  the analysed population (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004:216). 
The elite researcher then must choose between creating a plot of  the entire social space without defining 
the most distinctive variables as active, or perform a separate analysis of  the top of  the field. Both of  these 
solutions reduce the readers’ ability to place themselves within the social structure, to measure on paper 
how far or how close they are to the elite. 
Distances in a field and a network 
The concept of  social distance plays a important role, theoretically and especially methodologically, in all 
of  the articles presented in this thesis. There are two types of  distance: a distance of  properties in the 
social space and a distance in chains of  interaction and integration. The distance in the social space, like 
that described above, comes from a Bourdieusian framework but also has roots in classical elite theory. 
Mosca, for example, referred to the gap or distance between the social types of  the elite and the general 
population (Mosca 1939). We find this concept of  social distance in the analysis of  the social character of  
the top career patterns of  the CEOs, the inner circle and the power elite in Articles 1, 2, 3 and 7. The 
difference between the characteristics of  the general population and the elite group is deemed to indicate 
the degree to which the elite is closing itself  off. The longer the distance, the more different are the elite 
and the general population on almost all parameters, from attitudes to life chances (Bourdieu 1984), even if  
the extent of  this relationship in elite populations is debated (Edinger and Searing 1967). Interestingly, the 
distance between social categories such as class can also be thought of  in network terms (Beshers and 
Laumann 1967). 
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This sense of  social distance is the heart of  MCA and cluster analysis, as every point and every individual 
has a distance from each other. Individuals are clustered together equally by having or not having 
properties. In SNA, on the other hand, distances are fundamentally discrete. A tie is either present or not 
present and the distance between an individual and an isolated individual is infinite. Even if  ties are 
weighted (Marsden and Campbell 1984, 2012), they fall into categories: 0 equals an infinite distance; and 
more than 0 is a measurable distance. In a large network with a low density, the number of  0s is by far the 
most common. Some methods, like block modelling, use these 0s, or the white space in a matrix, for 
analysing the position within the network and its structure (White et al. 1976). 
Distances differ in their stability. In MCA, distances are stable and it is unlikely that an individual will move 
abruptly from one end of  the space to another. This is because the distance from one individual to all 
other individuals is based on several variables. Furthermore, many Bourdieusian MCAs in elite research use 
variables that rarely or never change conceptually, such as gender, social origin and education. These 
variables create very stable fields. Distances in a social network, on the other hand, are much more 
unstable. If  an isolated individual wins a position on a central and prominent board, that agent’s centrality 
is increased massively from being infinitely isolated to being fairly central. Changes in centrality, especially 
the movement from isolated to connected, are unexplained within a strict SNA framework. Personal 
attributes, habitus and capital composition could account for what in an SNA analysis would be the 
inclusion of  a maverick. Imagine, for example, a person who leaves a group for several years. In those years 
he accomplishes great feats and he brings back visible signs of  his accomplishments. People are thrilled to 
have him back and they are proud to invite him into central positions within the group. From a strict social 
network perspective this movement from a fringe position to a central position seems random and 
unexplained. Within a field-theoretical perspective, however, he was always integrated in the field and he 
accumulated symbolic capital that was then reconverted into social capital. Parts of  the instability and 
randomness of  social networks are a result of  the narrow focus on structure. 
We now turn to a discussion of  the differences in how the methods used in Article 3 and Articles 6 and 7 
conceptualise distance, and the strengths and weaknesses of  both approaches. This leads to a comparison 
of  the results of  the two analysis and how they relate to the analysis presented in Article 2. 
Social proximity 
In Article 3, we identify the inner circle of  the corporate network by hierarchical cluster analysis. Here the 
two forms of  distances are intertwined in the same analysis. First, we identify the largest component of  
linkers, directors with more than one board membership and a tie into the largest connected component. 
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By removing all hangers, individuals with only a single board membership, we remove individuals who by 
definition are excluded from the inner circle as they do not form interlocks between boards. 
Here, distances between linkers and isolates are still infinite. The amount and interconnectedness of  the 
isolates is therefore without consequence for the position of  the linkers. We then produce a proximity 
measure based on the share of  overlap between their 3rd neighbourhoods. This gives each of  the 514 
linkers a distance from each other ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 is a perfect overlap between 
neighbourhoods and 0 is no overlap. This 514 X 514 matrix is then analysed using a hierarchical clustering 
algorithm. The clustering algorithm produces distances that then form the basis for clustering. The 
individuals that are most alike are combined first and then these groupings are combined in a hierarchical 
tree structure until all individuals are combined into a single group. The researcher then chooses the height 
or number of  categories that fits best with the theoretical assumptions. The number of  categories obtained 
from a cluster analysis is decided by the researcher and not derived mainly from the data. In the analysis of  
the inner circle the best group had two properties. It was the smallest group, still holding at least 50 per 
cent of  all ties in the network of  linkers and where no group of  important and notable directors – based 
on our qualitative, informed knowledge of  the field – was left out. This process became much like peeling 
an onion, and stopped if  directors who would be considered inner circle members were peeled off. 
There are several benefits to this approach, but there are of  course also weakness. The first weakness of  
this approach is that the process that identifies the final cluster, the inner circle, requires that the researcher 
is very knowledgeable about the particular field, in this case the Danish economic field. This requirement is 
very difficult to live up to when we are looking at elites who cross several fields, like the field of  power. It 
is probably beyond most researchers’ ability to have considerable knowledge of  the most prominent figures 
within fields as diverse as politics, science, state administration, law, farming, unions, charities, arts and so 
on. 
A second weakness is that when there is no single result from the algorithm it is very difficult to compare 
between countries, periods and fields. Are the differences in size and composition of  the core a result of  
differences between fields or between researchers? 
A third weakness is connected to distance and the size of  data. We should always assume that we have too 
much or too little data in an analysis. The analytical tools should be able to handle this situation and the 
social proximity measure and the hierarchical clustering are fairly stable, but could change if  the size of  the 
data is changed substantially. You could argue the results of  any data-sensitive method should change if  
you double the size of  the data, but that is not the case if  the method is supposed to identify a particular 
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small group that is not a proportion of  a distribution but connected by interaction. 
Social distance 
In order to move beyond the weaknesses in the approach of  Article 3, we moved from social proximity to 
social distance, in a social network sense. The power elite is identified with the use of  k-core 
decomposition (Seidman 1983) on a weighted affiliation network (Doreian and Woodard 1994). The 
weighting procedure emulates social integration, where all ties made by an affiliation are weighted 
according to its size. (For the details of  the weighting procedure, see Article 6.) The weighting procedure is 
necessary because otherwise, large affiliations would dominate the network and they could therefore not be 
included. Specifically, affiliations with more than 14 members are weighted to make weaker ties between 
their members than smaller affiliations. 
This measure of  social integration, which varies from 0.01 to 3.3, is inverted into social distance measured 
in degrees. The social distances then range from 0.3 for the closest connection to 75 for the weakest 
connection. The head of  The Danish Confederation of  Trade Unions (LO), Harald Børsting, and head of  
The Danish Metalworkers’ Union (Dansk Metal), Thorkild Engell Jensen, have a very strong connection 
because they share 12 memberships. Their social distance is 0.3, which means they are almost identical. 
Any person can reach Harald Børsting in one step through Thorkild Jensen if  they have a weight to 
Thorkild Jensen of  0.7. This can be thought of  as a friendship. People with distances below 1 are so tightly 
knit that knowing one part of  the friendship means also knowing the other. This is related to the well-
known ‘forbidden triangle’: if  A has a strong connection to both B and C, then B and C necessarily have at 
least a weak connection (Granovetter 1973). 
The weakest connection or the furthest distance, on the other hand, is between two individuals who are 
only connected by having attended a part of  a royal ball with 2,184 guests. They are so far apart that it 
would be easier to go through 75 people with non-weighted contacts to reach them. In social network 
terms, 75 is a massive distance (Grannis 2010), but this distance is still present and obviously a lot smaller 
than infinite. They are still part of  the same social world, whereas those who have no memberships are not. 
It is unlikely, though, that any individual could have a distance of  74 degrees, considering that most people 
allegedly are connected within 6 degrees (cf. Milgram 1967; Watts and Strogatz 1998). 
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FIGURE 2: EDGE WEIGHTS (SOCIAL DISTANCES) IN ENTIRE ELITE NETWORK 
 
The necessity of  the weighting procedure is illustrated very clearly in Figure 2, where the vast majority 
(91%) of  the 3,500,000 ties between the 37,750 individuals are more than 2 in social distance. This means 
that the majority of  the ties come from the relatively few large affiliations. If  these ties were not 
dramatically weighted down, the density of  the network would rise and the core of  the network would be 
the largest affiliations. Instead, the role of  the large affiliations and the many large distances is that they 
may move a relation on the fringe just a tiny bit closer. Because a distance between two individuals can be 
less than 1, the large affiliations may also bring two already connected individuals closer and thereby also 
connect their neighbourhoods better. 
The social distance weighting of  network ties has some peculiar consequences. Consider persons A, B and 
C. If  the connection between A and B has a weight of  more than 2 and they both have a connection of  1 
to C, then it is easier for A and B to reach each other through C than by talking directly to each other in the 
relatively large affiliation of  60 members of  which they are members. It may seem contra-intuitive that 
someone like A and B, who has a social distance of  only 3 in their direct connection is better connected 
through someone else, C. To account for this we produce an adjacency matrix ranging from 0 to 1. The 
weighting, 1, denotes a relationship where the shortest path between the two individuals is 2.1 or less. In 
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the example of  A, B and C they are all connected because they can all reach each other in two or fewer 
steps. This adjacency matrix is used as the basis for k-core decomposition and as a result, the distances that 
the algorithm uses for the core identification are discrete and not continuous. This transformation from 
continuous to discrete distances is a requirement of  k-core decomposition, but a revision of  the method, 
k-shell decomposition (Miorandi and De Pellegrini 2010), is compatible with continuous distances. 
When the adjacency matrix based on reach values is calculated, the k-core decomposition becomes very 
resilient to the inclusion of  massive amounts of  data. If  more data are included, the peripheral individuals 
will be excluded quickly and will affect only the minimum degree, not the composition of  the core. This is 
evident in Figure 3, where the exclusion of  a substantial amount of  affiliations has no effect on the 
solution. It is only when around 3,000 affiliations have been deleted that there are serious changes to the 
composition of  the core. Interestingly, this tells us that there are approximately 1,000 affiliations 
connecting the core. 
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FIGURE 3: MEASURES OF CORE STABILITY WHEN DELETING THE MOST CENTRAL GROUPS AND WHEN 
DELETING GROUPS FROM THE PERIPHERY, FROM ARTICLE 6 
 
The k-core decomposition has many characteristics that are well-suited for elite studies. Most importantly, 
unlike hierarchical clustering, it has a natural cut point and it identifies a single cohesive group with a clear 
criteria for inclusion. The minimum degree, which is the smallest amount of  degrees within the remaining 
core, can be interpreted directly. In Article 6, the minimum degree is 199, which means that the least 
integrated individual in the core is able to reach 199 of  the remaining core within 2.1 steps. The number of  
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individuals, their character and the minimum degree can all be compared across studies or across sectors. 
Even if  one could argue about the weighting scheme that is applied, the elite identification procedure 
proposed in Article 6 has the strength of  reproducibility. If  another weight is deemed to be better, the 
analysis can easily be adjusted and rerun with the new weight. This is very different from the positional 
method, where it may be very difficult to alter the inclusion principles after the fact. This may place 
researchers in a dilemma where they have to choose between using an obsolete inclusion criteria and not 
being able to compare their results with former research. This problem grows considerably when there are 
no names attached to the data, as in the Danish (Christiansen et al. 2001) and Norwegian (Gulbrandsen et 
al. 2002) power studies. Naming the elite was a clear priority in the development of  the methodology 
proposed in Article 6: The methodology of  identifying power elites. It was important that the results could 
be used in comparative studies, because comparing different sizes and compositions of  elites is potentially 
a very rich source of  knowledge. By comparing different countries and time periods we may be able to 
develop theoretical frameworks that may describe the general characteristics of  elites in a detailed manner. 
This indicates some of  the strengths of  the inclusion principle, described in Articles 5 and 6. When the 
researcher has more than enough data, the problem is sorting out what is relevant instead of  what is 
missing. This way of  thinking about datasets, which is familiar to researchers working with big data and 
registers, makes it comparative research more plausible and lessens the influence of  the researcher’s 
theoretical assumptions, as argued in Article 6. 
Comparing results: The inner circle and the power elite 
But different methods may find the same results, so how do these two methods compare? If  we look at the 
intersection between the power elite and the inner circle we see that, of  the 171 inner-circle members, 92 
(54%) are also members of  the power elite, with its 423 members. Of  the 184 members of  the power elite 
with a primary affiliation in business, there are 78 (42%) inner circle members. This difference in 
population between the two methods is considerable. Although the two groups are close in network terms, 
the boundaries are different. Distance is central to the explanation of  the differences between the two 
methods. The inner-circle approach is unable to include affiliations with a large variation in size and is not 
able to handle weighted ties. As a result, the inner-circle method does not include affiliations other than 
corporate boards, which are only a small part of  the network that combines the business community. But 
the inner-circle analysis has the great strength of  using similar ties and a data source that is easily available 
across countries and time periods, as databases with interlocking directorates are easily accessible. 
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It could also be argued that the differences between the methods in part also reflect an empirical 
phenomenon. It might not be the case that the most central individuals within a sectoral network are 
always included in the power elite, nor is it certain that all of  those who are part of  the power elite from a 
given sector are central within that sector. In Bourdieusian terms, we could argue that some individuals 
have more capital in the field of  power than they have in their own respective fields and are therefore also 
more active in the field of  power. Furthermore, the aim of  Article 3 on the inner circle is to investigate the 
relationship between centrality in the corporate network and membership in networks in other sectors. If  
these sectors were included in the definition of  the inner circle, we would have investigated a tautology. 
Both of  these groups, the power elite and the inner circle are constructed from networks, but how do they 
compare to a positional approach? Article 2, uses a positional sample of  top CEOs, by comparing the 
overlap between these three groups it is possible to discern more of  the differences between the methods. 
In Article 2 it is proposed that the first dimension in the MCA, also presented in Figure 1, is the symbolic 
capital in the field of  power for the 100 top CEOs. We should therefore expect that this dimension should 
correlate with power elite integration and integration in the inner circle. The higher the symbolic capital, 
the more likely it should be that the director is integrated in the power elite. 
FIGURE 4. CORRELATION BETWEEN SYMBOLIC CAPITAL AND ELITE INCLUSION 
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In Figure 4, plot A shows the directors who are members of  the inner circle and the plot B, are the 
members of  the power elite,  painted in black. Of  the top 100 CEOs, 30 are members of  the inner circle 
and 46 are power elite members. It is important to note that the directors’ dataset was collected for 2008 
and the Danish Elite Network, which is the basis for both the inner circle and the power elite from about 
2013. During this period, some of  the prominent owners and CEOs died or resigned and are naturally no 
longer part of  the power elite. In fact, of  all seven managers having a position above 0 on the dimension 
of  symbolic capital, who are not in the power elite, only one is still active. With these reservations in mind, 
there are clear correlations between the status dimension and both inner circle and power elite 
membership. The cloud of  non-power elite members is more concentrated and slightly lower than that of  
the inner circle non-members. This indicates that the correlations between the dimensions in the MCA and 
power elite memberships are somewhat stronger, and that the inner circle is slightly better represented 
among directors than among owners. 
Although there are small differences, the social characteristics of  the three samples are very similar. Social 
background, residence, gender, age and education are very similar across all three populations. This is not 
surprising, given the large overlap between samples, but also indicates that these characteristics do not vary 
greatly with network inclusion, a point which is underlined by the low correlations found between the 
dimensions presented in Article 1 and inclusion in either the inner circle or the power elite. When looking 
at the social character of  the elite the question of  whether using a positional approach or a network 
sampling approach seems to be of  lesser importance, but this might apply only to very exclusive samples 
like the top 100 CEOs. 
The differences between the three methods and samples are substantial, but most important are perhaps 
the differences in comparability between the three methods. The selection of  the top 100 CEOs is easily 
comparable to similar populations in other countries. The inner circle is much harder to compare to other 
similar studies as its identification relies on relatively arbitrary decisions. The method for identifying the 
power elite is designed to be more reproducible and comparable than the inner circle approach, but the 
goals of  the inner-circle article are difficult to achieve via other methods. The power elite approach seems 
to require a fairly dense core, and when affiliations other than the corporate boards are excluded, the 
density in the core drops dramatically. This makes the k-core decomposition less precise. The non-
corporate networks could not be included in the inner circle detection because they would reduce the 
analysis to a tautology. 
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Chapter 2: Data and Craftsmanship 
In this chapter we will look into the sources of  data that the elite sociologist can use to create his or her 
dataset. In order to get the most out of  these very diverse data sources the sociologist should not lean on 
strict methodological rules, but instead, reflexively evaluate each  entry and how it fits into the large dataset. 
Rules and rigour are important because they protect against intellectual laziness and sloppiness, but rules 
should be easy to follow and be bendable when appropriate. In this view, the good sociologist is a flexible 
craftsman who does not follow methodological recipes blindly, even if  he hopes to create analyses that are 
comparable to the works of  others. A rule that might work in one setting is catastrophic in another, and 
the challenge is to see when comparability is saved by deviating from the rules. The selection of  top 
corporations for studies of  the corporate elite is a good example. If  you take the top 100 corporations 
from the raw list of  corporations ranked by turnover, you will find corporations that trade in bunker oil 
and currency speculation. These corporations have massive turnovers but fewer than 20 employees, and 
their headquarters could be a small house in the countryside. They are not part of  the corporate elite in the 
theoretical or common use of  the word, and therefore they should be excluded. This example is simple and 
straightforward, but this is not always the case. The researcher should adjust the guiding rules and produce 
new ones that fit the nature of  the data. But assembling data requires technical skills and tools that let the 
researcher clean, test and explore the data, while also letting others reproduce results. The techniques and 
legal framework around the data collection should therefore also be flexible and inclusive. 
The reward for this flexibility is wealthy datasets full of  descriptive data that can be assembled into rich 
stories, but which may be less suited for tests of  strong claims in the form of  a hypothesis. In the following 
section, we will look at the strength and weaknesses of  the different data sources and the technologies and 
legal framework used in this project. 
Data sources and elite research 
It is well known that the nationally representative survey is unsuited for studies of  small elites (Savage and 
Williams 2008:6). Some studies have successfully used surveys for the study of  small elites (Pappi 1984), 
though the general trend of  falling survey response is a real threat for such studies (Ruostetsaari 2013:264). 
There is some evidence that higher ranked elite individuals are less inclined to participate in surveys 
(Hoffmann-Lange 1987, 2006). The low response rate could be linked to considerable time constraints on 
the part of  the informants, who are reluctant to waste their time, but researchers also report that high-
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profile informants are difficult to access, and that secretaries and personal assistants are considerable 
barriers for the researcher. The classical interview, within an elite context, is also under attack (Jerolmack 
and Khan 2014) 
When studying elites, data sources that do not rely on interviewee collaboration therefore have a 
considerable appeal. It is not surprising, then, that the study of  collective biographies - the prosopographic 
tradition (Broady 2002) - is strong within elite studies. Some of, if  not the most iconic elite studies, use 
biographical data on a collective set of  agents (Bourdieu 1996; Mills 1945; Mills and Atkinson 1945). 
Although these studies are based on relatively small groups, considerable effort was needed to collect these 
data in a time before searchable databases. Thankfully, there has been an enormous jump in efficiency of  
the method of  data collection. But the price for not surveying the elite is of  course that important 
questions about attitudes are practically inaccessible. 
The prosopographic method is particularly well-suited to elite studies, as biographies often include some 
of  the most central variables of  elite studies. For the study of  elite circulation, we often look for data on 
social background, birthplace, sectoral affiliation and a short description of  careers. Biographic data also 
often contain a selection of  affiliations, but these lists of  affiliations are almost never complete. The 
number of  positions that the most prominent elite individuals hold and have held is often too long to be 
included in biographical registers like Who’s Who. The prosopographic method does not rely on a single 
source of  data, such as a biographical register, but is pieced together from a variety of  sources, most 
importantly portrait articles. The datasets are combined by different hooks, such as the name, workplace, 
email, address or family. All of  these things can be used to trace the same individual across databases, 
articles and so on. 
Recently suchservices such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Instagram have become a valuable source 
of  information for the researcher(Savage and Burrows 2007). In this dissertation they have only been used 
on an individual level, but there are application programming interfaces (APIs), back-ends that let the 
researcher access parts of  the data in these services. These APIs opens up for exciting new ways of  
studying the elite. Twitter, Instagram and GoogleMaps let the user extract data on the basis of  geographical 
coordinates. In Article 7, the researchers identify the coordinates of  the primary residence of  the power 
elite. Through the Twitter API it is possible to collect all the tweets that come from a very restricted area 
of  less than 1 km2, like some of  the areas in the upscale suburbs north of  Copenhagen, where power elite 
density is highest. Such a collection of  tweets could, along with other data sources, be useful for cultural 
studies of  the elites, even if  only a fraction of  them are from power elite members. 
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For the articles presented in this thesis we have used a variety of  data sources. They will shortly be 
presented in the following sections, with some very brief  reflections on strength and weaknesses. This 
summary will serve as the basis for a reflection on the more general character of  data in the digital age. 
 
Prosopographical data 
The primary source of  biographical data used in the articles has been the register Kraks Blå Bog,  which is 
the Danish equivalent of  Who’s Who. This register holds approximately 20,000 self-reported biographies. 
Updated yearly, the register has existed since 1910. The current edition holds 8,127 biographies. It is an 
excellent source of  information on social background1, marital status, residence, education, career, 
authorship and even email addresses. The main problem with this data source is of  course that it does not 
include its members on the basis of  the same criteria as the researcher. As a result, it is much more likely to 
find data on those who are more prominent in a general sense, even if  the publisher claims that mention is 
based entirely on merit. Furthermore, because data are self-reported it is vulnerable to the perhaps 
particularly Scandinavian problem of  ‘false modesty’. For instance, the well-known heir of  a billionaire has 
stated that his father was an engineer, which is technically correct, but obscures the fact that the engineer 
was also the founder and head of  a large corporation. In a Danish setting, a privileged social background 
could be deemed sensitive information, and they are often under-reported in sources like Who’s Who (Priest 
1982). 
For the study of  the business elite in Articles 1 and 2, we have used the private database Greens 
Erhvervsinformation, which kindly donated access. This database is very extensive, with 650,000 
individuals. Greens include educational profiles for some individuals within the business community and 
the annual reports of  most Danish corporations. From these reports we gathered information on turnover, 
number of  employees, exports, remuneration of  the board of  directors and top management, and several 
other variables. Annual reports are a very valuable source of  information on the business elite, but they are 
difficult to read and most sociologists are not trained in the implications of  different accounting practices. 
This is most evident when assessing the fortune and profits of  large holding corporations. An interesting 
finding is the variation in the quality of  the annual reports. Publicly traded corporations present well-
designed, high quality publications, whereas other corporations provide only that which is legally required. 
                                                 
 We  thank the editors of  Krak’s Blå Bog for kindly donating data and giving us insights into their editorial process and data 
collection. 
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This says a lot about the role of  the corporation and its conception of  control (Fligstein 1996b). 
The Central Business Register (CVR) register, which is administered by the Ministry of  Commerce, 
contains information on the number of  Danish subsidiaries, company age, sector and most importantly, 
the officially registered address of  all corporations and the home address of  their CEOs and board 
members. This is naturally a valuable resource as the addresses are updated and it allows the researcher to 
find the directors in other databases such as The Public Information Server (OIS). The OIS database has 
information on every address in Denmark. From this we are able to gather information on whether the 
address is a house, an apartment, a farm or a manor, as well as the name of  the owner, the price, its 
development, any debts, the size in square meters, the number of  bathrooms and even if  the house has a 
history of  problems with water in the basement. From the official documents on ownership, it is often 
possible to discern the name of  the spouse of  the researched individual. But because it is only possible to 
search by address and not by name, it is impossible to find all the houses, land and summerhouses that one 
individual might own. Some prominent industrialists are known for collecting large estates, and a 
considerable number of  the haute bourgeoisie have summer houses in the same few select areas. These 
aspects of  the housing practices of  the elite are not available from this source, and are not available in 
Denmark. 
The infomedia.dk database contains most printed articles from all major newspapers and magazines in a 
searchable format. From this the researcher can collect biographies and interviews, but the number of  
articles about a person or an organisation is an interesting variable in itself. Information is also provided 
about the composition of  that number. A corporation may have a strong regional presence, but not a 
national one. Likewise, some corporations have a strong presence in the business press but not in the 
national press. These are of  course very crude measures of  the extent and strength of  a reputation, but as 
Rose and Thomsen (Rose and Thomsen 2004) showed, reputation can be fairly one-dimensional, at least 
within the corporate community. Another measure of  reputation, but also of  academic merits, is the 
number of  publications about or authored by a person. Bibliotek.dk registers the national bibliography, 
which catalogues all written works in Danish or written by Danish authors. All works are tagged by subject, 
which means that biographies are easy to identify. In the Danish context it is fairly rare for a whole book 
dedicated to a single elite individual. Some prominent elite members have had several books written about 
them, whereas others feel compelled to fund and distribute autobiographies (Larsen, 2004). This measure 
of  reputation can be applied to corporations as well. Most publications about corporations are 
dissertations from business and management schools, which means that the number of  books about a 
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corporation is mostly an indicator of  the prominence and reputation a corporation has among young 
business professionals. 
TABLE 1: AFFILIATION NETWORKS INCLUDED (FROM ARTICLE 5) 
 From 
original 
sources 
Excluded* Added in 
snowball 
sample† 
Final no. 
affiliation 
networks 
No. relations 
State1 2,328 1,780 327 875 10,230 
Parliament1 153 101 31 83 970 
NGO1 749 144 922 1,527 16,436 
Corporations2 1,136 34 40 1,142 7,476 
Foundations2 1,380 18 83 1,445 8,181 
VL-Networks3 117 3 0 114 3,845 
Commissions4 116 44 0 72 1,121 
Events5 74 0 0 74 14,582 
 
Total 6,053 2,124 1403 5,332 62,841 
1 Source: Danish Public Administration Database (www.foa.dk) 
2 Source: The list of largest corporations according to turnover and list of all foundations in the Danish Central Business 
Register (obtained through www.biq.dk) 
3 Source: Homepage of VL-networks (www.vl.dk) 
4 Source: Registration of political commissions from November 2005 made by Danish weekly newsletter A4. 
5 Sources: Webpage of Danish Royal Family (www.kongehuset.dk) and private archive of journalist. 
*Affiliation networks were excluded if there was no board with extra-organisational members, no information available on the 
board either online or through personal contact, the board was included from other sources as well, or the board overlapped 
entirely with another board within the same organisation. 
†This includes both sub-committees within the organisations on the original list and the 142 networks obtained through 
snowballing the affiliations of prominent agents. 
 
Network data 
The elite network dataset is based on all of  the sources above, except Greens. Data on the corporate and 
foundation networks were generously donated by biq.dk, and originates from the official register, CVR. 
These data contain all foundation boards and all top 1,000 corporate boards. This gave us 2,587 affiliations, 
with 13,008 individuals and 15,657 positions. But it is extremely important to thoroughly check all 
affiliations for their uniqueness. Many corporations are organised in a holding structure and this structure 
poses a massive problem for the elite researcher. Some corporate holding structures are organised like a 
system of  Russian babushka dolls with subsidiaries embedded in parent companies, and it requires careful 
consideration to determine which position in the holding structure is the most influential or just influential. 
One solution is to take the topmost position in a holding structure, but this is prone to serious error, as 
family-owned corporations in particular frequently have a charitable or passive foundation as the owning 
legal entity, with the most prominent family members having direct control of  the ‘key’ corporation board. 
52 
 
Furthermore, some subsidiaries may be quite autonomous or owned by several parent corporations. This is 
also the case when an organisation has several boards for legal reasons, but the boards have very similar 
membership composition. 
If  you include all levels of  a holding structure the network becomes very cohesive around certain holding 
corporations, but the many levels in the holding structure may never hold individual board meetings and 
therefore do not reflect interorganisational ties. Including too many ties between any number of  
individuals could be a problem, because errors in centrality are contagious (Wang et al. 2012). To test for 
the uniqueness of  a board affiliation we visited the websites of  all corporation boards that had an overlap 
of  80 per cent or more of  their members with any other board. The problem of  identifying the right 
corporation within a holding structure is not only a problem for network analysis, but also for 
prosopographic studies. There are clear differences in the social profile between active and relatively young 
CEOs close to the productive corporations, and the foundation or holding managers, who are often retired 
or withdrawn notables with long corporate careers. 
This problem may seem trivial, but the time consumed by this problem does not scale well and indicates 
that extracting from large databases is a lot of  work. This was possible for the 2,500 affiliations we 
collected, but not for the 1,034,066 affiliations that it is possible to extract from these databases. 
The primary source of  affiliations from the non-corporate world is the now closed public administration 
database,  Common public adresse archive (FOA) (www.foa.dk). This was a state-administrated database 
of  entities, addresses and individuals in the entire public sector. All entities were organised hierarchically 
and organised according to their ministry. For example, all public schools are part of  the Ministry of  
Education. The quality of  the database varies and many entities contain only the name and position within 
the hierarchy and not the employees or elected officials. The database could therefore only serve as an 
initial list of  organisations and state entities from which we could perform small snowball samples of  
affiliations. In Table 1 we see that we extracted 2,328 state organisations and then excluded 1,780 
organisations, as they did not connect externally through a board, commission or similar affiliations. The 
many small snowball samples performed by visiting public websites gave us 327 affiliations not present in 
the FOA register. The FOA also contains a full list of  NGOs with a hearing right or a right to 
representation in public commissions. You could assume from these lists that it is easy to discern whether 
or not an affiliation is controlled or funded by the state, but that is far from easy as the boundaries of  the 
state are more than fuzzy. The only NGO whose director is represented in the power elite is the Consumer 
Council. This entity is partially funded by the state, but runs a private laboratory and gains a large portion 
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of  its funds from members. Other entities are not funded by the state directly but borrow money very 
cheaply from the state, under strict regulation. Examples are public housing projects and museums. This 
raises the question whether or not state-subsidised corporations should also count as parts of  the state, but 
in the Danish context that would basically account for the entire economy. 
The datasets used in this dissertation have all been constructed from these diverse sources and this raises 
the classical questions about validity and reliability. When data are collected for purposes other than 
research, which is the case for most of  the sources mentioned, it is not without its pitfalls. These challenges 
require a reflexive and pragmatic approach to the assembly and construction of  data on the elite. 
 
Limitations of  data 
The possibilities of  large registries and databases within elite studies are reduced substantially by the high 
need for data quality and similarity in both SNA and MCA. When looking at boards it is essential to 
include mainly boards with the power to make decisions and not boards of  holding corporations that are 
of  a completely different nature – often existing only for legal reasons. Some prominent lawyers have 
created and are present on hundreds of  corporation boards, but these corporations are empty shells and 
some exist primarily for tax evasion or other legal purposes. This network of  shell corporations would 
easily become the densest part of  any corporate network (for an example of  the size of  the network see 
Schøtt, 2003) and could distort any descriptive or model-based approach. A network of  shell corporations 
is an interesting network in itself, but it does not correspond well with the networks integrating the elite. 
These considerations and others presented above indicate that the promises of  big data may be hard to 
fully realise within elite studies and that there is a danger in including and using large datasets without 
knowing a large proportion of  the data points. The sociological methods used in the articles presented here 
are not suited for the diversity that is present in the raw and undigested data. Perhaps elite sociology is best 
suited for using inclusive but researcher-validated data drawn from ‘data of  the middle range’. 
 
Reproducible research and the public 
To ensure the quality and influence of  quantitative sociological research it is important to make the 
research reproducible (Freese 2007). The researchers should strive to make all relevant parts of  their 
research process open, from data to code, analysis and result, and to the final works (Stodden 2009). When 
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the research is open and available it is possible for the scientific community to test and improve on existing 
research. For elite research the reproducibility is also a way of  engaging the general public. Datasets and 
analytical results, such as rankings and groupings, can be used by journalists and bloggers. 
But there are barriers within the scientific community. Unlike among economists, there is not, a strong 
tradition among quantitative sociologists for sharing data and code (Freese 2007). Sociologists may have 
very diverse reasons for not sharing data, and the ‘publish or perish’ imperative could give the researcher an 
incentive to keep data to themselves for further publications. But this is not the only barrier within the 
scientific community. Unnecessarily restrictive norms on the publication of  names is a very real barrier for 
replicable science in studies of  small elites. 
 
Open data and code 
The articles included in this thesis all attempt to adhere to the framework of  reproducible research. This 
means that data, software and code are documented and available to the research community under a free 
license (Stallman and others 1991). All datasets used in this dissertation are kindly donated by the 
University of  Copenhagen to the scientific community and the general public under the open GNU 
General Public License. This license lets others freely use these data, but requires that all derived versions 
are provided under a compatible license. This requirement makes it very transparent that no one can 
control access to the data, making it a fruitful platform for collaboration with private firms, between 
researchers and between researchers and students. 
The code that is used for the analysis should also be distributed along with the data, but this requires that 
the code is also under a free license. It could therefore be argued, as Freese (2007) does, that researchers 
should minimise the use of  point-and-click software and instead use scripted languages. Going further, it is 
preferable for the code to be made available under a free license where the analytical algorithms are 
transparent and changeable instead of  under proprietary licenses, which makes it difficult to check the 
quality of  results. If  the analysis is made with software with expensive licenses it may dampen the 
enthusiasm of  both students and other researchers. 
For both SNA and MCA there are very good software implementations. Many of  the recent developments 
within MCA, such as specific and class-specific MCA, can be found in high quality R packages, such as: 
FactoMineR (Lê et al. 2008), anacor (De Leeuw and Mair 2007), ca (Greenacre and Nenadic 2007), and 
GDAtools. R also provides high quality packages for SNA, most notably: Igraph (Csardi and Nepusz 2006) 
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and STATNET (Handcock et al. 2008). The most prominent packages in R for MCA are not directed at 
social scientists but at the much larger audiences of  market research, botanics, medicine and others that 
also make use of  MCA. We wrote the soc.ca package (Larsen, Andrade, and Ellersgaard 2012) in 
collaboration with our colleague Stefan Bastholm Andrade who implemented class-specific analysis (Le 
Roux and Rouanet 2010), which was applied by Ellersgaard (2014) in an analysis of  the political subfield of  
the field of  power in Denmark. The package improves existing software by aiming it directly at the social 
sciences and by implementing the very flexible plotting framework ggplot2 (Wickham 2009). It is hoped 
this package will expand the use of  MCA within a reproducible framework among sociologists with less of  
a tech-fetish. 
The documentation and presentation of  the ‘Danish Elite Network’ dataset is presented in Article 5 and 
made available in the 'soc.elite' package, along with the analysis and additional datasets for Articles 3, 4, 6 
and 7. The correspondence analysis presented in Articles 1 and 2 are, with their data, available in the soc.ca 
package (Larsen et al. 2012). When the code and data are stored in an R-package (Venables et al. 2002), 
they are distributed in a very strict format that is readily accessible for the trained researcher. The soc.elite 
package is available via github at github.com/antongrau/soc.report and the soc.ca package is available 
through the R repository, CRAN (Hornik 2012). 
Anonymity 
If  the elite researcher is to get the full potential from diverse data sources and open the results up for the 
scrutiny of  others, it is necessary to dispose of  the idea of  anonymity. This may run contrary to ethical 
standards, for example, of  the American Sociological Association: 
(a) When research requires maintaining personal identifiers in data bases or systems of  records, 
sociologists delete such identifiers before the information is made publicly available.  
(b) When confidential information concerning research participants, clients, or other recipients of  
service is entered into databases or systems of  records available to persons without the prior 
consent of  the relevant parties, sociologists protect anonymity by not including personal 
identifiers or by employing other techniques that mask or control disclosure of  individual 
identities.  
(c) When deletion of  personal identifiers is not feasible, sociologists take reasonable steps to 
determine that appropriate consent of  personally-identifiable individuals has been obtained before 
they transfer such data to others or review such data collected by others. 
(American Sociological Association 1999) 
The American Sociological Association (ASA) recommends that names are deleted before publication and 
that the researcher obtains consent from the persons who are identifiable in the data. Although often 
important for qualitative researchers, for the elite sociologist they are a barrier to validation and critique. 
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For data collection, if  the different registers, and websites etc. are to be linked, each datum point has to be 
named. The middle ground, where the original researcher knows the names but the published data are 
anonymous, also has serious limitations. It prohibits other researchers from really assessing the quality of  
the data and questioning the methodological choices. If  you cannot see the exact principles for inclusion 
and reproduce them, any result becomes impossible to evaluate. This is of  particular importance for an 
SNA analysis. If  names were excluded, other researchers and agents within the field would have no way of  
knowing whether the clustering algorithms produced sensible results. 
What might seem to be protection of  the researched individuals could easily become problematic because 
the individuals in the dataset are not able to find themselves and correct errors in the data. If  they can 
identify themselves in the results the researched individuals might also object to the researcher’s 
classifications. As a protection, anonymity is weak as elite individuals are almost always easily identifiable 
for those who put themselves up to the task. If  you have just a small set of  former career positions, an area 
of  residence, age and education, then it should be possible to identify almost any elite individual. It is 
impossible to publish data and the results of  analysis of  an affiliation network in a way that can be 
evaluated without compromising anonymity. There are very few interlockers. If  you know the names of  
two affiliations, then it is possible to obtain the names of  all interlockers. 
It seems that anonymity does more to guard the researcher from criticism and oversight than to protect the 
researched individuals from data-related abuses. As a last note on the subject, when names are hidden, the 
public at large are alienated from the results, which lose their direct appeal. If  social scientists are to extend 
and enrich the general understanding of  how the elite act and think, then faces, names and multifaceted 
data are of  key importance. Within the Bourdieusian tradition of   MCA (see e.g. Bourdieu, 2005, 1996, 
1988; Bühlmann et al., 2012; Denord et al., 2011; Lebaron, 2003) and SNA, for instance, of  corporate 
interlocks (see e.g. Domhoff, 1978, 1975, 1974; Heemskerk, 2013; Mintz, 1975), the use of  names to 
validate and enhance the interpretation of  the data is commonplace. Adding to this, only publicly available 
information is used to construct the datasets. 
 
Open elite sociology 
It seems that elite sociology differs from many other strands of  sociology by having very particular 
requirements. Normally it is does not really matter if  you get the entire population or not, and in youth 
studies one young person is as good as another. But in studies of  the elite, some people cannot be omitted. 
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As well, most sociologists routinely delete the names of  the people they study. Names are irrelevant and a 
danger to those studied. But for the elite sociologist the reverse is true. Secrecy is problematic and the 
research can be evaluated by others only when names are in the open. Usually, researchers rely on a few 
data sources and thereby expose themselves to fewer forms of  measurement errors and confusion. Again, 
the elite sociologist has different needs and methods. The elite sociologist collects data from very diverse 
sources and often with very little knowledge about how this information was produced. Web searches are a 
very important part of  elite research, especially the collection of  affiliation memberships from affiliation 
websites. But has the website been updated? Are the members listed in full? Are their descriptions 
accurate? All of  these questions could be answered easily via email, but when the number of  affiliations 
rise, email becomes impracticable. 
If  we are to allow this kind of  data assemblage we need to play with open cards. The data in all their detail, 
and the code used for constructing and analysing the data should be easily available. In this way the 
scientific community can evaluate the qualities of  the research. This requires an open and reproducible 
framework. In sum, there is a need for an open and flexible sociologist to study the closed elites. 
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Chapter 3: So What? 
Any social science worth its salt is able to answer the question: So what? Like the tired refrain of  a 
teenager, the shrugged shoulders of  colleagues and audience inevitably confront the elite sociologist. The 
question is at the same time, ‘Why should I care?’ and ‘What can we do about it?’ The sociologist should 
answer both of  the dimensions inherent in the ‘So what?’ question. In the previous chapter I have tried to 
answer parts of  the question of  why you should care about studies of  the elite. Elite struggles shape the 
world for better and worse, and the same goes for elite perceptions of  society. These struggles are also 
important in peaceful times,  when there is no politics of  necessity. How the elite tackle challenges and 
national problems can always go in many directions. The composition and character of  the elite influences 
how these problems are dealt with. Why should anyone care about the cohesion and class consciousness of  
the elites in the articles presented in this dissertation? Or that their 1% share of  the total income is growing 
(Piketty 2014), that social mobility to top income positions has diminished (Hansen 2014), or that half  of  
the French CEOs come from just three university programs (Hartmann 2010)? If  the elite are recruited 
predominantly from technocratic educations such as economics and business schools, we may expect 
solutions that fit within a neoliberal economics framework. If  the unions are an integral part of  the elite, 
we may expect solutions that focus on changing labour market regulations. While this may answer why we 
should care, it still leaves open the question of  what is to be done about it. It is generally not the role of  
the social scientist to formulate policy in full, but it is fruitful to hint at openings for reform. 
Elite reform? 
Critique has a tendency to evolve into resigned apathy and elite sociology has to be very aware of  this 
possibility. By only criticising and not showing alternatives, critical sociologists may have wasted their 
efforts and in turn strengthened what they criticise. The demobilised public look at the towering elite and 
say, ‘There Is No Alternative’. The role of  the sociologist is to point out that there is substantial historical 
and national variation in elite organisation and to establish that elite organisation, elite power and elite 
privileges are an area of  politics. Elite politics and elite control were a crucial part of  the birth of  the 
democratic society. Positions within the state bureaucracy became no longer something to be bought, sold 
or inherited, but to be distributed imperfectly according to skills and merit, and to some extent, according 
to an ethos of  delivering results for the benefit of  the general public (Bourdieu 1996). Across society, the 
role of  inherited privileges was re-arranged, although not abolished. Seen in this light, elite reform is a part 
of  the modernisation process and the politics of  elite reform therefore is not confined to left-leaning social 
movements but firmly entrenched with republican and liberal democratic ideals (Higley 2012). 
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Many elite theorists believe that the rule of  the few over the many is an inevitable characteristic of  society. 
Raymond Aron (1950a) claimed that the elite were a more enduring trait of  society than class. In his view 
Soviet Russia was classless, but the Soviet society, along with all other societies, could never be without an 
elite: ‘There is government for the people; there is no government by the people.’ (Aron 1950a:9). Here 
Aron is in line with Robert Michels (1915), who famously formulated the iron law of  oligarchy. Michels 
found that even radical socialist political parties are governed by a tiny minority and that this is under 
constraints from characteristics of  the large orgazisation that make the party leaders more sympathetic to 
the existing elite than to the active members of  the party. In this light large organisations, like the populist 
political party, are inevitably on the side of  a society in which an elite rules the masses. But while this may 
be true, there is considerable national variation in the practices of  the elite. This variation indicates that, for 
the general public, there is a lot to be gained from imposing further restrictions on the privileges and 
power of  the elite. 
In this chapter I will briefly touch on three discussions that in the articles of  this dissertation are at times 
quite visible and at other times less so. First discussion relates to favouritism and meritocracy and how elite 
studies, along with studies in social mobility, sheds light on the character of  the more and often less 
meritocratic characteristics of  society. This discussion ends in a reflection on the double standard inherent 
in society, in which a privileged elite enjoys the benefits of  favouritism and cumulative advantage while a 
general population is caught up in a meritocratic competition, pitting the wage earners against each other. 
The second discussion is on the exclusion of  women from positions of  power, a discussion that is in the 
same vein as the discussion on meritocracy, which in essence is a discussion on discrimination against 
people of  the lower classes. The third discussion is about the legitimacy problems that arise when elite 
individuals from one field circulate or interlock into top positions within other fields. Whom do they 
represent? These three discussion are related to results in this dissertation that are relevant to the current 
discussion on power, privilege, democracy and elite reform. Hopefully this answers the ‘so what’ question. 
Favouritism: An end to hopes of the meritocratic utopia? 
One of  the central legitimising stories about modern liberal societies is that they are meritocratic, that 
those at the top are there because of  a combination of  skills and effort. Ironically, the term ‘meritocracy’ 
was coined by the labour politician Michael Young in a 1958 novel that portrayed a dystopian meritocratic 
society (Allen 2011). But the term has lost all of  its original connotations and is instead a cornerstone in 
not just the legitimisation of  liberal democracies but also the argumentation for welfare state policies. 
Meritocracy as an ideal is used in attacks on favouritism and nepotism across many sectors, especially in the 
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critique of  discrimination against women. Elite sociology has several important contributions to the 
discussions on whether society at large is a meritocracy and whether the elite are the hardest working and 
most skilled individuals in society. But elite sociology should also ask if  meritocracy is a viable way of  
distributing privilege and power. 
Social stratification researchers have debated whether modern societies could be deemed meritocratic 
(Breen and Goldthorpe 1999; Saunders 1995). It seems a well-established phenomenon that there is a 
considerable transmission of  privilege and resources across generations, even in relatively egalitarian 
countries such as Denmark. In Norway, Marianne Nordli Hansen (2014) found a considerable transmission 
of  wealth within the families in the wealthiest one per cent of  society. Whereas social mobility in relatively 
egalitarian countries is generally higher than in unequal societies (Corak 2013), the requirements for the 
richest one per cent are significantly different. Björklund and his colleagues (2010) finds that variables like 
education and cognitive and non-cognitive skills that generally influence income lose effect for the children 
of  the top one per cent in the income distribution. 
Most of  the social stratification literature focuses on the general population, but studies on elite 
populations can only confirm the influence of  family background. This has been covered in three of  the 
papers included in this dissertation. In Article 1 it is shown that the top 100 CEOs in Denmark have very 
exclusive social backgrounds and that their profile is comparable in both the UK and France (Maclean, 
Harvey, and Press 2006). This exclusive social profile has barely changed since the 1950s (Hansen 1964). In 
a comparative study, Kaelble (1980) found a convergence along this pattern from the beginning of  the 
industrial revolution until the 1970s in USA, Germany, the UK and France. In Article 3, we find almost the 
exact same social backgrounds for the 171 members of  the inner circle. In Article 7, the social 
backgrounds of  the power elite are shown to be very exclusive: 23% have parents from an upper class that 
forms 1% of  the general population. Although the social backgrounds of  all three elite populations are 
very exclusive, it is important to note that in the Danish context direct transmission of  CEO positions 
within the family is rare. Bingley et al.(2011) showed that sons are far more likely to ‘inherit’ their father’s 
employer if  they are part of  the top 1% of  the income distribution. This direct transmission of  positions 
within the father’s closest network is just one of  the forms of  transmission of  positions. Social capital can 
be inherited and this may be of  importance to the position of  elite individuals within the field of  power 
(Denord, Hjellbrekke, et al. 2011; Hjellbrekke et al. 2007). 
The transmission of  elite positions within the family is the strongest form of  favouritism and it is not the 
norm for recruitment to elite positions in modern society. But the relative importance of  inheritance is an 
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indicator of  how open the elite is. According to Mosca (1939:417–19), elites fluctuate between periods of  
instability, with strong inflows of  new families from lower strata and periods of  stability where recruitment 
becomes ever more closed. This model finds support in the works of  Padgett and Ansell (1993:1261). In 
this tradition the openness of  an elite group is a function of  the diversity of  the social characteristics that 
are allowed positions within it. Part of  the distance between the general population and the elite is then 
reflected in the diversity within the elite and thereby its openness. But even if  the elite are closed and social 
background is of  great importance, can it then be argued that the elite are not the most qualified for their 
jobs? This question is very difficult to answer, especially when we consider that the qualifications for elite 
positions are a moving target. In the words of  C. W. Mills: 
The fit survive, and fitness means, not formal competence – there probably is no such thing for 
top executives positions – but conformity with the criteria of  those who have already succeeded. 
To be compatible with the top men is to act like them, to look like them, to think like them: to be 
of  and for them – or at least to display oneself  to them in such a way to create that impression. 
(Mills 1956:141) 
 
If  the criteria for inclusion in the elite is the criteria of  the already established, then favouritism is at the 
heart of  the inclusion process. Although nepotism is a part of  what constitutes favouritism, favouritism is 
much more. It includes the appointment of  a successor who shares the spirit of  the organisation. In this 
way the established ensure the reproduction of  their habitual dispositions, even if  they do not pass on their 
position to one with their genetic dispositions. 
Recruitment to some lower positions in society might very well be distributed according to meritocratic 
standards, but meritocratic standards intensify the struggle for positions and function as a disciplinary tool 
for the benefit of  the employers. It may be argued that elite sociology should engage with this double 
standard. This engagement is taken up by Mosca (1939:417–19), who argues that only the most radical 
reforms could make a dent in the tendency to nepotism and favouritism. But, according to Mosca, even 
institutions that prohibit the formation of  families, such as the Catholic Church, are plagued by 
favouritism. 
And it is perhaps worth asking if  meritocracy as an ideal worth saving. If  meritocracy is simply a 
demagogic metaphor for competition and a rigged competition at that, in which nepotism and cumulative 
advantages skew the game in the favour of  the elite, then it is perhaps better to find new ways of  
envisioning a just form of  recruitment to positions. 
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Gender and elite recruitment 
The question of  the under-representation of  women in positions of  power is one of  the most familiar 
political discussions about elite composition in Denmark. The debate is strong both within the science 
community and in the political sphere, particularly since Norway introduced affirmative action and required 
corporations to include women on their boards or risk being closed down by the state. Elite sociology has 
made vital contributions to the discussion about the under-representation not just of  women, but also of  
people of  colour (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff  1998). Most obviously, elite sociologists are able to monitor 
the share of  women in positions of  power, but they can also point to the very stable recruitment patterns 
to the elite. Men from privileged backgrounds have held a comparable share of  the corporate elite in 
Denmark since 1932 (Christiansen et al. 2001). The elite culture that is the basis for these recruitment 
patterns is very strong and there is no reason to think that it will change without external shocks such as 
state regulation. This is illustrated by the Norwegian affirmative action legislation that has led to a large 
increase in the number of  women on corporate boards, with a very select group of  women becoming very 
sought after (Seierstad and Opsahl 2011). These women have become more central and have been pushed 
to the top of  the corporate network. 
If  we look at the groups studied in the articles in this dissertation – the top 100 CEOs of  Article 1, the 
inner circle from Article 3, and the power elite from Article 7, – there is a clear under-representation of  
women. Among the top 100 CEOs in the UK, France and Denmark there are no more than two female 
CEOs in each country. The proportion of  women rises to 8% (14 out of  171) in the inner circle and in the 
power elite to 19% (82 out of  423). 
When the Danish Elite Network  is split into sectors, we can see the variation across sectors. Not all 
sectors of  the elite network are as foreign to women as the corporate world. 
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TABLE 2: SHARE OF WOMEN WITHIN SECTORS 
SECTOR TOP1 OTHER 
EXTRAORDINARY 
MEMBERS
2 
Unions 48% 44% 34% 
Royal 46% 48% 15% 
Politics 35% 32% 34% 
Law 35% 32% 24% 
Culture 30% 34% 31% 
Science and education 29% 37% 27% 
State 29% 33% 23% 
Interest groups 27% 32% 29% 
Other 25% 22% 23% 
Media 24% 24% 17% 
Corporations 19% 14%  7% 
Business organisations  9% 21% 16% 
1 Top 20% most central positions according to the weighted out degree centrality of the affiliations within each sector. 
2 Extraordinary members are members that are directors, chairmen or vice chairmen.  
 
In table 2, the sectors, which are the same as those used in Article 7, are split into top and bottom. The top 
are the 20% most central positions according to the centrality of  their affiliations within each sector. The 
difference between the top most central affiliations and the rest is fairly small across sectors, except for the 
notable difference in the network of  the business organisations. This sector is also the most closed off  for 
women in general but particularly in the top, where only 9% of  the top positions are held by women. The 
sectors most receptive to women are the unions, royal, politics and law. If  the centrality of  the position is 
not strongly related to the proportion of  women, then the role within the affiliations is. Women are less 
likely to hold roles in the affiliations that distinguish them from the ordinary members. When the affiliation 
chooses a chairman, vice chairman or executive members, it will more often than not choose a man. This is 
disproportionate not only to the amount of  women in the general population but also to the amount of  
women within its sector and is most visible in the corporate sector, where only 7% of  extraordinary 
members are women. So, in brief, most sectors have an under-representation of  women, a few sectors have 
fewer women in their most central affiliations and most sectors give fewer extraordinary roles or positions 
to women. 
The under-representation of  women can be criticised on various grounds. From within an elite framework 
it is perhaps the distance between the social character and lived life experiences of  the elite and the general 
public that is of  the greatest concern. There is reason to believe that questions about gender equality, like 
equal pay, are addressed with less enthusiasm by men, perhaps especially elite men, than by women. From a 
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Bourdieusian perspective, gender roles and the gendering of  different domains in society also ascribe 
different symbolic values to these domains. When Bourdieu uses the metaphor of  the right and the left 
hand of  the state (Arnholtz and Hammerslev 2013; Bourdieu 1998) he creates an image of  a state that is 
split between the ‘hard’ economic rationality of  the right hand and the ‘soft’ tasks of  the left hand. Playing 
on gender stereotypes, it could be argued that the dominating right hand is the hand of  the man and the 
subordinate left hand is the hand of  a woman. Table 3 represents the share of  women in positions in 
affiliations that are occupied with one or more of  370 subjects (or tags; see more in Article 5). On the left 
side we have the ‘soft’ subjects like children, health, art, education, family and social politics. On the right 
side we find the affiliations that are concerned with industry, finance capital, transportation, leadership and 
conservatism. Note that all of  the tags with more than 50% women compose only 6% or 21 of  the 370 
tags. A dimension in the dominance of  finance or new public management, for example, could be tied to 
gender inequalities and the misrecognition of  subjects that are predominantly gendered towards women. 
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TABLE 3: WOMEN’S TOP AND BOTTOM SHARES OF SUBJECTS 
DOMINATED BY WOMEN DOMINATED BY MEN 
Subject (tag) Women Subject (tag) Women 
Teeth 95% Construction 6% 
Gender 72% Conservatives 7% 
Gymnastics 71% Fishery 7% 
Clothing 67% Rural 7% 
Public relations 67% Venture capital 7% 
Child care 61% Roads 7% 
Family 58% Car sales 8% 
Actors 57% Sailing 8% 
Cyclists 57% Iron industry 8% 
Library 57% Pensions 8% 
Middle class unions 56% Self-employed 8% 
Children 55% Military 9% 
Social politics 55% Shipping 9% 
Restaurants 54% Travel 9% 
Ethics 54% Marine 9% 
Integration 53% Industry 9% 
Primary education 52% Leadership 9% 
Human arts 52% Hunting 10% 
Language 51% Cars 10% 
Artists 51% Machines 10% 
Pharmacology 50% Football 11% 
 
In short, there women are clearly under-represented in all areas of  the elite, particularly in the corporate 
world. The under-representation of  women is correlated more strongly to the particular role within the 
affiliation than to the centrality of  the affiliation within the sector. Women are less likely to be given 
extraordinary roles (e.g. chairman) than men. Adding to this discrimination is the fact that the share of  
women present in the affiliations differs considerably when the subject of  the affiliation is considered. 
When the subjects are ranked according to their share of  women, there is a clear pattern. ‘Soft’ subjects, 
which are related to the ‘left hand’ of  the state, have a much higher proportion of  women than the ‘harder’ 
subjects, which are related to the ‘right hand’ of  the state and also tied to the general patterns of  
dominance in fields (Bourdieu 2007). Having the general resilience and stability of  elite recruitment 
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patterns in mind, there is no reason to believe that there will be any change in the under-representation of  
women without legislation. 
Elite circulation and multiple positions 
Fields should not be seen as self-containing entities. Moving to the top of  one field, especially a dominant 
one like the economic field, is a good way of  getting access to top or at least influential positions within 
another field, if  not also the recognition of  the participants within the field. The perfect example would be 
the charitable foundation that donates to science. The board of  the foundation could be composed of  
former CEOs, politicians and state officials, and they would distribute some of  the fairly scarce money that 
is given to the scientific field. No one within the field would attribute great scientific skills to the members 
of  the board, but they would nonetheless have considerable influence over the distribution of  symbolic 
and economic capital within the field. Depending on their relative autonomy, fields are influenced greatly 
by agents outside of  the field who hold prominent positions within it. There are two ways in which this 
may happen. The first way is by elite circulation, where a top full-time position is given to a former 
member of  another elite. The second way is by holding multiple positions at the same time as being 
‘double agents’, having ‘strategies function as double plays’ (Bourdieu 1996:271), often with a full-time 
position within another field. 
The patterns of  exchange of  elite individuals between fields or sectors varies markedly across countries. As 
a result, Hartmann (2010) proposed a model of  classification for national elites, with elite circulation a 
central concept. There are countries with a high degree of  elite exchange and with almost institutionalised 
patterns of  movement from the state and politics to top positions in the private sector. In France, this 
movement is so common so as to be dubbed pantouflage (Bourdieu 1996:391), or changing one’s slippers. This 
movement creates a strong integration between sectors and encourages tie formation. In Denmark, the 
career profiles of  the Danish business elites are far from following the same pattern. As shown in Article I, 
in Denmark, only a few corporate top CEOs have career backgrounds outside of  business. Movements 
from labour unions into state positions or into the Social Democratic Party and then further into semi-
private business or business organisations are conspicuous, but their extent is somewhat under-
investigated. Karsten, the current director of  the most powerful employers’ association, the Confederation 
of  Danish Industry, is an economist with a cross-sectoral career. Starting out as an economist in the labour 
union, he moved into a union-controlled pension fund and from there into the state, where he reached the 
highest positions: first as permanent secretary to the finance minister, then as permanent secretary to the 
prime minister. His current position is one of  the most influential in the private sector. The inclusion of  
67 
 
the labour unions in elite circulation is probably a characteristic of  the Danish corporatist state, but it 
would be interesting to investigate whether the movement between sectors is primarily one-directional, 
from the ‘left side’ (non-economic order) of  the field of  power to the ‘right side’ (economic order). 
There is a lot more to integration between fields and sectors than career paths. The most common is the 
multipositional individuals, who have positions in more than one sector. Multipositional individuals might 
not have a primary affiliation to any one sector, or may keep their primary occupation within one sector or 
field and still gain access to powerful positions within another. Multipositional individuals may import 
logics from one field into another. This is often the stated purpose of  inter-sectoral ties. A university gains 
a ‘better understanding’ of  the needs of  business when the board has a CEO or corporate chairman 
among its members. By including union leaders in a commission, the views of  the unions are heard and 
taken into account. If  these groups or positions are influential within a field or sector, then the field is 
penetrated by another field, and its internal logics may be challenged by the external field. This process 
creates challenges to the legitimacy of  the field. This example is most clear cut in science, when the internal 
values of  the scientific field may run contrary to the interests of  the corporate community as represented 
on the university board. If  society can be seen as divided into functionally defined and relatively 
independent sectors or fields, then what process legitimises the transformation of  their internal workings 
and hierarchies? A political mandate might suffice, but most multipositional elite individuals hold no 
political mandate and are therefore far more difficult to replace than elected individuals who base their 
power on just one position. 
But multipositional individuals do not cause legitimacy problems only because they import new logics into 
otherwise relatively independent fields without a clear political mandate. It is difficult to represent the 
inherent diversity within a field, most importantly the differences between the challengers and the 
incumbents (Fligstein 1996b). When the state invites multipositional individuals into their boards, these 
represent specific organisations and positions within their original fields. These positions do not reflect the 
field in total, as is clearly shown in Article 4: ‘Who listens to the top? Integration of  the largest 
corporations across sectoral networks’. The largest and most prominent corporations take the lion’s share 
of  ties to affiliations outside of  the corporate network. 
It is worth asking if  the struggles within the field are carried into other fields. Do corporations invited onto 
university boards try to shape the university to fit the needs of  the specific corporation or those with 
similar positions within the economic field? This problem lies at the heart of  the concept of  the ‘class wide 
rationality (Useem 1982). CEOs and directors within the corporate community have to show their ability to 
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transcend the particular interests of  their ‘primary’ corporation and formulate visions that include the 
entire capitalist class. Those who represent the class-wide rationality are included in the ‘inner circle’ of  the 
business community (Useem 1984). For more on the inner circle, see Article 3: ‘The inner circle revisited’. 
The analysis of  the inner circle shows that individuals with high inner-circle centrality are much more likely 
to hold positions across several sectors. But as is shown in Article 4, it is still primarily the size of  the 
corporations that explains inclusion in trans-sectoral networks. The top 250 corporations are heavily over-
represented across all sectors, and especially in the scientific and academic fields. The informal rules that 
govern inclusion in the inner circle do not prevent the largest corporations from getting the lion’s share of  
trans-sectoral influence. From this follows the problem that the economic field as a whole, and the 
challengers or the dominated in particular, are vastly under-represented. 
But could this be different? The state could take responsibility for the overall misrepresentation of  a field 
instead of  trying to solve the question of  representation in a case-by-case fashion. For certain positions, 
such as on university boards, the board members could have publicly known and collectively bargained 
mandates. Moving beyond this mandate could be deemed reason for exclusion. In this way the informal 
rules of  the inner circle would be made explicit and written into law, becoming much more than a tool of  
distinction. 
The continuous taming of  the elite is a process that requires constant attention. Elite privileges, inequality 
and the increasing concentration of  power in the hands of  the elite must be met with reform. Taming of  
the elite through reforms that produce transparency, democratic mandates, accountability and equality is a 
central part of  modernisation. By opening the elite to new institutions and new social characters, to 
women, to children of  the working classes, to a wider set of  educations, it is possible to bring the elite and 
the masses closer to each other. We should discuss which interests should be allowed to gain influence over 
the different parts of  society. And we should discuss whether the interests of  the power elite and the 
organisations they represent should have a stronger or weaker position within the central fields of  society. 
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Conclusion: Studying Elites in Denmark 
The power elite integrate the key institutional orders of  society in what Bourdieu (1996:263) calls ‘the 
organic solidarity of  a genuine division of  the labor of  domination’. The composition, size, social character 
and mode of  reproduction of  this group is central to the understanding of  any society (Aron 1950a). In 
Denmark, the power elite are a cohesive group of  423 people including the most prominent members of  
Danish high society: the  prime minister, the permanent secretaries, CEOs and chairmen of  the largest 
corporations, members of  the richest families, leading economists, union leaders, high court lawyers, and 
the royal family. These are described in Article 7: ‘The Power Elite in the Welfare State’. The key 
institutional orders within this group are the triumvirate of  organised capitalist class, organised labour and 
the state. Within this triumvirate, the organised capitalist class – employers’ organisations and the largest 
corporations – are by far the most dominant fraction within the power elite. Combined, they account for 
almost half  of  this group.  
The social character of  the power elite is very different from that of  the general population; for example, 
they are recruited from very few university programs, have very exclusive social backgrounds and their 
places of  residence show very clear patterns of  a shared culture.  
In Article 6: The methodology of  identifying power elites, we identify the power elite by means of  a new 
methodology that uses the k-core decomposition or minimum degree (Seidman 1983) to identify a 
cohesive core within the network. A simple weighting principle is applied to the network, based primarily 
on the size of  the affiliations within the network. This procedure was applied to a unique dataset on an 
affiliation network of  62,841 positions in 5,332 affiliations held by 37,750 individuals, as described in 
Article 5: The Danish Elite Network. The inclusive dataset is composed of  all nationally relevant affiliations 
that might integrate between organisations.  
Although some of  the affiliations are social events and career networks, the bulk are boards, advisory 
boards, commissions and political committees. Affiliations that also tie the elite together require 
collaboration and are positions of  power in their own right. 
This new methodology produces solutions for identifying national elites, which, unlike the positional 
method, are comparable across countries and time periods. Instead of  defining the size and composition 
of  the elite beforehand, the data-sensitive method identifies a group bound together by interaction. 
 
70 
 
Articles 1, 2 3 and 4 describe the dominant economic fraction within the power elite. Article 1: A very 
Economic Elite, describes the career trajectories of  the top 100 Danish CEOs determined by specific 
multiple correspondence analysis and ascending clustering analysis. We identify three dimensions that 
divide the space of  the otherwise very homogeneous CEOs: first, the accumulation of  organisational 
capital; secondly, the opposition between technical expertise and salesmen; and thirdly, the amount of  
inherited capital. The Danish business elite are recruited mainly from within the economic field and rely on 
careers in large corporations. Unlike in France, there is no systematic movement between the state and the 
top corporations. The role of  elite education also appears to be less central in Denmark than has been 
shown in the UK and France, but this said, the social backgrounds are comparable. 
Article 2: Status and integration on the field of  power for Danish top CEO’s, analyses the differences in symbolic 
capital in the field of  power, and the opposition between owners and managers, among the top 100 Danish 
CEOs. About a third of  the directors are excluded entirely from symbolic and social capital within the field 
of  power. This group of  excluded directors is more often from relatively smaller corporations and 
originate from the lower classes. This leads us to an understanding of  the exclusivity of  the higher circles 
of  the corporate world. 
Article 3: The inner circle revisited identifies the inner circle of  the corporate network, which, according to 
Michael Useem (1984) produces the class-wide rationality of  the capitalist class. The small community of  
171 businessmen are the most politically active, and they are therefore often present in central positions 
across the different fields of  the elite.  
Article 4: Who listens to the top? Integration of  the largest corporations across sectoral networks investigates the 
organisational underpinning of  the inner circle and the corporate elite. The correlation between cross-
sectoral ties and measures of  size and prominence reveal a clear pattern. Among the top 1,037 
corporations, it is the top 250 that are markedly better integrated than the rest. The inner circle and the 
corporate elite within the power elite are drawn primarily from this class of  big business. 
The results of  naming and describing the power elite may raise questions of  its legitimacy. Although this 
question is beyond the role of  the sociologist, it is clear that the findings of  this dissertation present 
questions and provide input to debates topics such as the under-representation of  women, the meritocratic 
character of  the elite and field autonomy. 
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Future points of convergence 
Our findings are placed within the framework of  Pierre Bourdieu and C. W. Mills, but some scholars, 
perhaps most notably those within the pluralist tradition, may be sceptical about a number of  the 
theoretical assumptions within our framework. Putting these controversies aside, there are interesting 
points of  convergence between proponents of  the positional and decisional approach and ours. 
The identification of  a cross-sectoral core within a large affiliation network is interesting for scholars using 
the positional method, because it allows them to investigate the difference between those organisations and 
individuals that are central and those that are not. Within the network, scholars may also find organisations 
that are central within the network, but which do not place high within the sector-specific rankings used in 
the positional approach. This could lead to either a sophistication of  the rankings in the positional 
approach or the starting point for an inquiry into what role these organisations play. 
Scholars who trace decision-making processes may also gain insights into the structural position of  the 
individuals and organisations that are active within the processes. Agents could be grouped according to 
their faction within the network or processes could be identified according to the centrality of  the 
participants. If  very central individuals are active, it may be because the decision is of  some importance to 
powerful players. 
The findings in this dissertation raise new questions in elite sociology. The most important question is of  
course the extent of  national variation in elite composition. This variation is important for the formulation 
and elaboration of  elite theory. What are the common characteristics of  modern elites? Is there a single 
European elite culture? Does the relative strength of  the corporate sector vary across countries? These 
questions are comparative in nature and the methodology presented in Article 6 could form the framework 
for such an investigation. Whether or not this method is applicable in larger and more complex countries is 
open to debate. Denmark is a small, transparent and corporatist society with a fairly simple collection of  
affiliation networks, but this might not be the case for a country such as Germany, which has a population 
that is 16 times the size. 
Although international comparisons are important, the Danish case is still a great source of  new insights. It 
is clear that a field analysis of  the power elite in Denmark could yield insights into the relationship between 
the positions within the network and within the field of  power. Such a study could investigate and integrate 
the two most prominent methods in the relational sociological tradition (Emirbayer 1997). By integrating 
social network analysis and multiple correspondence analysis, we may identify new properties of  the 
structure of  the elite. 
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Business Elite Reproduction
We must understand the objective structure of opportunities as well as the personal traits 
which allow and encourage given men to exploit these objective opportunities which 
economic history provides them. Charles Wright Mills (1956: 97)
The career trajectory of CEOs in large corporations shows which forms of resources 
these men – for they are usually men – use to qualify for, and legitimize holding, a posi-
tion of power and also allows us to view the relative strength of central societal institu-
tions, such as the family, the educational field and the market that transmits resources, 
and the nature of the respective national economies. As Aron (1950: 141) argues, one of 
the most characteristic features of any society is how the elite is structured and repro-
duced. Through a comparative study of the leading 100 senior executives in large, indus-
trial countries, primarily France, the UK, and a Scandinavian welfare state, Denmark, we 
explore the importance of families, educational system and economic organizations as 
institutions of elite reproduction.
While the relative importance of these institutions may differ in magnitude, the over-
all social origin of the top managerial elite is very similar, as shown in Table 1. At least 
four-fifths of senior executives originate from the top fifth of their respective society. 
The pathways are relatively heterogeneous, with diverse prevalences of exclusive sec-
ondary education, elite university diplomas and elite circulation. Following Hartmann 
(2007: 61–80) three models can be identified: 1) a French and Japanese model with high 
importance of elite universities – or grandes écoles – exclusive secondary education and 
high elite circulation; 2) a British and American model with high importance of elite 
universities and secondary education, but little elite circulation with low intersectoral 
mobility; and 3) a German model with little importance of elite universities and little 
elite circulation, with reproduction mediated through a ‘class-specific habitus’ – the 
incorporated cultural capital attained through upbringing in the bourgeois family 
(Hartmann, 2000: 243, see also Bourdieu, 1984: 66) – enabling individual mastery of the 
behavioural codes of the boardrooms. When looking at business elite reproduction, the 
question is to what degree the incorporated cultural capital of the business elite offspring 
can successfully be turned into institutionalized cultural capital in the form of diplomas 
from elite universities, enabling a ‘school-mediated mode of reproduction’ (cf. Bourdieu, 
1986: 244, 1996: 285–90), or, alternatively, are reproduction strategies based in forms of 
capital acquired outside educational institutions? The mode of reproduction of a 
Scandinavian business elite, however, remains largely unresolved vis-a-vis Hartmann’s 
terminology.
The phenomenon left to be explained is the surprisingly stable pattern of reproduction 
of the managerial elites. This pattern is part of a general image of an extremely homoge-
nous business elite with regard to age, sex and ethnicity (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1999: 
16). Even though the reproduction rate of the business elite has decreased historically, the 
social background of this group has remained very exclusive over the last 250 years in the 
major industrialized nations (Kaelble, 1980: 415–16). Adding to this, Andrle (2001) sug-
gests that post-communist economic elites have a strong family linkage to the pre-
communist bourgeoisie, emphasizing the strength of this particular type of reproduction 
mechanism. The closer to the top of the business hierarchy, the more important having a 
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moneyed family background is (Hartmann, 2007: 92). In all the countries compared, the 
majority – approximately two-thirds – of the top CEOs are recruited from social groups 
within the top 20 per cent of society, as Maclean et al. (2006: 91) define the upper middle 
and upper class. Almost the same exclusive background can be identified among a less 
exclusive part of the economic elite in Norway (Gulbrandsen, 2005: 344). Along with 
cultural elites, economic elites have the most exclusive social background of all elites in 
the Scandinavian countries (Ruostetsaari, 2008: 164). The homogenous background of 
private corporate leaders is also seen in Germany (Hartmann, 2000), with estimates of 82 
of the top 100 senior executives originating from the dominant classes in 1995, of whom 
34 had fathers engaged as industrialists or bankers, while 11 originated from the middle 
and lower classes (Hartmann, 2000: 248), albeit the middle class includes only the CEOs 
with ‘Lower-middle class’ background in Table 1.
Drawing on the terminology of the field of power developed by Pierre Bourdieu 
(1996), the notion of forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986) is used as a strategy to identify 
the resources at stake among the most powerful economic agents. By analysing holders 
of the top 100 executive positions, we restrict ourselves to a particular subspace – the 
business elite – within the economic pole of the field of power. These agents acquire 
the organizational capital needed to enter the upper echelons of corporate manage-
ment. The concept of the field of power is thus used as an epistemological tool, rather 
than as a grand theory that ties power tightly to economic and cultural capital (cf. 
Hjellbrekke and Korsnes, 2009: 44–5), to identify a multidimensional space of differ-
ent forms of capital within the business elites through geometrical data analysis. The 
structure of the different forms of capital needed to enter the business elite is explored 
using geometrical data analysis. Using the Euclidian distances generated within this 
space, four distinct pathways to top management in Denmark are explored through 
hierarchical cluster analysis.
Within this framework, convincing comparisons have been made between career trajec-
tories and the significance of educational institutions in large industrial societies (Bauer 
and Bertin-Mourot, 1999; Hartmann, 2007, 2010; Maclean et al., 2006); other studies have 
compared less exclusive elites (Useem and Karabel, 1986) or national elites alone (Bendix 
Table 1. Social origin of top 100 CEOs.
Denmark France UK
Year 2007 1998 1998
Upper class 33% 43% 35%
Upper-middle class 35% 34% 29%
Lower-middle class 25% 19% 25%
Lower class 8% 4% 11%
N (of known cases) 78 98 91
Note: The data on France and the UK are based on Maclean et al. (2006: 91), who identify origin in the upper 
class exclusively by being ‘born into a family with substantial wealth and a large income based on inheritance 
or a parent occupying a leading position in society’ (Maclean et al., 2006: 266). Source: France and UK, 
Maclean et al. (2006: 91); Denmark, authors’ own research.
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and Howton, 1957; Flemmen, forthcoming). Although a study has described the business 
elite in Denmark (Christiansen and Togeby, 2007), the scope and methods received 
considerable criticism for their limitations (Andersen, 2005; Ellersgaard and Grau, 
2008; Sørensen, 2004), which led to inaccurate characterization of the Danish business 
elite within contemporary literature (Hartmann, 2010: 314; Ruostetsaari, 2008: 147ff).
While comparing the Danish case with larger, industrialized societies, particularly 
France, Britain and Germany, we address the following two research questions:
1) To what extent is the institutionalized cultural capital of Danish top CEOs tied to 
elite universities or elite schools?
2) Through which forms of capital do Danish top CEOs acquire and legitimize their 
position?
Understanding Business Elites through the Terminology 
of Fields
Following Savage and Williams’ (2008: 15) call to apply the terminology of Pierre 
Bourdieu as valuable guidance in the study of elite reproduction, we examine the sym-
bolic elements of the economic field (Lebaron, 2000: 124) used to legitimize the posi-
tions of executives. CEOs reproduce their position through symbolic capital, which is the 
legitimate form of capital giving their dominance an ‘innocence of natural phenomena’ 
(Bourdieu and De Saint-Martin, 1978: 26). The legitimating value of these symbols is 
determined in the struggles in the field of power (Bourdieu, 1996: 264–5). The symbolic 
capital used in the economic field is also determined by other fields, such as the aca-
demic field. Accordingly, our empirical findings of the social biography, educational 
pathway and career pattern of top CEOs are not merely a description of qualifications. 
These social facts can be analysed as position takings by accumulating legitimate forms 
of capital in relation to the state of – and struggles in – three embedded fields: 1) the field 
of the firm; 2) the economic field; and 3) the field of power. The relative autonomy of the 
economic field from other fields, and thereby its position in the field of power, is there-
fore indicated in the reproduction of the CEOs.
The strategies of firms[…] depend also on the structure of power positions constitutive of the 
internal governance of the firm or, more exactly, on the (socially constituted) dispositions of 
the directors [dirigeants] acting under the constraints of the field of power within the firm and 
the field of the firm as a whole. (Bourdieu, 2005: 205)
Hence, executives produce ‘the interest of the firm as their interest within the firm’ 
(Bourdieu, 2005: 207, italics in original). Bourdieu (2005) notes that firms as fields tend 
to have homologous or isomorphic structures (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148–50; 
Fligstein, 1996: 657) and thus that the same type of strategies may be successful. 
Therefore, the population of CEOs examined here can be seen as agents capable of hav-
ing success in the homologous fields of their respective firms.
We can understand the firm in which the top executives have succeeded as a field both 
of force and of struggle embedded within the economic field in general (Bourdieu, 2005: 
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69, 205–6). Due to the importance of economic capital, these fields are also related to the 
struggles within the field of power as a whole (Bourdieu, 1996: 264–72). A field of 
power is structured by particular compositions of capital, making the hierarchies of fields 
both multidimensional and relational (Hjellbrekke et al., 2007: 245–6). These structures 
are identified using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Lebaron, 2009).
Bourdieu (2005: 194–5) identifies a number of central forms of capital in the eco-
nomic field. These include financial, cultural, technological, juridical and organizational, 
commercial, social and symbolic capital. ‘Capital’, Bourdieu (1986: 241) notes, ‘is accu-
mulated labor’ thus acquired over time depending on the structure of distribution of the 
different forms of capital. Having access to the capital needed to occupy a dominant 
position thus enables the agent to influence both the ‘games of society’ through which 
these forms of capital are accumulated and the conversion rates between different forms 
of capital, which is the central stake in the struggles within the field of power (Bourdieu, 
1996: 265).
The technological capital – ‘the portfolio of scientific resources (research potential) 
or technical resources (procedures, aptitudes, routines and unique and coherent know-
how, capable of reducing expenditure in labour or capital […])’ (Bourdieu, 2005: 194) – 
can be seen as an applied or field-specific component of cultural capital, while not 
necessarily requiring the same incorporated features as the mastery of a more general-
ized cultural capital. Therefore, we interpret university diplomas in economy or science, 
and particularly doctorates, as indicators of cultural-technical capital identifying experts 
rather than intellectuals. In our MCA, we limit our focus on the reproduction mechanism 
to organizational, cultural-technical, commercial and what can analytically be labelled as 
inherited capital. Available through ‘the Family Mode of Reproduction’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 
278ff), inherited capital can consist of 1) financial capital, such as the heritage of the 
financial resources tied to ownership; 2) cultural capital in the incorporated form allow-
ing the grace of the native within the social games of the dominant classes (cf. Bourdieu, 
1984: 339); 3) social capital providing access to the network of the established family; 
and through this 4) symbolic capital tied to the family name and its ‘social investment 
strategies’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 273). Inherited capital thus enables the agents to understand 
the doxa (Bourdieu, 1996: 35, 272) of the firm as a field, and the economic field in gen-
eral and gain mastery of the class-specific habitus (Hartmann, 2000), or what Mills 
(1956: 140) terms the ‘sound character’:
Those who have started from high have from their beginnings been formed by sound men and 
trained for soundness. They do not have to think of having to appear as sound men. They just 
are sound men; indeed, they embody the standards of soundness. (Mills, 1956: 142)
Data
The Danish data were collected using the prosopographical method (Broady, 2002), 
while using a wide array of sources to access biographical and corporate information. 
Data were systematically collected from the Danish equivalent of Who’s Who? (Kraks 
Blå Bog), Greens Erhvervsinformation (a private business information database), jour-
nalistic portrait articles, article search engines, bibliographic databases, financial reports 
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and public registers. The method used to identify forms of capital and relations is Specific 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis, with support from a descriptive analysis of the vari-
ous business elites.
CEOs from 82 corporations were selected according to their position as CEO in 
December 2007. We included 18 executives on other criteria, taking into account the 
magnitude of the corporations and issues regarding ownership and control, leaving us 
with a final population of 100 CEOs. These CEOs thus compose a business elite holding 
positions of command (Scott, 2003: 156–7). Inside this exclusive group of top corpora-
tions, there is a considerable difference in size. The turnover of the shipping giant A.P. 
Møller-Mærsk is 50 times higher than that of the company with the lowest turnover 
(EAC). The corporation with the most employees (ISS), with half a million employed, 
has more than a thousand times the number of employees than the state-controlled gam-
bling monopoly (Danske Spil). Because of these major size differences between top 
Danish corporations, more than one senior executive from the largest companies have 
been included. Moreover, six owner-managers were included – all were both former 
CEOs and current chairmen within the corporation – as they could be seen as the de facto 
leaders of the firm, both internally and externally.
The 82 corporations with formal ownership and management located in Denmark 
were selected through either financial capital, measured as having a turnover of over five 
billion DKK (€650 million), or organizational capital, defined as having a least 5000 
employees; 34 corporations were included on both criteria, 45 on financial capital and 
three on organizational capital alone. To avoid including investors, rather than execu-
tives, a minimum of 500 employees was also required, excluding 12 firms. Companies 
acting only as subsidiaries were also excluded.
The Comparative Methodology
The historical differences between the nation-state-based business elites under compari-
son are considerable (cf. Scott, 1997: 16; Windolf, 1998: 321–2). The most significant is 
the difference in the size of the economy and, consequently, also the number of world-
scale corporations. Likewise, the ownership structure varies, for example, with more 
dispersed shareholding in the UK and more family and state control in France (Maclean 
et al., 2006: 69) and Denmark. Following Hartmann (2010), a small number of Danish 
CEOs could be compared with the top 100 from large, industrialized countries. However, 
this would make it impossible to study elites of the same relational importance, reputa-
tion and size within the nation-states.
Apart from being cases of the three models of business elite reproduction, the reason 
we restrict our direct comparisons to certain studies of French, British (Maclean et al., 
2006) and German business elites (Hartmann, 2000, 2007, 2010) is because these studies 
define the business elites with the same level of exclusiveness as our data: the top 100 
senior executives, or the top decile of the dominant segment of the business elite as iden-
tified by Useem and McCormack (1981). Here, we present the most important discrepan-
cies. The Danish data include executives only, whereas Maclean et al. (2006) also include 
non-executives with many top-board memberships. Compared with our selection criteria 
of either financial or organizational capital, Hartmann (2000) used turnover with the 
 at Copenhagen University Library on March 3, 2015soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Ellersgaard et al. 1057
predefined relation 5:3:2 of corporations from industry, commerce and finance. The 
solution used for Denmark gives a relative strength of 39:32:17 from industry, commerce 
and finance (the 12 executives from conglomerates excluded). This should be attributed 
to the distinctive trading culture that has shaped economic life in Denmark (Fellman, 
2008), rather than to bias towards inclusion of commercial corporations in our analysis.
The Disappearance of the Elite School
Capital acquired through exclusive educational institutions has been given a pivotal role 
in studies of elite recruitment, with the importance of diplomas increasing with the size 
of the corporation (Bourdieu et al., 1973: 66–70). In this sense, elite universities are 
defined not so much by their ranking as by their ability to secure 1) a substantial number 
of alumni placed in the most powerful positions in society (Hartmann, 2000); and 2) an 
exclusive social selection, often probing the elite socialization through personal inter-
views (Karabel, 2005), thus enhancing elite consciousness. Consequently, this makes the 
sole selection criterion of Danish universities – grade-point average – a less efficient 
exclusion strategy because of the inability to examine, and thus legitimize, more per-
sonal traits gained through inherited capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1996: 295ff).
As Table 2 shows, the educational profile of Danish CEOs is similar to that of their 
British counterparts. A university diploma is certainly important to succeed in the upper 
echelons of management but is not a prerequisite in the same way as in Germany or 
France. Rarely do Danish CEOs have educations that are primarily connected with cul-
tural capital, such as the arts, humanities and social sciences. Instead, it is diplomas in 
applicable business knowledge or technical competences that are required. Hartmann 
(2000: 252) describes the difference between German universities focusing on techno-
logical capital – ‘the transfer of subject knowledge’ – and French elite institutions repro-
ducing and converting cultural capital: ‘abilities such as intellectual brilliance, rapid 
comprehension, responsibility, leadership drive, and a pronounced elite consciousness’.
No university programme or institution in Denmark can be seen as an elite university 
according to the first definition: in itself being so prestigious that a promising career 
leading to a highly powerful position is guaranteed. Most top CEOs (14) attended gen-
eral business education at the Copenhagen Business School (CBS), the University of 
Copenhagen or the Technical University of Denmark (DTU); each institution has 12 
alumni in top senior executive positions. Considering there are relatively few institutions 
offering university diplomas, the number of CEOs from each institution is low. 
Additionally, none of these institutions is important for the recruitment of other elite 
groups in Denmark.
While research clearly demonstrates that selection into tertiary education in Denmark 
is tied to parental social position and cultural reproduction (Munk and Thomsen, 2011; 
Thomsen, 2012), and the engineers and economists are generally recruited within the 
economic upper class, there is no indication in our Danish data of a strong linkage 
between parental background and the top CEOs’ elite education, as seen, for example, in 
the UK (Maclean et al., 2006: 119). Furthermore, no more than five of the top 100 CEOs 
qualified from among the top 25 programmes, measured by grade-point average mini-
mum of enrolled students, in either 1979 (the median graduation year of the CEOs) or in 
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2007. Thus the institutionally validated personality gained through exclusive social 
selection of the student – as used in the second definition of elite universities – is in no 
way a common feature of the programmes followed by the Danish CEOs. However, 
through examinations, some programmes may contribute to a selection process and thus 
gain more exclusivity before individuals take up executive positions.
Despite Germany having no elite universities, the institutionalized cultural capital of 
a university or doctoral degree is important: almost 90 per cent of CEOs have a higher 
degree and almost half have a PhD (Hartmann, 2010: 303–4). In Germany, doctorates 
may also be gained much later in the career trajectory (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1999: 
26), tying holders of this title more to their organizational capital within the firm than to 
their inherited cultural capital. Nonetheless, the number of doctorates emphasizes the 
importance of scholarly capital compared with Denmark’s less than two-thirds with mas-
ter degrees and less than one in 10 with doctorates, as shown in Table 2. Thus, in 
Denmark, few exclusive university programmes, or academic merits in general, act as 
gatekeeper in legitimizing a potential elite member’s social qualifications.
Adding to this result, we have not been able to identify Danish secondary equivalents of 
the British public schools, the American boarding schools or the prestigious French Lycée 
[the khâgne] so important for both recruitment and networks of future elite individuals 
Table 2. Education profiles of top 100 CEOs.
Germany France UK Denmark
Year 1995 1998 1998 2007
Education type
Arts, humanities or 
social sciences
27 2 12 7
Business, economics or 
administration
33 42 26 43
Science, engineering or 
medicine
22 44 27 25
Professional 6 4 29 23
School only 0 7 5 0
Not known 9 1 1 2
Highest qualification
Doctorate 46 10 6 8
Higher degree 36 80 23 54
First degree – 2 45 13
Professional qualification 
only
6 0 20 23
School – 7 5 0
Not known 9 1 1 2
N 97 100 100 100
Note: Sources: Germany, Hartmann (2000: 248); France and UK, Maclean et al. (2006: 117); Denmark, authors’ 
own research.
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(Bourdieu, 1996: 84; Maclean et al., 2006: 96ff; Mills, 1956: 67). The most well-known 
Danish boarding school, Herlufsholm, has only one former student as a top CEO; the two 
most prestigious secondary schools situated in the most upscale Copenhagen suburbs have 
two former top CEOs as alumni. No evidence suggests that social or cultural capital gath-
ered through the attendance at specific institutions of secondary education plays an impor-
tant role in the qualification or selection process of Danish top CEOs. These findings 
appear to be general for the Scandinavian countries; Mastekaasa (2004: 223) describes the 
absence of elite institutions in Norway on both the secondary and the tertiary level.
Interestingly, the lack of an elite university or programme is not because none has 
been established. In the 1950s, DTU was one of two institutions with admission criteria 
other than a secondary diploma. The DTU had an explicit focus on developing tomor-
row’s leaders (Reinholdt Hansen, 2000). In 1999 almost one-third of the top 250 Danish 
CEOs were engineers (Christiansen et al., 2001: 153), whereas only 17 engineers are 
included in our population of 2007, eight years later. Of these, 10 were born before 1950 
compared to only 27 of the CEOs in total, adding to the image of a declining engineering 
profession. While similar tendencies are found in Norway (Gulbrandsen et al., 2002: 59), 
the strength of the French engineers leads us to believe that the diminishing numbers of 
engineers may be due to the lack of exclusiveness. The decline of DTU’s prestige may 
have been due to its relocation in 1974 from the centre of Copenhagen to the suburbs, 
Kgs. Lyngby, and a subsequent restructuring, resulting in a substantial increase in enrol-
ment. Accordingly, the alumni lost both the symbolic benefits and the espirit du corps 
that a potential French executive gains from the numerus clausus at, for example, the 
École Nationale d’Administration with an annual intake of around 175 students from 
more than 2000 applicants.
The structural homology between the field of elite universities and the field of eco-
nomic power found by Bourdieu (1996) in France thus plays a subordinate role in the 
reproduction of the business elite in Denmark. As our correspondence analysis shows, 
we can therefore interpret the university diplomas of Danish top CEOs as principally 
being indicators of technical capital, as in Germany. However, as in Britain, this techni-
cal capital is not a prerequisite for a successful managerial career. In this sense, Denmark 
is placed between the German and the British positions, with elite universities being of 
little importance, as in Germany, but, as in Britain, academic qualifications in general 
being of less importance.
Reproduction through the Economic Field
Without the selection mechanism of elite universities, how are the cohesion, homogene-
ity and exclusive social background of CEOs possible? As Table 3 shows, it is necessary 
to have a career in the economic field. The degree of elite circulation in Denmark resem-
bles the low circulation found in Britain and Germany (Hartmann, 2010: 304) without 
the French tradition of pantouflage from higher civil service to a managerial career 
(Bourdieu, 1996: 329). However, loyalty towards one firm, an important component of 
organizational capital, seems more important in the larger industrial societies. More than 
half the German CEOs have spent their entire career within one corporation (Hartmann, 
2010), whereas this holds true for a quarter of the Danish top CEOs.
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Another important finding shown in Table 3 is that it seems much easier to change 
path from enterprise to corporate careers in Denmark than in both France and the UK. 
This suggests that capital and merits gained from the economic field in general, rather 
than purely the space of top corporations, qualify potential top CEOs. Likewise, Danish 
top CEOs have had, on average, almost one more corporation as an employer than have 
their French and British counterparts.
An important characteristic of Danish top CEOs in a comparative perspective is 
the importance of their corporate career and thus their organizational capital. The 
relatively high number of 16 CEOs with no educational diplomas, apart from being 
trainees in large corporations, points to the importance of some corporations, particu-
larly A.P. Møller-Mærsk, as being academies (cf. Cappelli and Hamori, 2005: 25) 
within a corporation-based mode of reproduction. This organizational capital is not a 
prerequisite, as the trajectories of several Danish top senior executives point to more 
irregular careers based in enterprises in the economic field, but outside the hierarchies 
of large corporations.
Identifying Relations between Forms of Capital: Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis
Correspondence analysis, Bourdieu (2005: 102, italics in original) notes, can be used ‘to 
bring to light the structure of positions or – and this amounts to the same thing – the 
structure of distribution of specific interest and powers that determines and explains the 
strategies of the agent’. Through this method, we visualise the opposite positions 
Table 3. Career profile and characteristics of top 100 CEOs.
France UK Denmark
Year 1998 1998 2007
Corporate 41 84 57
Enterprise to corporate 9 2 30
Public administration or organizations to 
corporate
49 3 7
Law to corporate 0 6 1
Media, politics, academia or sports to corporate 1 5 2
Not known 0 0 3
N 100 100 100
Age at first appointment as top CEO 40.5 44.1 44.4
(Standard deviation) (6.0) (5.8) (7.3)
Number of companies to first top 100 
directorships
2.2 2.1 2.9
(Standard deviation) (1.2) (1.2) (1.8)
Note: Source: Career profile, age as top CEO and number of companies in France and UK (Maclean et al., 
2006: 127, 117, 139), Denmark, authors’ own research.
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generative of practice by graphically identifying the distribution of ‘objective positions’ 
within the business elite.
A Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis, which allows us to ignore missing or 
redundant categories when determining the Euclidian distance between the individuals 
by which the principal axes are determined (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004, 2010), was 
conducted on indicators of organizational, technical-cultural and inherited capital 
(Table 4). Note that these indicators cover the career trajectory only until the first 
appointment as a CEO at one of the 82 selected corporations. It is difficult to separate 
the institutionalized cultural capital tied to academic diplomas from the more work-
related and applicable technical capital when no valid indicators of either social or 
economic capital before appointment are available.
We identified a multidimensional Euclidian space consisting of three interpretable 
axes accounting for 57 per cent of the total adjusted inertia (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004: 
209). The interpretation of the axes is inferred by the modalities with a contribution value 
above average (Jambu, 1991: 286).1 Figures 1 and 2 map the geometrical representation 
of the axes’ principal components. When interpreting these, distances between modali-
ties above 0.5 are considered ‘notable’, while distances above 1.0 are deemed to be 
‘large’ (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010: 71). As shown in Figure 1, the first axis, explaining 
Table 4. Contribution of active variables.
Heading Variable Modalities Dim.1 (25%) Dim.2 (18%) Dim.3 (14%)
Career Career start 2 7.9 4.8 0.8
 Years from education 
to executive
4 12.3 3.7 5.6
 Years in corporation 
until CEO
5 17.8 6.2 4.1
 Age as CEO 4 8.0 0.3 10.8
 Career changes 3 8.4 8.6 4.1
 MBA 3 4.3 1.6 2.6
 Business diploma 2 3.5 0.0 0.0
 Abroad 3 1.1 2.0 8.2
Total 26 63.3 27.2 36.2
Education PhD 2 0.8 7.5 1.6
 Education 9 17.1 16.9 8.9
 Author 2 1.9 12.1 2.4
 Career foundation 5 5.6 12.1 5.6
Total 18 25.4 48.6 18.5
Family Place of birth 5 5.0 13 10.3
 Social background 7 5.1 9.0 20.4
 In-laws in Who’s Who 2 0.7 0.5 2.0
 Family in Who’s Who 2 0.3 1.6 12.5
Total 16 11.1 24.1 45.2
All headings 60 100 100 100
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25 per cent of the total inertia, captures a contrast between agents holding large amounts 
of organizational capital (typically, trainees with long careers within the corporation and 
no company changes throughout their career) and those who succeeded through other 
forms of capital, usually with a much shorter career length.
The left side of the second axis, representing 18 per cent of the total inertia, shows 
CEOs with high amounts of technical or cultural capital before appointment; for exam-
ple, having authored a book, a doctoral degree and being born in a provincial town. The 
right side shows CEOs with large amounts of commercial capital. Characteristics of 
CEOs with commercial capital are a high number of career changes; rural upbringing; 
father being a farmer, craftsman or shopkeeper; career start in enterprises; and having a 
BSc and an MSc in Business from the Copenhagen Business School. All modalities of 
university education are placed on the left side of the second axis of technical and com-
mercial capital, while trainees and those with vocational training are placed with the 
business school graduates on the right side. Thus it seems that the distinctive features on 
Figure 1. Modalities with above average contributions to axis 1 and 2.
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the Danish CEOs shown in Tables 2 and 3 are closely tied to a career path dependent on 
high amounts of commercial capital.
When interpreting the third axis, accounting for 14 per cent of the total inertia 
(Figure 2), a clear division in amount of inherited capital is seen, with top CEOs with 
parents (or parents-in-law) mentioned in the Danish equivalent of Who’s Who, parents 
who were executives or owners, and CEOs born in the Copenhagen area opposed prin-
cipally to CEOs with rural backgrounds. Those associated with high levels of inherited 
capital are seen as managerial potential from the start of their career and therefore 
achieve their first executive position shortly after finishing their education, reaching 
the top managerial elite before their 40th birthday. Those with a low level of inherited 
capital reach the top after they turn 50 years and, logically, have longer careers.
This three-dimensional structure, and particularly the important role of commercial 
capital in recruitment of Danish CEOs, could be a result of the larger commercial sector 
in this sample and in the Danish economy. This would hold if the sector of the corporation 
Figure 2. Modalities with above average contributions to axis 3.
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as a supplementary variable were placed distinctively within the three-dimensional space. 
However, this is not the case. Industry, commerce, and finance are not distanced from 
each other by more than a 0.5 distance on the principal axis, allowing no valid interpreta-
tion of this deviation.
Cluster Analysis: The Pathway of Inheritors, the 
Organizational Personnel, Experts, and Salespeople
With the general structure of capital constructed, subgroups of distinct pathways can be 
constructed by cluster analysis to construct a typology (cf. Denord et al., 2011) of path-
ways to the top management in Denmark. Clusters of individuals have been identified by 
way of ascending hierarchical clustering of Euclidian distances within the three-dimen-
sional space of individual career trajectories constructed through the SMCA (Le Roux 
and Rouanet, 2004: 106–15) identifying the partition with four clusters as the best fit. 
The four clusters are shown in Figure 3 and can be described ideally as follows:
1 The inheritors (C1) are characterized by high levels of organizational and inher-
ited capital and relatively quick careers within a single corporation. Often sons of 
executives, born near the centre of the national field of power in Copenhagen, 
with a trainee background, a career start in management and foreign experience 
– typically less than seven years, but enough to acquire cosmopolitan capital (cf. 
Weenink, 2008), these men symbolize a sound character. A quarter (25) of the top 
CEOs are placed in this cluster. The inherited path is not uniquely characterized 
by the owners who inherited their position through financial control of the firm. 
Only seven (28%) of the CEOs in the inheritors’ cluster are owners, and these 
seven account for half the total number of owners (14) in the study. Thus the 
majority of the inheritors do not follow this path as a result of material inherit-
ance of ownership; instead, it is due to their ability to master the class-specific 
habitus.
2 The organizational personnel (C2) also have a high level of organizational capi-
tal but very little inherited capital. These men have worked their way to the top 
within one corporation and are, on average, seven years older than their peers 
before their appointment as top CEOs and have a significantly lower number of 
career changes. On average, their capital structure is slightly more tied to techni-
cal than commercial capital, both in general and in comparison with the inheri-
tors. The label ‘the organizational personnel’ applies to 27 top CEOs.
3 The experts (C3) have high levels of technical capital, quick careers, authorships 
and PhDs. These men have been able to benefit from their merits in scholarly 
fields. It is also among these agents that we find the few career patterns that 
involve positions in the state bureaucracy or organizations and an educational 
background in economics in common with top politicians and bureaucrats – the 
characteristics of pantouflage. With parents without a particularly prestigious 
background, and with partners in academic jobs, it appears that this relatively 
rare trajectory – followed by only 14 CEOs – is similar to the path trodden by the 
highly scholarly qualified German CEOs and the elitist French CEOs.
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4 The salespeople (C4) seem to have the most homogenous trajectory when 
looking at the concentration ellipses in Figure 3. It is also the most common of 
the four trajectories, followed by more than a third (34) of the top CEOs. 
Typically, these men have high levels of commercial capital, with a career start in 
enterprises, many career changes and a rural upbringing. Like the experts, these 
men have not spent many years in their current firm accumulating capital. 
However, they have spent their entire career in private businesses, usually with-
out prestigious diplomas to catapult them to a certain level of the organizational 
hierarchy. Instead, they started their career in sales or marketing and gradually 
worked their way up through different enterprises and corporations. CEOs quali-
fied by their commercial capital work in firms that are younger – the average age 
of their firms being 51 years – than the average of 82 years for all corporations 
included here. The firms managed by salespeople are also less profitable and less 
prestigious than the other firms, as seen by the lack of publicity, both in the num-
ber of press articles and books about the firm. These characteristics are correlated 
to other indicators of firm prestige such as members of other sub-elites on the 
board of directors and sheer economic size. In many ways these organizations 
offer a trajectory more compatible with the strategy of a newcomer to the field 
with dispositions from an upbringing in a self-employed milieu.
Discussion
Adding to Hartmann’s (2007) three models of reproduction, we place the Danish 
business elite as being tied to the German case of both low elite circulation and low 
importance of elite universities or public schools. The cultural-technical capital 
acquired through university diplomas in general and postgraduate studies in particu-
lar appears to be specific for the German and French case rather than the Danish 
case. Like the British case, capital acquired through the economic field in Denmark 
is more important, with the important distinction that not only organizational capital, 
but also commercial capital qualifies for a position in top management. On the basis 
of a Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis, it is possible to identify four clus-
ters of career trajectories: the inheritors, the organizational personnel, the experts, 
and the salespeople.
Of these groups, only the 14 experts can be seen as legitimizing their power through 
capital acquired in the educational system. The lack of an institution of elite education 
thus implies a weaker position of cultural capital – and institutions that distribute it – 
within the business elite and perhaps within the Danish power elite as a whole. It is pos-
sible that the lack of elite schools can be attributed to the egalitarian ethos of the 
decommodifying, social-democratic Scandinavian welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Nevertheless, it may also be a function of the relatively small size of the Danish 
elite, which is therefore unable to sustain an elite school.
These findings emphasize the need for the use of Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology of the 
social stratification of the elite in an economic and cultural fraction as a model of the 
logic behind ‘the organic solidarity of the genuine division of the labor of domination’ 
(Bourdieu, 1996: 263) rather than as a theory of the social ontology of elites in all 
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western nation-states. Thus the analysis follows Hjellbrekke et al. (2007) in showing 
how the forms of capital structuring the field of power vary across different nation-states 
depending on the particular strength of different institutions of reproduction. The inte-
gration of the corporate, political and military elite into a power elite in C. Wright Mills’ 
(1956) analysis should likewise be interpreted as a theory on the effects of elite cohesion 
and not as a description of the paramount elite fractions across historical and national 
boundaries.
However, the reproduction strategies of the business elites tied to nation-state institu-
tions are under considerable pressure because of the rise of transnational corporations 
and the ensuing integration of corporate elites into transnational communities, demon-
strated by Carroll (2010). Even though the vast majority of the included corporations 
have some – or even all – of their activities located outside Denmark, only five CEOs 
were not born in Denmark. Of these, all have been tied to the Danish economic field for 
many years. Two started their career in Danish corporations or in Denmark more than 20 
years prior to their current appointment. One married the heiress to the corporation he 
now heads. Two are Swedes and are thus familiar with the particular social games of the 
Scandinavian boardrooms. These findings follow the pattern found by Hartmann (2010: 
315–16) in Germany and France. Furthermore, fewer than half the Danish CEOs have 
worked abroad, and, of the 47 who have, 36 were stationed abroad by their Danish parent 
corporation. While 24 of the 26 MBA degrees of Danish CEOs were acquired from busi-
ness schools outside Denmark, which confirms that an international market for exclusive 
executive degrees taken during a corporate career has been established (see also Marceau, 
1989), only six of the Danish-born CEOs have their university diploma, or parts of it, 
from abroad. While networks of corporate power, and the culture of business elites (cf. 
Sklair, 2001: 255–94), have gone global, access to them is still tied to local dynamics 
within the reproduction strategies of national business elites.
The exclusive social background of Danish CEOs and the specific trajectories of 
recruitment question the picture of the open nature of Scandinavian elites, cited below 
using the analysis of the Danish Power Study. A very particular and strong form of char-
acter still has to be formed to be considered top managerial material.
The social exclusivity of elites increases according to the size of the respective country [while] 
there are also specific national traditions and balances of power […]. In the Scandinavian 
countries with their comparably egalitarian basic attitude and their relatively open educational 
system the social composition of elites is on average less exclusive than in countries with 
explicit institutions of elite education, a classical upper class, or a tradition as a great power. 
Hartmann (2010: 222)
The importance of this character can be seen by the fact that the reproduction of business 
elites is not tied solely to exclusive social background. Women also form a minority. In 
the Scandinavian countries, there are no more than 5 per cent of women in any of the 
business elites (Ruostetsaari, 2008: 163). Moreover, there are no more than two women 
amongst the 100 top managers in France, Britain (Maclean et al., 2006: 7) and Denmark. 
This suggests that explanations focusing on the more bodily acquired skills (such as 
mastery of the natural tone of voice, gesture and body language) that enable an individ-
ual to play the power games within the firms and the business elites (Bourdieu, 1996; 
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Hartmann, 2000; Mills, 1956; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998) can have great explana-
tory value for the stable reproduction of business elites.
The world economy was shaken by the financial crisis, and questions were raised 
about managerial legitimacy in the transnational corporations. When viewed from a 
national perspective, the qualifications and traits of the CEOs seem functional necessi-
ties of the managerial position. However, when compared across countries, the arbitrary 
nature of these requirements becomes apparent. If there were a universal requirement, it 
would be to have the established social background, which does not resonate well within 
a meritocratic ethos. A critical perspective on the historically established character of the 
CEO and its consequences for the quality and ethics of corporate governance is therefore 
required.
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Abstract: 
When assessing whether a CEO in a top firm is a powerful agent on the field of  power it is not enough 
to look exclusively at the objective resources of  the firm. It is essential to know the accumulated 
symbolic resources of  both the firm and the CEO. We will demonstrate both theoretically and 
empirically that social capital within the field of  power is a good indicator of  the symbolic capital of  
the CEO. Only those directors that have symbolic capital on the field of  power are able to influence 
the field of  power directly. With the help of  correspondence analysis, we map the distribution of  
symbolic and social capital among the 100 topmost CEO in Denmark. The analysis is based on 
prosopographical data from 2007 and finds a strong correlation between indicators of  different forms 
of  social and symbolic capital. These findings are used in a discussion of  the size of  the Danish field 
of  power. 
 
Keywords: Social Capital, Bourdieu, Multiple Correspondence Analysis, prosopograhy, Symbolic 
Capital, Economic Elites, The Field of  Power 
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Introduction: The symbolic and social integration of chief executives 
within the field of power1 
 
Of  course, the CEO of  Danske Bank has power, but the position itself  is not enough. It takes 
a respected person that people will listen to, and Peter Straarup is such a person.  
Michael Pram Rasmussen, Chairman of  the Board of  Directors of  A.P. Møller – Mærsk,  
in Mikkelsen (2007:105, our translation) 
 
You cannot tell whether a managing director is a part of  the field of  power, and thus one of  the 
decisive players in the distribution of  resources in society, simply by looking at his job position. 
Inclusion in the core of  the field of  power does not simply follow from the size of  a company, or from 
the “performances” of  a CEO. The distribution of  contacts to the field of  power and of  influence 
within it, is mediated through a symbolic economy.  The CEOs who have influence are the ones who 
are symbolically recognised by the other players within the field. In this article, we will argue that social 
capital plays a special role in the distribution of  symbolic recognition within the field of  power. By 
knowing the social capital of  CEOs we can thus assess the degree to which they are included in the 
field of  power.  
The ability of  a company to integrate their senior managers in the field of  power can be of  decisive 
importance for the company, the sector and the capitalist. Danish companies do not merely make 
decisions focusing on the behaviour of  the markets or the disciplining gaze of  the investors. According 
to Neil Fligstein (1996, 2002), business success is largely dependent on alliances with the state actors 
who create the framework of  the game in the economic field. In the words of  Ralph Miliband (1969:1), 
these agents are fighting ‘for the state's attention, or for its control’. Particular interests are universalised 
through the state.  
However,  as Pierre Bourdieu (2010) has shown, the state – and the field of  power more generally – 
cannot be reduced to a superstructure, which merely reflects the economic basis and the division of  
power, as simplistic readings of  Marx would. Instead, the connections through which economic 
                                                 
1 In preparing this article, we have benefited greatly from the advice and guidance from our colleagues at the Department 
of  Sociology, especially Kristoffer Kropp, and Martin D.  Munk. In addition, thanks to Toke Skou Larsen. We are also 
grateful for the advice and comments from the anonymous reviewers. The responsibility for the content of  the article is 
of  course our own. 
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organisations influence state bureaucracy and other institutions connected to the field of  power, are 
borne by concrete individuals and relations, with their relatively independent dynamics. Both 
conservative and Marxist elite theories show how contacts are established through common class or 
educational backgrounds, and overlapping social circles, etc. (see e.g. Aron 1950; Miliband 1969). For a 
field theory-based analysis of  the overlapping circles of  the elites within the Scandinavian counties, see 
Denord et al. (2011). 
Apart from these common features, Bourdieu’s keen eye for the symbolic dimension of  power helps us 
understand how these common features creates an integrated potential for action. When the CEOs of  
the largest companies master the broad elite culture, they demonstrate that they are not merely capable 
actors within the economic field, but personal carriers of  a power resource that makes them central 
intermediaries between different forms of  capital within the field of  power. They become ‘sound 
person’. Only by engaging in this symbolic economy of  honour can CEOs win the favour of  the rest 
of  the field of  power, and engage in relations of  capital conversion. For this reason it is central to 
understand the criteria of  inclusion within the circles of  power (cf. Mills 1956). The struggles within 
the field of  power largely concern the definition of  legitimate forms of  power (Bourdieu 1996:265) and 
thus there is not one fixed hierarchy of  recognition and distribution of  symbolic capital. Yet, when a 
person is invited to join a network, a board, or other spaces where powerful people are found, it seems 
like a symbolic consecration of  the individual. Thus social capital can function as a measure of  
symbolic capital within the field of  power. To be included means that to be recognized as an individual 
within the symbolic economy of  honour of  the field of  power.  
The relation between symbolic and social capital can be understood as structured by the Matthew effect 
(cf. Merton 1968). Access to the right social circles opens for symbolic recognition, which gives access 
to new social circles in turn. Symbolic and social resources are accumulated, and partake in a further 
process of  accumulation of  symbolic and social resources. This effect must not be understood 
tautologically as “you gain contacts because you are powerful and you are powerful because you gain 
contacts, but as processual. If  agents gain a position with sufficient symbolic capital – or convert 
another form of  capital – it gains the possibility of  participating in the social and symbolic economy of  
the elite circles.   
This article will attempt to throw light on this dynamic from a prosopographic study of  the hundred 
highest-ranking CEOs in Denmark. The dynamics of  the integration of  the chief  executives in the field 
of  power is specifically interesting, because they administer the economic and organisational capital, 
which according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986, 1996:274, 2005:194) makes them the representatives and 
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possessors of  the dominant and most easily convertible form of  capital within the field of  power. For 
this reason, the relation between a company and its CEO’s position is interesting: Which executives 
from what companies achieve social and symbolic capital within the field of  power? Which differences 
are there in the forms of  social and symbolic capital different types of  CEOs – owners and managers – 
gain access to? How many chief  executives are integrated within the field of  power? 
Initially, we answer these questions through a theoretical clarification of  the role of  social and symbolic 
capital within the field of  power according to the works of  Bourdieu and Mills. After a brief  
description of  the data that forms the basis of  this investigation, we analyse chief  executives according 
to their relation to the field of  power. Through a description of  the allocation of  royal recognition 
through orders and invitations, of  positions on boards and in networks, connections to the state, 
politics and science, as well as their salaries and residencies, we arrive at a picture of  the chief  
executives as a symbolically recognized and well-integrated group. The relations between these different 
indicators of  symbolic, social and economic capital is investigated through specific multiple 
correspondence analysis. Through this investigation, we construct the space of  social and symbolic 
capital within the field of  power between Danish chief  executives. We analyse this space with the key 
characteristics of  the companies and the social background of  the CEOs. The analysis results in an 
assessment of  the coincidence between social and symbolic capital. Finally, we discuss the meaning of  
the Matthew effect for symbolic capital in relation to the size of  the power elite in Denmark. 
The field of power and circles of power  
 
Bourdieu’s and C. W. Mills’ descriptions of  power within the elites of  western societies are quite similar 
(Burawoy and Von Holdt 2012). They both describe society as built up by hierarchically organised 
sectors, and the actors at the summit of  these sectors (or fields) participate in a unifying and integrating 
field where the struggles over resources between sectors play out. Bourdieu speaks of  a “field of  
power” and C.W. Mills (1956) of  the “power elite” or ”the higher circles of  power”. 
Mills found that power in the USA is centralised around the spheres of  the economy, military and state. 
Bourdieu found that in France the central contradictions in the elite is between the economic and 
cultural elite, see Figure 1. The struggles in the field of  power decide the exchange rate between 
different forms of  capital, yet they work towards integration: 
The existence of  a plurality of  partially independent principles of  hierarchization sets a de facto limit to 
the struggle of  all against all among the dominant. It fosters a form of  complementarity which is the 
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basis of  a veritable organic solidarity within the division of  labour of  domination. Thus the couple of  
those who act and those who speak is at once antagonistic and complementary, the division of  labour of  
domination being accomplished within and through the conflict which links them.  
Bourdieu (in Wacquant 1993:25) 
Through these struggles, a form of  meta-capital arises in the field of  power (Hansen and Hammerslev 
2010). This meta-capital is crucial for the determination of  the exchange rate between the forms of  
capital, and the struggles over this rate is a struggle over the state and the definition of  the state. That 
the state becomes the point of  focal point of  the power struggles in the top of  society is a result of  the 
state’s function as ‘the central bank of  symbolic credit’ (Bourdieu in Wacquant 1993:39). The state’s 
recognition of  the different types of  capital is necessary because, according to Bourdieu (1996:265) no 
power is satisfied by existing in its raw form, and because the recognition of  the state can lend 
particular interests a universal form. 
FIGURE 1: THE FIELD OF POWER 
 
The field of  power following Wacquant (2005:143) and Bourdieu (1996:267). 
The struggles are carried out by individuals who, as a result of  the mechanisms of  reproduction that 
underlie the field of  power, are already disposed to the structure of  the field. Thus, the struggles take 
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place between individuals who by and large recognise the existing order. Therefore, the results of  the 
struggles within the field of  power will not radically alter the power relations between the sectors (Aron 
1950:10). According to Aron, such changes demand a radical break with the composition of  the elite 
and with its the mechanisms of  reproduction. From this follows that any study of  the elite and similar 
closed circles must have an eye for the ways in which people gain access to the elite, and what the 
criteria of  access do in terms of  creating a more or less uniform elite character. We will now briefly 
summarise the dynamics of  reproduction (see Ellersgaard and Larsen 2011) in relation to the position 
of  chief  executives before we explain what significance mechanisms of  reproduction have for the 
access to social and symbolic capital within the field of  power. 
Habitus and character 
The understanding, that the field of  power is integrated organically by opponents mutually recognising 
each other’s power resources (capital forms) can be supplemented by empirical studies that show a 
significant homogeneity in the culture and opinions of  the elite (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot 1999; 
Bürklin and Rebenstorf  1997; Gulbrandsen 2005; Hartmann 2000; Maclean, Harvey, and Press 2006; 
Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1990). The majority of  the 100 chief  executives share an exclusive social 
background (Ellersgaard and Larsen 2011), just as they did in 1955 (Hansen 1964). In the larger 
industrialised countries, the social recruitment of  the elite has remained exclusive during the past 250 
years (Kaelble 1980:415–6). At the same time, homogeneous class conditions tie the actors in the field 
of  power together. They all share relatively high incomes, similar housing conditions, stable 
employment and the opposition to the lower ranking employees. These cultural and structural 
conditions make possible a certain “mechanical” solidarity based on homogeneity. Mills points out the 
homogeneity of  the elite in his description of  the routes that give access to the partially overlapping 
circles that make up the power elite: 
All the structural coincidence of  their interests as well as the intricate, psychological facts of  their 
origins and their education, their careers and their associations make possible the psychological affinities 
that prevail among them, affinities that make it possible for them to say of  one another: He is, of  
course, one of  us.  And all this points to the basic, psychological meaning of  'class consciousness'.  
Mills (1956:283) 
This solidarity is not only an expression of  similarities in class background and education, but to a large 
extent a result of  the mechanisms of  selection that let new individuals enter the decisive circles (Mills 
1956:281). These pose clear demands of  what Mills terms the character of  chief  executives (which can 
be understood as derived from their symbolically dominating habitus and hexis, see below). 
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The fit survive, and fitness means, not formal competence – there probably is no such thing for top 
executives positions – but conformity with the criteria of  those who have already succeeded. To be 
compatible with the top men is to act like them, to look like them, to think like them: to be of  and for 
them – or at least to display oneself  to them in such a way to create that impression  
Mills (1956:140) 
Among CEOs, it is easier for those who have the right class background to gain inclusion in the ‘best’ 
circles (Hartmann 2000; Marceau 1989:6; Mills 1956:142). Even though the ‘right’ character is inherited 
to some extent, it is more important to understand that character is shaped by the dominant criteria of  
recognition. One will therefore find a partial correspondence between the relations of  power between 
different forms of  capital within the field of  power and the criteria of  recognition which shape 
individuals in the highest ranking positions (in this case chief  executives). Before they enter into the 
field of  power the dominant actors are therefore already disposed to recognise the existing order, 
because this was a criteria of  their inclusion.  
‘We instinctively recognize the ones who are and the ones who aren't,’ a top industrial leader states, 
adding that ‘when you're part of  the establishment, you don't talk about the establishment.’ It is obvious 
that ‘there are truly no men of  the left in the establishment’ but here again it all comes down to the way 
one behaves; and [...] people have nothing but scorn for the “trouble-makers” who in their 
progressiveness, betray their caste and give the game away.   
Bourdieu (1996:317) 
Inclusion within the field of  power can therefore be understood as a result of  several different 
selection processes which produce a homogeneous, integrated elite within a high degree of  mutual 
solidarity. An executive’s inclusion within the field of  power is not directly inherited, nor determined 
solely by the strength of  his or her organisation. Therefore, the actors with most economic and 
academic capital do not necessarily become the most powerful players within the field of  power2. The 
field of  power cannot be reduced to simple relations of  strength or “nobility”, but must be understood 
as a result of  a symbolic economy of  honour, which benefits people and classes with certain 
characteristics. In the following, we will clarify the relation between social and symbolic capital in the 
field of  power. Through this, we will attempt to show that symbolic capital in the form of  reputation 
and honour is the dominant form of  capital within the field of  power. 
  
                                                 
2 In the case of  academic research this is exemplified by the eccentric top-physicist.    
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Symbolic and social capital in the field of power 
The concept of  symbolic capital springs from Bourdieu’s analyses of  the Kabyle economy of  honour. 
The symbolic economy of  honour masks the “raw” economy in such a way that the material conditions 
do not appear “too visibly”.  
Symbolic capital, a transformed and thereby disguised form of  physical ”economic” capital, produces its 
proper effect inasmuch, and only inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it originates in ”material” forms 
of  capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source of  its effects.  
Bourdieu (2007:183, italics in original) 
Symbolic capital reflects the other forms of  capital, but it cannot be reduced to them, and it functions 
as a euphemism for them. In this sense, symbolic capital can be understood as the legitimate form of  
other forms of  capital. 
If  belonging to the establishment is so closely linked to the senoirity of  one's establishment in business, 
this is undoubtedly because symbolic capital consisting of  recognition, confidence, and, in a word, 
legitimacy has its own laws of  accumulation that are distinct from those of  economic capital.  
Bourdieu (1996:318) 
This legitimate form of  capital is a result of  the actor’s display of  the necessary symbols and ability to 
maintain relations of  gift giving. Over time this transforms the actors forms of  capital to specific form 
of  trust that Bourdieu terms symbolic capital. As Bourdieu (2007:181) writes: 
Once one realizes that symbolic capital is always credit, in the widest sense of  the word, i. e. a sort of  
advance which the group alone can grant those who give it the best material and symbolic guarantees, it 
can be seen that the exhibition of  symbolic capital (which is always very expensive in economic terms) is 
one of  the mechanisms which (no doubt universally) make capital go to capital.  
Here Bourdieu draws a clear parallel to the social capital, which in its most pithy definition is capital per 
proxy, but which is dependent on the symbolic credit the individual has built up within the group he 
partakes in (Bourdieu 1986:247–8). Thus, it is not possible to understand social capital without the 
symbolic capital which legitimates the activation of  a connection. It is through the exchange of  
resources, which in the form as presents become symbolic forms of  recognition, that a group 
maintains itself  and marks its boundaries (Bourdieu 1986:247). 
However, social connections can also function as symbolic capital. By having publicly known relations 
to individuals with legitimated forms of  capital, an actor’s own capital gains a seal of  approval and its 
amount is affirmed. These mechanisms are specifically relevant within the field of  power where the 
struggles centre on the exchange relations between different forms of  capital. When one wants to 
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assess the value of  a sub-field’s forms of  capital one of  the best indicators of  the exchange rate 
between, for instance, ecclesial, academic and economic capital is whether a specific form of  capital is 
included within prestigious networks or not. In other words, if  others in the elite for instance think that 
a bishop’s title is powerful and legitimate enough, they allow the bishop space to speak within the 
closed circles. At the same time, the membership and amount of  symbolic work an actor has invested 
in the class indicates his legitimacy. These mechanisms are signs that symbolic capital in the form of  
social capital are strong mechanisms of  differentiation within the field of  power in the same way that 
social capital is crucial in deciding whether a manager rises to the position of  chief  CEO (Harvey and 
Maclean 2008:111). 
 
The Matthew effect 
We will now briefly look at one of  the central ”laws” of  the accumulation of  symbolic capital, the 
Matthew effect (or cumulative advantages), as it is described by Robert K. Merton (1988:606): 
The concept of  cumulative advantage directs our attention to the ways in which initial comparative 
advantages of  trained capacity, structural location, and available resources make for successive 
increments of  advantage such that the gaps between the haves and the have-nots in science (as in other 
domains of  social life) widen until dampened by countervailing processes. 
The Matthew effect, which takes its name from the gospel of  Matthew, describes the process through 
which all forms of  resources are concentrated exponentially until the accumulation is stopped by 
countervailing tendencies. Those, who already have much of  a dominant form of  capital (e.g. scientific 
reputation), have more easy access to those other forms of  capital, which makes it possible to produce 
more of  the dominant form of  capital. From this follows that resources and capital will grow in 
tandem in a upward moving spiral.  
The Matthew effect of  symbolic capital is a result of  the collective character of  symbolic capital. This 
means that a network, institution or title gain status according to the collective capital of  its members 
(Bourdieu 1986, 1996:79–81, 201). This means that a reputable member will be elevated by the other 
members, and that they will be elevated by him. A network is prestigious because it only lets in the 
finest members, and the members have prestige because they are part of  a prestigious network. This 
almost tautological circle of  mutual recognition plays a part in creating vast inequality in the 
concentration of  symbolic capital, and it can function as an efficient barrier between the executives 
who are a part of  the establishment and those that are not. Thus, according to Mills (1956:282), it also 
shapes the individual’s character to be placed in this circle of  mutual recognition: 
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In these diverse contexts, prestige accumulates in each of  the higher circles, and the members of  each 
borrow status from one another.  Their self-images are fed by these accumulations and these 
borrowings, and accordingly, however segmental a given man's role may seem, he comes to feel himself  
a 'diffuse' or 'generalized' man of  the higher circles. 
As Mill indicates, the mutual giving of  status has an integrating effect. Those that have received much 
from the status-giving network feel a certain loyalty toward those that are the cause of  their symbolic 
resources. If  the Matthew effect applies to the accumulation of  symbolic capital within the Danish field 
of  power, we have to expect a rising concentration of  capital culminating in a small group possessing 
the major part of  the symbolic resources. 
 While the field of  power integrates through conflict and division of  labour, as we have seen, it is also 
kept together by homogeneous habitual dispositions and mechanisms of  reproduction. Because the 
struggles in the field of  power concern the legitimation of  the forms of  capital, symbolic capital – the 
legitimating capital – is decisive in the field of  power. Due to the kinship between symbolic and social 
capital, networks come to function as a central form – and indicator – of  symbolic capital within the 
field of  power (De Nooy 2003). The actors mutually legitimate their symbolic capital within prestigious 
networks. We assume this leads to a Matthew effect, through which capital is not accumulated linearly, 
but exponentially. 
Data and methods 
The basis of  the present investigation is prosopographical data from publicly available sources, 
including Kraks Blå Bog, Greens Erhvervsinformation, OIS, FOA, CVR and an assortment of  
journalistic portrait articles found through the common archive of  Danish newspaper articles, 
Infomedia. Our selection of  data sources and the construction of  variables and indicators drawns on 
the designs of  earlier prosopographical studies (see e.g. Bourdieu 1996; Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2009a; 
Maclean et al. 2006)3.  
We have included chief  executives from 82 companies based on the size of  the company’s turnover and 
staff. The lower limits of  these are set at 5 billion Danish Kroner (760 million USD) and 5.000 
employees, respectively. Further, financially large companies are only included if  they have more than 
500 employees. In this way, the investigation captures both companies with strong financial and 
organisational capital (Bourdieu 2005:190). From these 82 companies we have collected data covering 
such things as: turnover, size, number of  employees, age, ownership structure and publicity. We have 
                                                 
3 See Ellersgaard and Larsen (2010:147–57) for further details. 
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drawn data from the companies’ annual financial statements from 2004 to 2007.  
For the largest companies such as A.P. Møller - Mærsk, Danske Bank and Arla, we have not only 
investigated chief  executives but also an additional 12 board members. Finally, we have included six 
owner-managers, all former CEOs who are now chairs of  the boards of  the companies they own at 
least a significant portion of. Thus Lars Larsen from JYSK and Tom Kähler from Rockwoll have been 
included. This gives us a total population of  100 chief  executives.  
The construction of  the space is undertaken through geometric data analysis (see Andrade, Karlson, 
and Bæk 2011; Denord et al. 2011; Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2009b; Lebaron 2009) in the specific form 
of  multiple correspondence analysis (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004, 2010). This allows us to include individuals, 
for whom we do not have information on all variables, in the construction of  the spaces4. In this way 
we can identify the “hidden relations” in the data (Jæger 2006:52) using statistics in a way that does not 
break with, but lies in extension of  Bourdieu’s relational perspective on the social (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991:251; Broady 1988). The method is thus not only descriptive, but also 
capable of  uncovering the structures that are generative of  strategies within the field (Bourdieu 
2005:102–3). In this way, correspondence analysis can be used to identify capital forms within the field 
of  power (Bourdieu 1988, 1996, 2005; Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2009b). 
The prestige of the company 
In order to investigate the relation between the integration of  an executive in the field of  power and 
the organisational capital of  his company, we will now sketch out the field of  large companies today 
including the relation between size and prestige. To describe how chief  executives can operate within 
the field of  power it is essential to understand how large companies are given prestige. 
The Danish economy is largely characterised by its few, large actors. As we see in figure 2, the 
concentration of  capital in Danish companies follows an exponential curve. This shape is a product of  
different strategies of  consolidation, which have accelerated from 1970 until today (Iversen 2005). The 
result is the structure seen in figure 2, in which the largest five companies have a turnover 25 times (607 
                                                 
4 The analysis conducted with the help of  the Soc.ca-package to R (Larsen, Andrade, and Ellersgaard 2012). The code of  
the package is based on Michael Greenacre’s ”ca” package (Greenacre and Nenadic 2007), but it has a more user-friendly 
interface, with new graphic functions and relevant help-features. Methodologically and mathematically the package 
implements Brigitte Le Roux's specific correspondence analysis (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004, 2010). The package can be 
downloaded at: https://github.com/Rsoc/soc.ca/ 
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billion kr.) as high as the five smallest of  the 82 companies included in this analysis. These 82 
companies account for 72% of  the total turnover of  largest 1000 companies in Denmark, and the 10 
largest companies alone account for 33% of  the total turnover. Thus, there are significant differences 
between the 82 companies, which have been included in the analysis. Even though the population is 
small, it captures a large part of  the total economic activity in the largest Danish companies. If  we had 
included more companies, it would have been hard to argue that the CEOs were faced with comparable 
challenges. For instance, there is a huge difference between managing the company with the largest 
organisation, ISS, with its more than 400.000 employees, and managing the company with the smallest 
in the investigation, Danske Spil, which with its 261 employees has several thousand times fewer 
employees than ISS. Overall, however, the absolute top of  Danish companies have been included in the 
analysis, and the power potential of  their directors is significant.  
FIGURE 2: THE DANISH TOP 1000 CORPORATIONS BY TURNOVER 
 
 
However, in order to understand the differences in the allocation of  symbolic capital among chief  
executives it is not enough to look at the size of  companies. One must take into account the symbolic 
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resources of  the company, what we call a company’s prestige. The prestige or reputation of  a company is 
an important factor in deciding whether a CEO is included and decorated by the Royal Family. Prestige, 
i.e. the symbolic strength or the brand of  the company, is an aggregate expression of  the company’s 
size, publicity, fame, the industry’s importance within the national economy, the age and ownership 
structure of  the company, and much more. However, even though many different factors can boost a 
company’s prestige, much evidence suggests that we are dealing with a Matthew effect in which the 
different factors grow together (see our analysis of  the space of  top companies in Ellersgaard and 
Larsen 2010:134–5). 
In their factor analysis, Rose and Thomsen (2004) have found that different types of  reputation can be 
reduced to one form, in which an increase of  one type leads to an increase in another. At the same 
time, they demonstrate the probability of  investors buoying reputable companies, making them less 
vulnerable to market fluctuations or bad financial statements. Historically leading companies such as 
EATC [Danish East Asiatic Trading Company] can draw on this symbolic capital for decades. With a 
turnover of  DKK 4.4 billion EAK it is one of  the absolutely smallest companies in this analysis, yet it 
was mentioned in 8,081 articles within four years, which places it as number 32th in terms of  publicity. 
Just as a bad press story need not have any lasting effect on a company’s reputation, swings in 
economic performance need not affect its prestige.  
The symbolic economy regulating the prestige of  companies moves according to its own logic, which 
only partially follow the economic performance of  companies. For instance, the role a company plays 
in the national self-understanding is important, e.g. in relation to the strategic interests taken by the 
state in certain companies. This is especially the case for export companies that bring foreign currency 
to Denmark, thus helping the Danish trade balance (Iversen and Andersen 2008:316ff). The interests 
of  the state become the interests of  the population, which is reflected in terms of  publicity. For 
instance, export companies are mentioned in books thrice as often as home-market companies 
(Ellersgaard and Larsen 2010:117). An executive’s possibilities of  achieving social and symbolic capital 
in the field of  power will follow the company’s prestige and not merely its size. In the following 
correspondence analysis, we will compare the distribution of  symbolic and social capital among CEOs 
with the companies’ distribution of  size and prestige. 
 
The forms of capital 
This investigation will look at the differences between chief  executives, but it is important to remember 
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that this group is extremely homogeneous. Of  the 100 chief  executives two are women, six are from 
working class families, five are non-Danes, 92 are married, 54 have master-degree level education and 
41 had their first professional position in management and leadership5. The fact that this group is so 
exclusive might lead us to expect that there will not be large differences in the amount of  symbolic 
resources each CEO has achieved.  
However, as we will see in the following table and correspondence analysis, the distribution of  the 
different forms of  social capital in in fact characterised by significant unevenness. In the following, we 
will look at those indicators that play an active part in the construction of  the field. Table 1 is organised 
in headings (see Lebaron 2008), of  which each capture the recognition of  different parts of  the field of  
power. The table also shows how large a contribution the different modalities and variables make to the 
two first dimensions in the correspondence analysis. Most of  these measures have a mainly symbolic 
character and are therefore not direct expressions of  the power resources of  the CEO. At the same 
time, a variable is rarely expressive of  symbolic capital alone. The aim of  the following run down of  the 
table is to give the readers a detailed insight into the forms of  capital and in how they relate to the field 
of  power. 
TABLE 1: CONTRIBUTIONS OF ACTIVE VARIABLES1 
 
1st 
axis 
(%) 
2nd 
axis 
(%) 
Active 
indivi-
duals 
All 
indivi-
duals 
     Publicity and biographies 16.4 3.4
  
Articles: 0-10 2.3 1.9 19 36 
Articles: 50-300 0.2 0.0 33 44 
Articles: more than 300 4.5 1.4 20 20 
Total 7.0 3.3 72 100 
     Biographed 8.5 0.1 7 7
Not biographed 0.9 0.0 65 93 
Total 9.4 0.1 72 100 
     Royal recognition 16.2 15.1
  
Danish decoration 4.6 5.6 23 23 
No Danish decoration 2.1 2.6 49 77 
Total 6.7 8.2 72 100 
     1 The average contribution per modality is 1.8%. 
(continued from previous page)     
                                                 
5 For an international comparison of  the population, see (Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Munk 2013).   
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1st 
axis 
(%) 
2nd 
axis 
(%) 
Active 
indivi-
duals 
All 
indivi-
duals 
Foreign decoration 1.5 5.8 10 10 
No foreign decoration 0.2 0.9 62 90 
Total 1.7 6.7 72 100 
     Royal invitation 4.3 0.1 32 32
No royal invitation 3.5 0.1 40 68 
Total 7.8 0.2 72 100 
     Directorates and board memberships 23.7 27.1
  
VL groups: 1, 3 or 46 1.5 1.2 23 23 
VL groups: Not 1, 3 or 46 2.1 2.5 23 23 
VL groups: Not member 0.0 6.4 26 54 
Total 3.6 10.1 72 100 
     Leader of  the year 6.1 0.4 10 11
Not Leader of  the year 1.0 0.1 62 89 
Total 7.1 0.5 72 100 
     Top networks: Samtalegruppen 5.5 2.0 5 5
Top networks: Netværket 0.6 5.7 7 7 
Top networks: Not in top networks 0.9 1.5 60 88 
Total 7.0 9.2 72 100 
     Board memberships: +4 0.7 1.5 9 11
Board memberships: 1-3 0.4 0.4 44 55 
Board memberships: None 0.2 0.0 19 34 
Total 1.3 1.9 72 100 
     
More than one membership of  other top corporate board 0.5 3.7 7 7 
One membership of  other top corporate board 2.8 0.5 15 15 
No memberships of  other top corporate board 1.4 1.2 50 78 
Total 4.7 5.4 72 100 
     
State, politics and science 13.9 21.5   
Scientists on own board 1.5 2.9 15 18 
No scientists on own board 0.4 0.8 57 82 
Total 1.9 3.7 72 100 
     
Politicians on own board 0.0 2.8 14 15 
No politicians on own board 0.0 0.7 58 85 
Total 0.0 3.5 72 100 
     
Denmark-America foundation: Member of  the Board 1.8 1.0 29 29 
Denmark-America foundation: Corporation member 0.5 0.6 16 21 
Denmark-America foundation: Not member of  the Board 3.8 2.5 27 50 
Total 6.1 4.1 72 100 
     
(continued from previous page)     
Position in scientific institution 2.4 5.9 12 12 
No position in scientific institution 0.5 1.2 60 88 
Total 2.9 7.1 72 100 
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1st 
axis 
(%) 
2nd 
axis 
(%) 
Active 
indivi-
duals 
All 
indivi-
duals 
     
Position in state commission 2.5 2.6 12 12 
No position in state commission 0.5 0.5 60 88 
Total 3.0 3.1 72 100 
     
Corporation and residence 29.4 32.9   
CEO more than 10 years 1.8 4.8 23 27 
CEO 5-10 years 0.6 1.0 23 35 
CEO less than 5 years 4.0 1.2 26 38 
Total 6.4 7.0 72 100 
     
Salary: +11 mio. DKK 4.6 2.7 7 10 
Salary: 10-11 mio. DKK 1.2 1.8 13 13 
Salary: 6-9 mio. DKK 0.0 2.1 12 21 
Salary: 3.5-6 mio. DKK 3.5 0.2 20 28 
Salary:  less than 3.5 mio. DKK 0.1 4.9 8 10 
Total 9.4 11.7 60 82 
     
Residence: Affluent Northern Copenhagen 0.8 3.5 27 41 
Residence: Central Copenhagen 0.3 0.1 10 12 
Residence: Copenhagen suburbs 0.2 0.2 7 12 
Residence: Århus and Aalborg 2.1 0.0 8 9 
Residence: Provincial cities 0.2 1.4 8 11 
Residence: Estates and summerhouse 3.2 5.5 9 11 
Residence: Abroad 0.9 0.0 3 4 
Total 7.7 10.7 72 100 
     
Real Estate: +12 mio. DKK 4.5 0.3 12 12 
Real Estate: 8-12 mio. DKK 0.0 2.3 19 24 
Real Estate: 3.5-8 mio. DKK 0.2 0.2 31 48 
Real Estate: Less than 3.5 mio. DKK 1.2 0.7 7 12 
Total 5.9 3.5 69 96 
 
 
Publicity and biographies 
As we have pointed out earlier, there are vast differences in the total capital of  the different companies 
in our investigation. The exponential and monopolistic character of  these differences reappear among 
executives. Thus, even within an extremely elitist group such as the 100 chief  executives there are 
distinctive differences in symbolic recognition. As Table 1 shows, publicity is very unevenly distributed. 
Whereas most executives are mentioned in more than 50 articles in a year, very few CEOs have had 
their biographies written. Largely, the amount of  publicity depends on the PR strategies of  the 
companies. For instance, listed companies and their CEOs are generally much more visible. A strongly 
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networked and publicly known executive can also contribute to drawing attention to his company6. Yet 
it is important to remember that companies actively support the public profile of  their CEO. Whereas 
articles are part of  the daily news consumption circle, biographies are reflect the longer sales horizon 
of  publishes. Biographies thereby capture different assessments of  the executives, stressing the gravity, 
history and distinctive features of  their subjects. It is thus largely the most important companies’ 
managers or owners, who have their biographies written. This publicity can be a resource because it 
confirms the importance of  the CEO: if  he is famous, he unavoidably becomes a figure to reckon with. 
It might be expected that “too much” publicity will be a liability within this space, but as we will see this 
is not the case. This is due to the connection between publicity and company prestige, and the fact that 
publicity is seen as a condition for the CEOs of  the largest companies.  
Royal recognition 
Royal recognition reflects the executive’s connection to and recognition within a certain high bourgeois 
elite circling the Danish Court (Maclean et al. 2006:182). The Royal Family gives invitations and orders 
based on a judgement of  the CEOs character and the company’s prestige. Because it is state ministries 
who nominate executives, orders are to some extent an expression of  the state’s assessment of  the 
character of  the CEO, the company, and its national importance7. It is worth exploring to what extent 
the Royal Family functions as one of  the central gatekeepers to the most powerful circles in Denmark, 
and if  they control the access to a Danish equivalent of  the French “establishment” (Bourdieu 
1996:315ff). As seen in table 1, only a minority of  CEOs are found worthy of  the different forms of  
symbolic recognition given by the Royal Family and foreign states.  
 
Executives and board members 
In table 1, we see different forms of  professional networks and boards. These networks have the 
double character of  exclusive groups: they are both symbols and resources. Because the time of  
                                                 
6 A good example is the difference between the two insurance company CEOs Stine Bosse of  TrygVesta and Henrik 
Ramlau-Hansen of  Danica. Despite great similarities in the size, publicity and business profiles of  their companies, 
Ramlau-Hansen was personally mentioned 45 times, while Bosse was mentioned 438 times, and one of  the only eight 
CEOs to have their biographies written. 
7 However, there is also an element of  social networking in the granting of  orders and invitations, in which the CEOs 
who maintain relations with the Court are given more recognition as a result of  personal friendships. 
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powerful individuals is a naturally scarce resource, to be given the time and attention of  a chief  CEO 
can raise your status (Goffman 1951:299). When a social relation becomes known, e.g. through official 
membership lists, the capital of  the individuals is concretised. The symbolic value of  membership 
follows from the total capital composition of  the involved parties. A good example are the VL-groups 
who mainly count CEOs among their members, but also permanent secretaries of  government 
ministries, professors, Vice-Chancellors, journalists, etc. These groups are closed career networks, and 
the old members pick new members based on their weight and personal characteristics. The most 
prestigious VL-groups are presumed to be 1, 3 and 46, where group number 3 counts people such as 
Niels Smedegaard Andersen (A.P. Møller - Mærsk), Karsten Dybvad (Confederation of  Danish 
Industry), Karsten Ohrt (National Gallery of  Denmark), Maria Rørbye Rønn (Danish Broadcasting 
Corporation) and Ove Ullerup (Lord Chamberlain). The VL-Groups thus reflect inclusion in the 
networks that integrate across the field of  power. Contrary to networks (not only VL, but also 
Netværket and Samtalegruppen), boards of  directors have decision-making powers. To entrust an actor 
with influence over a company is an expression of  a very high level of  trust and integration. The 
composition of  boards of  directors is therefore often used as a measure of  the level of  integration of  
the elite (Christiansen, Møller, and Togeby 2001; Gulbrandsen et al. 2002; Hjellbrekke et al. 2007; 
Schøtt 2003; Scott 1991a; Vedres and Stark 2010). In the study of  boards of  directors there are many 
pitfalls in identifying the central form of  membership.  
Most chief  executives have positions on boards, but they rarely gain access to the boardrooms of  other 
high-ranking companies. Almost one fourth of  the chief  executives are members of  the three most 
prestigious VL-groups, while more informal network such as ”Netværket” and ”Samtalegruppen” are 
reserve for a small minority. Most forms of  social capital within the field are only bestowed on a 
minority of  the CEOs. The question, then, is if  different CEOs are considered suited for specific board 
posts, or if  these are concentrated on the hands of  a smaller group of  especially integrated chief  
executives.  
 
State, politics and science  
In figure 4, we see how many of  the executives who have been able to successfully integrate across 
different elites. Such integration is expressed most clearly in the small number of  chief  executives who 
have been given posts in public commissions or who have politicians in the boards of  their companies. 
These are the executives and companies that are recognized by the rest of  the elite as having sufficient 
capital to be tied more closely to, for instance, the state elite. This integration is, as can be seen, 
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relatively rare. On the other hand, it is a sign of  exclusion if  an executive or company is not 
represented in the Denmark-America Foundation8. A strong relation to the state can be seen as a 
consecration of  the executive, which identifies him as a representation of  interests and opinions that 
are valid beyond his specific company. Such a relation makes the CEO a representative of  the 
economic field in general.  
 
The company and the home, economic recognition and position 
A CEOs choice of  residency also mirrors his connection to the field of  power. When an executive 
settles in Northern Copenhagen, close to the rest of  the Danish elite (Christiansen et al. 2001:233), it is 
often in the search of  the opportunities of  social integration that are connected to such an exclusive 
address: 
The importance attached to place of  residence can be understood not only in the value attached to one's 
address, one's sign of  nobility among others, but also in the importance that being at the very heart of  
“society” takes on for one's social life (parties, dinners, encounters). 
 Bourdieu (1996:331) 
The importance of  the a centrally located home is also shown in a study of  friendships within the 
French business elite (Kadushin 1995), which found that friendships are often made between the actors 
that live near to one another in the prominent quarters of  Paris, a finding that resonates with Mills’ 
(1956:47) description of  the urban elite. 
We also see that most common habitat of  CEOs is the most prestigious part of  of  Northern 
Copenhagen, the so-called “Whiskey Belt”. Often the executives who live elsewhere are employed by 
companies with very strong regional ties, such as Lego, Grundfos, Danfoss and Arla. The location of  
their homes is a reflection of  company owners’ strong preferences and roots in certain areas.  
The size of  a residence does not only reflect the economic capacity of  an executive, but also his 
position in the field of  tension between owners and managers. The owners can allow themselves a 
more extravagant life style than the more humble managers can. This is expressed both in salaries and 
economic capacity. A high salary functions as a signal for the company and the CEO. It gives the CEO 
a high position in the economic field, and it is perceived as “natural” that the largest companies pay the 
                                                 
8 DAF’s board of  directors bring together leading figures within the state, universities and industry. 
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highest salaries and have the most valuable executives. However, as with the character of  the residence, 
an executive rarely makes enough on his salary to make the qualitative shift in economic capital, ‘the big 
jump’ (cf. Mills 1956:110–1) into the same economic league as the owners.9 In the choice of  address, we 
again see a fusion of  symbolic and social capital where the address with the largest symbolic capital also 
becomes that which provides the best opportunities for accumulating social capital. The residence 
constitutes a rare opportunity for converting economic capital to other forms of  capital. In Danish 
society, the choice of  address guides a number of  other choices concerning strategies of  reproduction. 
When you choose a neighbourhood, you also choose the classmates and day care of  your children, and 
much more. Thus, the choice of  address reflects habitual dispositions of  the elite to a marked degree.  
Correspondence analysis: The concentration of power and status after the 
Matthew effect 
After we have created an image of  the distribution of  different forms of  symbolic and social capital, 
the question of  their relations remains. In the following sections, we will investigate these relations by 
constructing the space for social and symbolic capital through a specific multiple correspondence 
analysis. However, an analysis based on the indicators we have presented above shows that the Matthew 
effect applies to such an extent that the space becomes skewed. One group of  chief  executives have so 
little social and symbolic capital compared to the others that we find them in an isolated position (see 
Ellersgaard and Larsen 2010:97). The distribution of  symbolic and social capital among the hundred 
most important chief  executives is so uneven that the constructed space becomes extremely 
heterogeneous. A group of  unintegrated chief  executives, who are not operating in the field of  power, 
are therefore not contributing any nuances to the investigation. Thus, in order to reach a higher spread 
in the space, we have excluded them. However, the interpretation of  the two primary access has not 
changed because of  the exclusion and the dimensions therefore remain stable (cf. Le Roux and Rouanet 
2004:277).  
As explained above, the criteria of  exclusion from the analysis is non-participation in central social or 
symbolic relations. Thus, we have excluded from the correspondence analysis those chief  executives 
who are neither part of  the boards of  other top companies, the Denmark-America Foundation or a 
VL-group, and who have neither participated in royal events nor received Danish or non-Danish 
                                                 
9 However, high salaries and stock-options lift the CEOs out of  the dependency on wage labour and enable them to live 
of  the interest of  their acquired capital. This places them in the lower part of  the owning class (Wright 1997:25). 
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orders. Of  the 100 chief  executives 28 fall within this group. Of  these, only three are vice-executives 
(of  Carlsberg, Arla and ISS) and one (Eelco van Heel of  Rockwool) is from a company where the 
owner-manager is also among the other 100 chief  executives. Thus, the whole management of  A.P. 
Møller – Mærsk and Danske Bank are still part of  the group of  chief  executives who, within this 
perspective, are part of  and recognized within the field of  power. The rest of  the excluded chief  
executives primarily represent the smaller companies among the 82 in terms of  turnover and prestige, 
with Jesper Lien (Coop) and Kurt Kokhauge Larsen (DSV) as exceptions. However, this exclusion is 
not only due to methodological concerns. That nearly 30% of  the 100 highest-ranking chief  executives 
are unintegrated within the field of  power is a surprising and interesting finding. The social circles of  the 
elite are extremely narrow in Denmark. 
We have thus constructed a space with 72 integrated chief  executives. We will now briefly introduce 
how this this analysis must be interpreted. The interpretation of  the axes is inferred by the modalities 
with a contribution value above average (Jambu 1991:286). The active dimensions are chosen from a 
criterion of  interpretability, as well as their relative strength in relation to one another. The first 
dimension explains 46% of  the total adjusted inertia (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004:205–15), while the 
other dimension explains 22%10. Both dimensions have obvious interpretations, while the third only 
explains 9% and does not have any clear interpretation. The third dimension captures an opposition 
between a specific sub-group of  Copenhagen-based CEOs and a number of  the owners based in 
Jutland. The present we do not have any theoretical and empirical reasons to presume that this 
dimension is central for the understanding of  the chief  executives. 
Since we intuitively understand power relationships as top-down, we have exchanged the first and 
second axis of  the map, so that the strongest dimension is vertical. All maps have principal coordinates 
in order to make interpretation across variables more reliable. Distances of  more than 0.5 are 
considered strong relations, while distances of  more than 1.0 are considered very strong connections 
(Le Roux and Rouanet 2010:71). We will now begin a closer interpretation of  the two dimensions. 
 
FIGURE 3: THE SPACE OF CAPITAL ON THE FIELD OF POWER: INDIVIDUALS 
                                                 
10 Two modalities are passive in this analysis: ”Property: Abroad” and ”Salary: Lacking information”. They amount to less 
than 1% of  the total mass in the analysis. 
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FIGURE 4: THE SPACE OF CAPITAL ON THE FIELD OF POWER: MODALITIES WITH STRONGEST 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DIMENSION 1 
 
First dimension: Symbolic capital in the field of  power 
The first dimension describes the total amount of  capital and opposes one or several of  the indicators 
of  symbolic capital against modalities without these properties. As we saw in Table 1 this dimension is 
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relatively equally determined by the two different headings. However, both royal recognition and 
publicity are relatively strong. This dimension demonstrates an opposition between the symbolically 
dominant executives at the top, and the excluded at the bottom. As figure 4 shows, the CEOs with 
most publicity are in the best networks, they receive the highest salaries and live in the finest and best 
residencies. They are placed in the top of  the space. Opposite we find the excluded CEOs with low 
publicity and relatively low salaries. Here we also find those CEOs who have been chief  executives for 
less than five years. Some of  these will be able to move upwards in the space, as it takes time to convert 
other forms of  capital into symbolic capital. 
The dimension demonstrates that the distribution of  different types of  symbolic capital follows the 
Matthew principle (cf. Merton 1968). This becomes apparent when such diverse forms of  recognition 
as network membership, awards for being executive of  the year, residency and public posts follow the 
same dimension. It is also supported by the fact that the most recent arrivals within the field are placed 
at its bottom. Meanwhile, at the top of  the map we find the executives of  the largest Danish 
companies, as demonstrated by figure 3. At the very top of  the map, we find owner and erstwhile 
executive of  Danfoss Jørgen Mads Clausen and A.P. Møller Maersk chief  executive Nils Smedegaard 
Andersen. At the bottom of  the map, we find executives of  relatively smaller companies such as Jørgen 
Wisborg from OK Benzin and Christian B. Lund from Sanistål. At the same time, we see that the cloud 
of  individuals has its centre of  gravity towards the bottom, while its spread continues to increase 
towards the top. Thus, a small number of  CEOs possess significantly more symbolic capital than the 
rest. 
One of  the individuals placed in the upper part of  the map, Stine Bosse, was the leader of  the 
insurance company Tryg at the time of  data collection. She later left her post and became more closely 
integrated in other elites, most prominently as the chair of  the board of  the Royal Danish Theatre and 
the think-thank Concito. The interpretation in this analysis would be that executives with lower total 
symbolic capital would not be candidates to these positions. Here we see that symbolic capital within 
the field of  power is convertible to top positions within other fields. 
It is interesting to note that being a member of  a low-status VL-group places you lower than those who 
are not included. This is a result of  the fact that several owner-managers are not members of  VL-
groups, but recipients of  many other forms of  symbolic resources. However, it is worth mentioning 
that had we included more executives as active individuals, the modality of  lacking VL-membership 
would have been placed significantly lower in the space. The sharp distinctions between the strength of  
different VL-groups are made by the already included executives. 
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FIGURE 5: THE SPACE OF CAPITAL ON THE FIELD OF POWER: MODALITIES WITH STRONGEST 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DIMENSION 2  
 
 
Second dimension: Owners and managers  
The second dimension divides the spaces horizontally in an opposition between different forms of  
symbolic capital. On the left pole we have the owners who gain their income as return on capital; they 
do not prioritize professional networks, and seek to integrate with the state instead. The integration 
happens both symbolically in the form of  orders and royal invitations, but also through honorific posts 
and seats on state commissions. The owners also often live further away from the central networks of  
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North Zealand and Copenhagen. Among them, we find landowners such as Troels Holch Povlsen and 
Kjeld Kirk Kristiansen, owners of  Bestseller and Lego respectively.  
We thus find an opposition between the heirs and the owners on the one side, and the employed CEOs, 
who have built their position through their career, on the other (Bourdieu 1996:270). According to the 
post-Keynesian school of  economics (Stockhammer 2004) we find three opposed class position within 
the capitalist class: executives, capitalists and rentiers. Capitalists and rentiers are both owners, but 
where the capitalist is an executive owner, the rentier is a relatively passive recipient of  dividends. The 
executive, who is not an owner, is placed in a relationship of  contradiction with the circle of  owners: 
theoretically, he is more interested in the growth of  the company than maximizing shareholder value. In 
other words, the CEOs are interested in strengthening their status within their specific field by 
increasing its organisational capital. This relation explains that the owners of  many companies have 
tried to tie the executives closer to the interests of  the owners, by increasingly paying them through 
stock options and bonus schemes11. 
The managers, i.e. the executives who have not inherited their position through ownership, distinguish 
themselves by being members of  more networks, having more posts on executive boards and much 
higher salaries. They are also more in the same boards as members of  other elites. It is interesting that 
the Royal Family are bestowing most recognition on the owners, who have the same mechanism of  
reproduction as them, namely the family based one (cf. Bourdieu 1996:278–85). This opposition 
between strategies of  reproduction has divided the field of  power since the days of  absolutist 
monarchy (cf. Hansen and Hammerslev 2010:20). 
The differences we find in this correspondence analysis suggest that owners and managers have very 
different strategies and needs. To some extent we can see the central networks as attempts by the 
executives to position themselves internally in the competition between executives, cf. figure 5. At the 
same time, we see that state-actors prefer to include the owners directly in commissions and 
committees, while the executives integrate themselves through networks. These oppositions 
demonstrate that there are divisions even within this exclusive and homogeneous group, and that these 
divisions matter for personal careers as well as for the character of  the types of  state contacts different 
companies can achieve. Companies with strong and active owners have other opportunities than 
companies with diverse or passive ownership circles. The largest companies have the option of  
                                                 
11 This is happening despite the fact that about 300 studies of  the effect of  stock options on company profitability have 
been unable to establish a clear effect (cf. Daily 2003). 
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harvesting the advantages of  both an active owner and a prestigious executive. We see this in figure 5 
where both the manager Nils Smedegaard Andersen and the owner Arnold Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller 
have a high position within the field12.  
Prestige and character 
The connections described above are interesting, but if  they do not map onto the resources of  the 
companies – in a way that places the largest companies at the top of  the map – it would raise the 
question if  the dimensions actually capture integration within the field of  power or if  it merely shows 
local connections. Meanwhile, one would expect that the status differences uncovered in the analysis 
would be the expression of  different compositions of  habitual dispositions among the CEOs. This 
would entail that executives from distinguished homes would have their own specific strategies. We can 
attempt to answer these questions through an analysis of  supplementary variables for company prestige 
and the character of  executives.  
Prestige 
In the analysis of  the supplementary modalities (see figure 6 and appendix) we see that the most 
prestigious companies measured by turnover, employee number and publicity are significantly higher 
placed in the relatively smaller companies. Not surprisingly, integration and recognition follow the 
strength of  the organisation. This also demonstrates that integration and the distribution of  symbolic 
resources to the executives follows the company’s prestige and place within the economic field. This 
would indicate that the symbolic resources of  an executive stands in a dialectical relationship to the 
resources of  the company. In figure 7, we see that this connection is not complete, because relatively 
smaller companies are pulled up by their symbolic resources, for example in the form of  publicity. Here 
it is clear that some of  the family-owned companies with active owners are able to achieve a higher 
integration than much larger enterprises. This, for instance, is the case of  Lego (0.5), which is one of  
the smaller companies in the population, in comparison with Nykredit (-0.25), which is one of  the 
largest companies measured by turnover. Both are on Danish hands, but Lego is a dynasty, an export 
company and a “national pride”. This has implications for the allocation of  symbolic resources. We also 
see that amount of  mentions a company gets in books has a large impact on how included its chief  
executive is. The accumulated symbolic capital of  the company is also reflected in the recognition of  
                                                 
12 However, not all owners share the symbolic capital, as we see in the relation between JYSK’s owner, Lars Larsen, and its 
manager, Hans Henrik Kjølby. 
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the CEO. This suggests that the symbolic capital personified in the CEO also, but not only, is an 
expression of  the collective strategy of  a whole enterprise.  
FIGURE 6: THE SPACE OF CAPITAL ON THE FIELD OF POWER: SUPPLEMENTARY MODALITIES 
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FIGURE 7: THE SPACE OF CAPITAL ON THE FIELD OF POWER: CORPORATIONS  
 
Character 
We measure the executive’s character through data for his and his father’s education, which together 
give access to what Michael Hartmann (2000:6) describes as the “class-specific habitus”. In figure 6, we 
see that the executive’s education varies very closely with the amount of  recognition. For instance, we 
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see that civil engineers or scientifically trained CEOs have stronger positions than executive who merely 
have degrees in Business & Management. Here the contradiction between owners and managers 
reappears, because the many more owners than managers have degrees in civil engineering. 
Simultaneously, it is apparent that CEOs with parents who have also been executives have higher 
positions. The largest companies often hire executives with family backgrounds in management due to 
a double mechanism: firstly because they stand more strongly in the internal competition, and secondly 
because they have resources that can help them gain symbolic capital beyond the symbolic capital that 
comes with a job in a given company. In this conversion of  one form of  capital to another, we once 
again see the Matthew principle in action. 
 
Conclusion: Owners and managers within the field of power  
By establishing different measures for social and symbolic capital in the field of  power, this analysis has 
demonstrated that one can identify a dimension of  total capital, which follows a Matthew effect in 
which the different forms of  capital grow in tandem. To a large extent symbolic and social capital are 
expressions of  the same upward movement in the space. This is due to the kinship of  the two forms 
of  capital, but also to the fact that inclusion (social and symbolic) is the central mechanism of  
differentiation within the field of  power. The importance of  social capital within the field power 
springs from its diverse composition and the fact that integration within it is based on both 
homogeneity and difference. The inequality in symbolic capital between the 100 top-most chief  
executives means that including the lowest 28 of  them would skew the space downwards, in a way that 
would make it harder to see the differences within it. This suggests that even within this extremely 
exclusive group the distribution of  symbolic capital, which is important in the field of  power, is so 
uneven that is far from all actors that can assert themselves. The analysis makes visible the divisions 
between the integrated and powerful executives and the executives who are not capable or do not want 
to play an active role in the field of  power. 
The analysis also identifies a contradiction between owners and managers, once again finding internal 
divisions in the distribution of  symbolic resources within the class of  capitalists. All this shows that the 
state and other elites allocate different types of  capital to owners and managers respectively and it 
shows that owners are more frequently invited to participate in public bodies. Managers, on the other 
hand, are much better mutually integrated, as shown in their status in the field of  executives. 
Recognition is mainly bestowed upon people who are already recognised. Thus state actors also take 
part in giving certain actors advantages. This group is not representative of  the rest of  the economic 
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field and it is therefore worth investigating if  this biases economic policy in favour of  these actors.  
 
Discussion: Chief executives and the size of the power elite in Denmark  
Compared to previous elite studies in Denmark and internationally, the population of  this study is very 
homogeneous and restricted, because we only look at the 100 most important executives. For instance, 
the elite-study of  large state funded research project Power and Democracy in Denmark13 (Christiansen 
et al. 2001) included 500 business people, among them 250 executives. It was thus not to be expected 
that our correspondence analysis would find it hard to differentiated between the least prestigious 
CEOs in the bottom of  the map, because we presumed that these executives were included in the social 
networks around the power elite. However, that a relatively large group can be described as ‘have-nots’ 
(Denord et al. 2011), suggests that the group is too heterogeneous in terms of  social and symbolic 
capital. This finding is in itself  interesting, because it raises the question of  the size of  the power elite 
in Denmark.  
The analysis suggests that only about half  of  the most important CEOs in our analyses are included in 
the social circles– both company boards, royal events, foundations and more social clubs such as the 
VL-groups – around what Bourdieu describes as “the establishment” and what C. Wright Mills defines 
as a power elite, properly speaking. The integration in these exclusive social circles seems to be limited 
both in terms of  integration internally in the economic field – i.e. with other chief  executives, chairmen 
and owners – as well as in relation to the main players in both the scientific and the political field. 
If, in addition to managing directors, one estimates how many actors from the top of  the economic 
field (e.g. chairmen, owners, investors, managers of  pension funds, leaders of  employers' organizations 
or representatives from public authorities such as the National Bank) are included in these circles, it 
may double the amount of  inclusions from the economic field within the power elite. In that case, we 
might deal with some 100 individuals, representing only a fifth of  that economic elite, which was 
identified in Power and Democracy in Denmark. While that study contains 1,711 positions in its entirety, 
and our analysis of  its data (Ellersgaard 2014; Ellersgaard and Larsen 2008) suggests that the business 
                                                 
13   This project, known in Danish as “Magtudredningen” was launched by the initiative of  the Danish parliament in March 
1997 and officially entitled, ”An Analysis of  Democracy and Power in Denmark.” The study was headed by an 
independent research committee. 
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elite is the best integrated14, we can estimate that such a socially integrated power elite may only consist 
of  between 250 and 500 people. 
Thus, we are proposing a significantly more narrow definition of  elite size than suggested by the 
tradition of  elite studies. Typically, such studies focus on about 2,000 persons in countries such as 
Denmark and Norway (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002), about 3,000 in Sweden (Statens Offentliga 
Utredningar 1990), 5,000 in medium-sized countries such as Australia, France, and Germany and 7,000 
in the super power USA (Burton and Higley 2001:189). The tradition presumes that the larger the 
country, the larger its elite. However, this presumption does not suggest that the relationship is directly 
proportional. Thus, the elite of  the USA is taken to be 3½ larger than that of  Denmark, even if  the 
country’s population is 50 times larger. Behind this lies a notion of  the relative strength of  power in 
relation to other actors within the nation-state-based organized power elite. However, such studies 
rarely make explicit their criteria weighing the relative strength of  power, and most elite studies are very 
vague about their reasons for choosing a specific population size. Yet such delimitations are interesting 
results in themselves, especially comparatively, and they are naturally of  great importance for the results 
of  the analysis of  the selected population. 
Here, a definition of  the elite, which looks at the actual network connections within the elite, could 
provide the answer to question of  which individuals are found worthy - and thus have the necessary 
social or symbolic capital – to enter into the highest circles. Memberships are both a power resource in 
itself  and an indication that an actor has been initiated into the division of  labour of  domination. 
Based on data from the Norwegian power study, Denord et al (2011) have found an elite with a size of  
about 290 individuals, which integrates itself  across key sectors. This study looks at exchanges between 
sectors, and the population is not obtained by means of  network data, but through the position 
method. We believe that the development of  a method that identifies elite membership through 
aggregated network connections could contribute significantly to the solution of  both the problem of  
the size of  the elite, and provide a computerized image of  the elite’s composition. This will require a 
methodological application of  inductive social network analysis (see Scott 1991b) to the task of  
defining elite populations. As mentioned, such a strategy will probably provide a significantly smaller 
elite population, which can be seen as interwoven by a mechanical solidarity created by many meetings 
in integrating social communities (cf. Collins 2004).  
                                                 
14 These analyses even suggest that certain sub-elites, especially the cultural elite, but also partially the media-elite are 
almost totally excluded.  
133 
 
References: 
Andrade, Stefan Bastholm, Kristian Bendt Karlson, and Esben Raunsø Thomassen Bæk. 2011. 
“Kulturen I Kassen: Sammenhængen Mellem Socialklasse Og Tv-Forbrug I Danmark.” 
Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk tidsskrift for kultur- og samfundsvidenskab 5(2-3):43–62. 
Aron, Raymond. 1950. “Social Structure and the Ruling Class: Part 1.” The British Journal of  Sociology 
1(1):1–16. 
Bauer, Michael, and Bénédicte Bertin-Mourot. 1999. “National Models for Making and Legitimating 
Elites. A Comparative Analysis of  the 200 Top Executives in France, Germany and Great 
Britain.” European Societies 1(1):9–31. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. “The Forms of  Capital.” Pp. 241–58 in Handbook for Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of  Education, edited by John G. Richardson. New York: Greenwood. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1988. Homo Academicus. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. State Nobility - Elite Schools in the Field of  Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2005. The Social Structures of  the Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2007. Outline of  a Theory of  Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2010. “Modstridende Interesser I Staten.” Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk tidsskrift for kultur-
og samfundsvidenskab 2010(1-2):121–34. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1991. The Craft of  Sociology - 
Epistemological Preliminaries. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Broady, Donald. 1988. Jean-Paul Benzécri Och Korrespondensanalysen. Stockholm: Universitets- och 
högskoleämbetet. 
Burawoy, Michael, and Karl Von Holdt. 2012. Conversations with Bourdieu: The Johannesburg Moment. 
Johannesburg: Wits University Press. 
Bürklin, Wilhelm P., and Hilke Rebenstorf. 1997. Eliten in Deutschland: Rekrutierung Und Integration. 
Opladen: VS Verlag. 
134 
 
Burton, Michael G., and John Higley. 2001. “The Study of  Political Elite Transformations.” International 
Review of  Sociology 11(2):181–99. 
Christiansen, Peter Munk, Birgit Møller, and Lise Togeby. 2001. Den Danske Elite. København: Hans 
Reitzels. 
Collins, Randall. 2004. Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Daily, Catherine. 2003. “Governance through Ownership: Centuries of  Practice, Decades of  Research.” 
The Academy of  Management Journal 46(2):151–58. 
Denord, François, Johs. Hjellbrekke, Olav Korsnes, Frédéric Lebaron, and Brigitte Le Roux. 2011. 
“Social Capital in the Field of  Power: The Case of  Norway.” The Sociological Review 59(1):86–108. 
Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman. 2014. “Elite Og Magtfelt - Om Sammenhold Og Modsætninger 
Indenfor Eliten.” Pp. 99–142 in Socialt Rum - Symbolsk Magt, edited by Christian Sandbjerg 
Hansen. København: Forlaget Hexis. 
Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman, and Anton Grau Larsen. 2008. “De Autonome Eliter? - En Kritisk 
Korrespondanceanalyse Af  Data Fra ’Den Danske Elite [Autonomous Élites? A Critical 
Correspondence Analysis of  ‘Den Danske Elite’ ].” Århus. 
Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman, and Anton Grau Larsen. 2010. “Firmaets Mænd.” Master Thesis, 
Copenhagen: University of  Copenhagen. 
Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman, and Anton Grau Larsen. 2011. “Kulturel Kapital Blandt Topdirektører 
I Danmark - En Domineret Kapitalform?” Dansk Sociologi 22(3):9–29. 
Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman, Anton Grau Larsen, and Martin D. Munk. 2013. “A Very Economic 
Elite: The Case of  the Danish Top CEOs.” Sociology 47(6):1051–71. 
Fligstein, Neil. 1996. “Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions.” 
American Sociological Review 61(4):656–73. 
Fligstein, Neil. 2002. The Architecture of  Markets: An Economic Sociology of  Twenty-First-Century Capitalist 
Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Goffman, Erving. 1951. “Symbols of  Class Status.” British Journal of  Sociology 2(4):294–304. 
135 
 
Greenacre, Michael, and Oleg Nenadic. 2007. “Correspondence Analysis in R, with Two- and Three-
Dimensional Graphics: The ca Package.” Journal of  Statistical Software 20(3):1–13. 
Gulbrandsen, Trygve et al. 2002. Norske Makteliter. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. 
Gulbrandsen, Trygve. 2005. “Ideological Integration and Variation within the Private Business Elite in 
Norway.” European Sociological Review 21(4):329–44. 
Hansen, Erik Jørgen. 1964. “De Administrerende Direktørers Sociale Oprindelse.” Sociologiske 
Meddelelser 9:95–124. 
Hansen, Jens Arnholtz, and Ole Hammerslev. 2010. “Bourdieu Og Staten.” Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk 
tidsskrift for kultur- og samfundsvidenskab 2010(1-2):11–31. 
Hartmann, Michael. 2000. “Class–specific Habitus and the Social Reproduction of  the Business Elite in 
Germany and France.” The Sociological Review 48(2):241–62. 
Harvey, Charles, and Mairi Maclean. 2008. “Capital Theory and the Dynamics of  Elite Business 
Networks in Britain and France.” The Sociological Review 56:103–20. 
Hjellbrekke, Johs. et al. 2007. “The Norweigian Field of  Power Anno 2000.” European Societies 9(2):245–
73. 
Hjellbrekke, Johs., and Olav Korsnes. 2009a. “At Studere Magtfeltet.” Pp. 147–70 in Refleksiv sociologi i 
praksis: Empiriske undersøgelser inspireret af  Pierre Bourdieu, edited by Ole Hammerslev, Jens 
Arnholtz Hansen, and Ida Willig. Hans Reitzel. 
Hjellbrekke, Johs., and Olav Korsnes. 2009b. “Quantifying the Field of  Power in Norway.” Pp. 31–45 in 
Quantifying Theory: Pierre Bourdieu, edited by Karen Robson and Chris Sanders. Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
Iversen, Martin J. 2005. “25 År Som Revolutionerede Dansk Erhvervsliv.” Den Jyske Historiker 
(109):105–17. 
Iversen, Martin J., and Steen Andersen. 2008. “Co-Operative Liberalism: Denmark from 1857 to 2007.” 
in Creating the Nordic model of  capitalism: the development of  comparative periphery, edited by Susan 
Fellman. Bassingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
136 
 
Jæger, Mads Meier. 2006. “Skaleringstekniker - at Se Det Skjulte I Data.” Pp. 49–66 in Sociologiske 
Metoder - Fra teori til analyse i kvantitative og kvalitative studier, edited by Ole Bjerg and Kasper 
Villadsen. 
Jambu, Michel. 1991. Exploratory and Multivariate Data Analysis. Orlando, FL, USA: Academic Press, Inc. 
Kadushin, Charles. 1995. “Friendship Among the French Financial Elite.” American Sociological Review 
60(2):202–21. 
Kaelble, Hartmutt. 1980. “Long-Term Changes in the Recruitment of  the Business Elite: Germany 
Compared to the US, Great Britain, and France since the Industrial Revolution.” Journal of  Social 
History 13(3):404–23. 
Larsen, Anton Grau, Stefan Bastholm Andrade, and Christoph Houman Ellersgaard. 2012. Soc.ca: 
Specific and Class Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis for the Social Sciences in R. 
Lebaron, Frédéric. 2008. “Central Bankers in the Contemporary Global Field of  Power: A ‘social 
Space’ Approach.” The Sociological Review 56:121–44. 
Lebaron, Frédéric. 2009. “How Bourdieu ‘Quantified’ Bourdieu: The Geometric Modelling of  Data.” 
Pp. 11–29 in Quantifying Theory: Pierre Bourdieu, edited by Chris Sanders and Karen Robson. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Maclean, Mairi, Charles Harvey, and Jon Press. 2006. Business Elites and Corporate Governance in France and 
the UK. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Marceau, Jane. 1989. A Family Business?: The Making of  an International Business Élite. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Merton, Robert K. 1968. “The Matthew Effect in Science.” Science 159(3810):56–63. 
Merton, Robert K. 1988. “The Matthew Effect in Science, II: Cumulative Advantage and the 
Symbolism of  Intellectual Property.” Isis 79(4):606–23. 
Mikkelsen, Ole. 2007. Straarup - Et Portræt. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books. 
137 
 
Mills, Charles Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
De Nooy, Wouter. 2003. “Fields and Networks: Correspondence Analysis and Social Network Analysis 
in the Framework of  Field Theory.” Poetics 31(5):305–27. 
Rose, Caspar, and Steen Thomsen. 2004. “The Impact of  Corporate Reputation on Performance - 
Some Danish Evidence.” European Management Journal 22(2):201–10. 
Le Roux, Brigitte, and Henry Rouanet. 2004. Geometric Data Analysis from Correspondence Analysis to 
Structured Data Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Le Roux, Brigitte, and Henry Rouanet. 2010. Multiple Correspondence Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Schøtt, Thomas. 2003. Den Økonomiske Elites Netværk. Århus: Magtudredningen. 
Scott, John. 1991a. “Networks of  Corporate Power: A Comparative Assessment.” Annual Review of  
Sociology 17:181–203. 
Scott, John. 1991b. Social Network Analysis: A Handbook. London: Sage. 
Statens Offentliga Utredningar. 1990. Demokrati Och Makt I Sverige - Maktutredningens Huvudrapport. 
Stockholm: SOU. 
Stockhammer, Engelbert. 2004. “Financialisation and the Slowdown of  Accumulation.” Cambridge 
Journal of  Economics 28(5):719–41. 
Vedres, Balázs, and David Stark. 2010. “Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping 
Groups.” American Journal of  Sociology 115(4):1150–90. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1993. “From Ruling Class to Field of  Power: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu 
on La Noblesse d’Etat.” Theory, Culture & Society 10(3):19–45. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2005. Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics. Cambridge: Polity. 
Wright, Erik Olin. 1997. Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
138 
 
3. The Inner Circle Revisited: The Case of an 
Egalitarian Society 
By Anton Grau Larsen & Christoph Houman Ellersgaard,  Ph.D.-fellows, Department of Sociology, 
University of Copenhagen 
Abstract 
The interlocks between the corporate elite in a highly egalitarian society, the Scandinavian welfare 
state of Denmark, are examined through re-establishing Michael Useem’s notion of the inner circle, 
which describes the conditions of the formation of classwide rationality in the corporate elite. In 
spite of challenges to intercorporate cohesion from the ongoing internationalization of capital, the 
withdrawal of banks and the limits to networking posed by new standards of corporate governance, 
a cohesive core group of 171 individuals is identified within the entire corporate elite of 6154 board 
members of the top 1037 Danish corporations in 2012. Using a new measure of social circles 
memberships based on proximity in social networks, the identified inner circle encapsulates the 
notion of the inner circle better than the usual indicator of inner-circle memberships, number of top 
board memberships. A high level of social homogeneity of gender, social background, education, 
and career position underlines the cohesion of the inner circle. Further, the members of this inner 
circle are the main political representatives of the corporate elite in other powerful networks. By 
data-mapping all powerful networks in Denmark (i.e. business association committees, political 
commissions, university governing boards, cultural institutions, social clubs, foundations, and royal 
events) it is shown that the inner-circle members appear more frequently in all fields of power than 
other the rest of the corporate elite. 
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Introduction 
In the wake of the financial crisis and the subsequent downturn in the global economy, an old 
spectre returned: the spectre of the upper classes, the ultra-rich, and the capitalist class. And yet, the 
prevailing impression is that this class no longer has an organized capacity to act in a concerted 
fashion. This is particularly the case in countries where class action in general is viewed as most 
improbable, such as the egalitarian welfare states of Scandinavia. Of these countries Denmark in 
particular has been regarded as, if not a pluralist haven, then at least one with relatively weak 
coherence and high openness in recruitment (Christiansen and Togeby 2007; Ruostetsaari 2007). 
Along with the perceived waning class consciousness of the working class and relative income 
equality it is tempting to see Denmark as one of the most likely cases for the “death of class” thesis 
(see e.g. Bell 1973; Pakulski and Waters 1996). However, the social organization of the capitalist 
class has been neglected in discussions of the dissolution of class society. A closer examination of 
the inner circle within the network of the Danish corporate elite questions the notion of the death of 
class action and reveals a capitalist class that exists, to express it in the most classical terms, both “in 
and for itself”. 
Michael Useem’s (1984) concept of ”the inner circle” provides a framework capable of challenging 
the misconception of a fragmented corporate community by exploring its networks. The inner circle 
is a cohesive segment of the capitalist class, organised through interlocking board memberships to 
create the basis for a classwide rationality representing the interest of big business at large. This inner 
circle is, in turn, shown to be the also most politically active among the corporate elite, appearing on, 
for example, university boards, in policy planning groups, in business organizations, and exclusive 
social clubs. The inner circle both facilitates the formation of class interest and represents this 
interest among other elites. While demonstrating the existence and framework of an inner circle in 
Denmark, the authors, along with constructing the inner circle framework, were faced with three 
challenges. First, the classical boundary problem of elite sociology: Who can be regarded as 
members of the elite? Second: How can we observe the political action of this group? Third: Under 
the current business infrastructure, which has been developed to respond to a more and more 
globalized economy and new standards of corporate governance, is it still possible to form cohesive 
corporate groups in egalitarian societies such as Denmark? 
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The primary aim of this study, then, was to establish the continued relevance of the concept of the 
inner circle. Originally, Useem (1984:63) used multiple memberships of top corporate boards as a 
“proxy” of inner-circle membership for “technical convenience”. However, a more empirically 
sensitive procedure for identifying the intersection of social circles through social network analysis 
was developed by Richard Alba and Charles Kadushin (1976). When investigating the inner circle by 
applying this method to the network of multiple board members of the top 1037 Danish 
corporations, a core became visible. After identifying this inner circle, the social homogeneity of 
their biographies was assessed. Finally, the political activity of the inner circle was demonstrated by 
mapping their participation in other potentially powerful networks, drawing on unique data of all 
institutionalized power networks in Denmark. This enables us to analyze whether or not an inner 
circle identified only by positions in the corporate network is more likely to be part of other 
important elite networks. 
Background: The Fracturing of the Inner Circle in Contemporary 
Capitalism 
Recent developments have seriously challenged the inner circle hypothesis. In a number of countries 
the level of integration within the inner circles of corporate elites has deteriorated for three reasons: 
(1) the decline of bank involvement in the corporate networks; (2) the emergence of transnational 
corporate networks; and (3) new standards of corporate governance. The Danish context questions 
the extent to which these developments have rendered the concept of inner circle obsolete. Contrary 
to the intuitive notion that a country with relatively strong labor organizations and egalitarian politics 
such as Denmark would lack a strong corporate elite, perhaps these institutions engender a greater 
need for corporate elite unity in order to secure the interests of the capitalist class. 
First, as the American interlocks had been tied through bank centrality (see Mariolis 1975), the 
disengagement of banks led to a much more loosely and infrequently tied corporate network in the 
US (Davis and Mizruchi 1999; Mizruchi 2013). In Denmark, corporate law prohibits bank directors 
from taking board positions outside the financial sector (Edling et al. 2012). As a result, the network 
has never relied on banks, therefore changes in their behaviour are unlikely to have had much 
impact the corporate network. 
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Secondly, small, open economies such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, both comparable to the 
Danish economy, have experienced a decline in the number of corporate interlocks (Bühlmann, 
David, and Mach 2012; Heemskerk and Fennema 2009). Whereas dissolution of the US corporate 
network can be explained by the bank centers turning their attention away from productive capital, 
the weakening of ties in the smaller economies can in part be attributed to the influx of foreign 
capital. Foreign ownership will usually result in foreign directors and board members. As the 
national networks decline we see the rise of new trans-European or global elites formed by “global 
interlockers” (Carroll 2010). However, Denmark is still at the periphery of European corporate elite 
formation (van Veen and Kratzer 2011). Furthermore, both the Netherlands and Switzerland are 
hosts to numerous transnational corporations, whereas Danish corporations are comparatively small, 
with the exception of the shipping giant and conglomerate A.P. Møller – Mærsk, the only Danish 
corporation listed in Fortune’s Global 500. The Netherlands have 11 listed corporations and 
Switzerland 14. The Danish case thus sheds light on whether or not the inner circle has also 
corroded within economies with relatively small corporations1. 
Thirdly, as changes to international standards of corporate governance (see e.g. Ferris, Jagannathan, 
and Pritchard 2003) question the legitimacy of the “olds boys’ ” network, the challenge in Denmark 
arises more from ideological inspiration than direct interest of ownership as Danish corporations 
have not yet been subject to dispersed shareholding. Of the top 82 corporations in 2008 
(Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Munk 2013), 25 were controlled by families, 15 were controlled by 
foundations, six were state-owned, and nine were owned by cooperatives. Of the 1037 corporations 
included in this study, only 88 were listed on the stock exchange and some were even retained under 
a system of classified stocks. Corporations are therefore able to remain more autonomous from 
stock market influence and to a large extent, include board members they trust. The sparse research 
on corporate interlocks and interlockers in Denmark also suggests a high degree of clustering 
(Schøtt 2003) and that the small-world phenomenon is more common in Denmark than in the rest 
of Scandinavia (Edling et al. 2012). 
                                                 
1 However, the 1,037 corporations employed around 1,600,000 both inside and outside Denmark, which would be equal 
57 % of the total Danish labor force, showing their potential importance in spite of their apparent lack of size.   
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The international tendency towards the fracturing of corporate elites could also be attributed to the 
inner circle’s decreasing need for coordinated political action, owing to the rise of neoliberal politics 
(Mizruchi 2013), as the cohesion of the inner circle also derives from the extent of political 
opposition to corporate interests (Useem 1982). The context of a decommodifying the Scandinavian 
welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) and a coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001) 
creates a relatively equal and affluent society for the distribution of income as measured by Gini 
coefficient and high GDP per capita levels (Campbell and Hall 2006). 
Furthermore, organized labor still holds a strong, if declining position, with union density at about 
70% (Visser 2006). This corporatist environment created by the collective organization of both labor 
and business also ties union leaders to the corporate world through union-owned banks and 
employer–employee owned pension funds. However, recent declines in union density, level of 
equality and corporatism (Blom-Hansen 2001) are challenging the consensus based on cross-class 
alliances. Thus, the role of union leaders as both tied to and a political challenger of the corporate 
elite remains unclear. At the same time, business organizations remain key political actors of the 
corporate worlds, both as lobbyists and through involvement in government (Binderkrantz, 
Christiansen, and Pedersen 2014). This adds to the paradox of the status of the inner circle in 
Denmark. Does egalitarian, corporatist society, as one of the last challenges to neoliberalism, remain 
a place where capitalists have to unite, even outside of the business associations? 
Theory: The Notion of the Inner Circle 
In emphasizing the creation of class cohesion through social interaction within the elite, Useem’s 
concept of the inner circle follows a current in classic elite theory. From Mosca (1939) and C.W. 
Mills (1956) to studies of corporate interlocks (Allen 1974; Mintz and Schwartz 1981; for review, see 
Mizruchi 1996; Scott 1991), this tradition has defined the social integration of the elite by their social 
integration. This is in contrast to a tradition running across sociologists as diverse as Pareto (1991) 
and Bourdieu (1996), who in various ways emphasize the resources and formal positions of elite 
individuals. 
Any search for a cohesive elite group struggles with the demarcation of the core group (Laumann, 
Marsden, and Prensky 1983). In a democratic society, lacking the formal definitions of social 
standing, defining the exact boundaries of such a group must be akin to demarcating a cloud 
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(Bourdieu 1996). As a result, the inner circle is not a distinct group with clearly marked boundaries 
but an axis of inner group centrality within the capitalist class (Useem 1979). The extensive networks 
create cohesion within this elite group through ties of friendship, kinship, ownership, clubs, business 
associations, and boardroom interlocks (Cornwell and Dokshin 2014). Furthermore, the 
cohesiveness created by these networks is in turn enhanced by the members forming a status group 
exhibiting social closure and shared values and manners (Domhoff 1975; Useem 1978), thus forming 
a “class-specific habitus” (Hartmann 2000). The connections serve many purposes, but an extended 
“business scan” is of particular importance (Useem 1982). By tapping into the flow of information 
that moves in these networks, the directors and their corporations gain privileged information on 
the plights and opportunities of other corporations. By maintaining direct contact with state 
officials, the directors gain insights into the workings of the political apparatus. As Bourdieu 
(1996:368) stated, “information on power is a source of power in and of itself”. But these channels 
of information are also channels for reputation and social control. 
Manoeuvring multiple directorates, boardrooms and business organizations may be a tricky business, 
because of questions of loyalty towards different corporations (Vedres and Stark 2010) and the 
corporate community as a whole. As a result, formal and informal rules restrict praxis in the inner 
circle. The ones who are able to manifest the “…capacity to transcend the immediate imperatives of 
his or her own company to express a broader vision” (Useem 1982:216) become central in the inner 
circle. These are the individuals who come to embody the classwide rationality of the inner circle. 
Classwide rationality differs from the diverging, uncoordinated, and atomistic interests of the 
corporations by “promot[ing] the broader needs of big business” (Useem 1982:201–2). It is 
important to note that classwide rationality is not a neutral concept. Any definition of the interests 
of an entire class is likely to be biased towards the interests of the dominating corporations (Fligstein 
1996). Rather, the inner circle is able to successfully legitimize their interpretation of the class 
interest. The cohesive network that is the basis for the formulation of class interest is what sets the 
definition of the inner circle apart from other business elite definitions. Those who are most likely to 
embody the classwide rationality are not necessarily the CEOs of the largest corporations or the 
wealthiest owners. 
Since the work of Berle and Means (1932), there has been an ongoing discussion on whether or not 
CEOs share class relations with the capitalist owners. It was proposed that the diffusion of 
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ownership would entail a loss of capitalist control and a diminished focus on profits. Although the 
disintegration of ownership and control has been seriously questioned (Zeitlin 1974), the notion of 
classwide rationality rests upon the social connections between management and ownership through 
corporate interlocks (Useem 1979). Thus inner-circle membership cannot be ascribed through the 
traditional positional method of identifying elite membership, such as holding a senior management 
position within a corporation of a certain size (see e.g. Maclean, Harvey, and Press 2006). Inner-
circle membership requires being part of a social group rather than just holding a position of 
command (cf. Scott 2003). 
Politically, the inner circle can be seen as informal representatives. To the extent that the corporate 
community manages to gain access to other power spheres, those who are inner-circle members will 
be more likely to take part. This is the case for business associations, cultural organizations, federal 
and government advisory panels, and university boards (Useem 1978, 1979). These institutions 
correspond to the subfields within the field of power identified by Bourdieu (1996), allowing inner-
circle members the opportunity to engage in the exchange of different forms of capital. 
Furthermore, when, for instance, state officials seek new persons to take up public positions, they 
may acquire recommendations for possible candidates from prominent business leaders already 
holding public positions (Useem 1984). A cohesive inner group both provides a common 
framework and secures the promotion of internal members. Although this does not mean that inner 
circle members necessarily hold a firm grip on public opinion or individually be financially 
positioned to promote certain causes, the inner circle is characterised in other power networks by 
being the representatives of the capitalist class. 
Data: The Networks of the Entire Corporate Elite 
The data used in our study to identify the inner circle consists of the names of the board members 
and management of the top 1000 corporations according to turnover, as of March 2012. Data on 
board membership and corporation size comes from the Danish Corporate Register. Furthermore, 
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we have added 36 independent subsidiary firms of these corporations2. In addition, to ensure that 
the recent trend towards financialization of the economy (Stockhammer 2004) is not neglected, we 
have included the boards and management of the 28 members of the Danish Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Association and the state-owned Finansiel Stabilitet, which controls the leftovers 
from failed banks. After removing non-independent subsidiaries, the data comprise 1037 boards, 
with 7065 positions held by 6154 individuals. This data is fairly inclusive and the differences in size 
among the corporations is notable. The smallest corporation has a turnover of just DKK 304 
million (US $53 million), whereas the largest corporation has a turnover of DKK 315 billion (US 
$55 billion). The top 100 corporations account for 68.3% of the total turnover of the 1037 
corporations. 
The network data are combined with data for business association committee membership, 
governing boards of academic and cultural institutions and foundations, membership of political 
committees, and the like. These data come from a mapping, conducted by the authors, of all 
institutionalized power and prestige networks in Denmark. Unless otherwise indicated, the data were 
collected through the public administration database [FOA], which lists all state-recognized 
organizations and public positions, and matched with the names and positions provided by the 
websites of the organizations listed in the FOA. Biographical material for the social homogeneity of 
the inner circle was gathered from Kraks Blå Bog [Who’s Who], company websites, profiles on 
LinkedIn, and newspaper articles, and are thus primarily self-reported. 
Methods: Reconstructing the Methodology of Inner Circles as the Core of 
the Corporate Network 
One might argue that selecting more than 1000 corporations in a small country like Denmark is too 
inclusive. The main methodological focus of this network of the entire corporate elite is to secure the 
inclusion of all relevant but still fairly comparable corporate ties that might facilitate cohesion and 
the diffusion of reputation. Non-prestigious boards are deliberately included, with the result that the 
                                                 
2 Included subsidiary firms all have board members who are not all employed by or at the parent company board. 
Further, these companies all have turnovers so large that, were they independent firms, they would have been 
included in the data. 
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issues of the scale of ranking (see Carroll and Fennema 2004; Kentor and Jang 2004) are less 
important in this case. Within the corporate elite, the network of the connected comprises the 3166 
corporate elite members who are connected to each other in the largest component. It is within this 
component that the inner circle must reside, because the second largest component comprises only 
28 businesspeople and is thus more than 100 times smaller than the largest component. However, 
many members of the connected corporate elite do not themselves form ties but are tied only 
through the clique nature of boards: if just one board member forms ties to other boards, everyone 
in the board becomes connected at a second degree. Thus we have restricted parts of our analysis to 
the 514 board members and directors who hold more than one position within the largest 
component of the corporate network, the network of linkers. 
 
FIGURE 1: OVERLAPPING 3-NEIGHBOURHOODS AS PROXIMITY MEASURE 
 
The proximity of A and B is determined by the shared overlap for 3-neighbourhood divided by the total size 3-
neighbourhood of both A and B. In this case, the shared neighbourhood is 8 (A, B, C, D, E, G, I, J and K - 1) out of 14, 
giving a proximity score between A and B of 0.571. 
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This group of 514 linkers would usually be regarded as the inner circle (Heemskerk and Fennema 
2009; Useem 1982). When the number of boards increases, this definition rapidly decreases in 
selectivity. The network grows in size and with it the network dynamics change. The degree (the 
number of connections) or betweenness centrality (to be on the shortest paths in the network between 
linkers) and closeness centrality (having the shortest average path length to all linkers—(Freeman 1979), 
as well as size of the 3rd neighbourhood, all follow a power-law distribution (Barabasi and Albert 
1999), not only in the network of the entire corporate elite, but even within the network of linkers 
(see Figure 1). The diameter—the longest path length within the component—is still 13 degrees in 
the network of linkers, so that transmission of actual knowledge of each other’s reputation through 
these channels is very unlikely. 
In order to identify a more cohesive subgroup, cluster analysis was used as a heuristic tool. A 
measure of proximity using overlapping social circles (Alba and Kadushin 1976) calculates distances 
between all linkers, which are in turn cut into clusters by hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis. 
The advantage of this procedure is that the linkers are placed in mutually exclusive typological 
groups. The measure of overlapping circle proximity is identified by using the shared overlap of 
linkers’ 3rd degree neighbourhood. A proximity measure ranging from 1 (total overlap of 3rd degree 
neighbourhood) to 0 (no overlap) is created for each pair of linkers (see Figure 2). Thus linkers are 
regarded as close and potentially part of a certain circle, to the extent that a large proportion of their 
network share the same members and to the extent that these ties in turn are composed of the same 
linkers. The 3rd degree neighbourhood has the advantage of measuring the degree centrality of the 
2nd degree neighbourhood. As a result, individuals with relatively selective but central direct contacts 
can get high proximity scores, because their 3rd neighbourhood grows rapidly in size and therefore 
has a higher possibility of overlapping with others. 
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF DEGREE, 3-NEIGHBOURHOOD, CLOSENESS CENTRALITY AND 
BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY IN NETWORK OF CONNECTED AND NETWORK OF LINKERS
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FIGURE 3: THE DIFFERENT NETWORK SEGMENTS OF THE CORPORATE ELITE IN DENMARK 
 
 
As the clustering algorithm cuts the network into clusters, the group having the largest share of all 
ties is analyzed. At the partition before this cluster no longer has half of all ties, the procedure is 
terminated. In this case, 343 linkers are excluded from the network, leaving us with 171 members of 
a more cohesive network: the inner circle, as we define it. The entire procedure is summarised in Figure 
3. When comparing the inner circle as clusters are gradually cut off (see Appendix I), the procedure 
works much like peeling layers of an onion. Less integrated parts of the inner circle are excluded one 
by one. The excluded clusters do not form a single connected group, but subgroups hanging onto 
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different parts of the inner circle. A common denominator is provided within each cluster, for 
example, individuals connected on boards due to cross-ownership of less prestigious firms. 
The decision to end this clustering procedure is of course based on an estimate rather than on 
strong objective criteria, and yet it does rest on both qualitative and quantitative concerns. Thus, the 
clustering procedure is concluded after four subgroups have been removed from the inner circle 
because a further reduction would reduce the number of ties from the network of linkers by more 
than a half to 44.5%. Most importantly, the fifth cut-off would exclude several corporate leaders 
known qualitatively to be key business representatives. Furthermore, the members of the inner-circle 
cluster have the highest average degree, closeness and betweenness centrality, all members of the 
inner circle should remain connected to each other in the same component, and the diameter of the 
inner-circle network should fall as clusters are peeled off. Hence the inner circle is the cluster in the 
network of linkers: (1) still holding more than half of all ties; (2) having, on average, the most central 
individuals; and (3) that does not exclude key corporate leaders. 
A central inner circle of 171 members within the network of linkers is identified (see Table 1 and 
Figure 4). These inner-circle members are on average tied to 11.0 other linkers, up from an average 
of 7.3 for all linkers. Adding to this, the distance between the members of the network is reduced 
significantly. The average path length within the network of the inner circle drops from 4.3 in the 
network of linkers to 2.8 in the inner circle. With no path longer than five degrees inside the inner 
circle, this suggests a group with very high connectivity. However, inner-circle cohesion is not 
further improved by the same directors sitting on several boards together (Heemskerk and Fennema 
2009); rather, the share of multiple ties drops from 9.4% in the networks of linkers to 7.8% in the 
inner-circle cluster. Some of the multiple ties outside of the inner circle reflect ownership structures 
within conglomerates, where several subsidiaries share board members from the holding company. 
These relations are less frequent in the inner circle than among the linkers. The inner circle connects 
205 corporations, 96 of which are from among the top 200 corporations. 
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FIGURE 4: THE INNER CIRCLE IN THE NETWORK OF LINKERS 
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TABLE 1: THE CENTRALITY OF THE INNER CIRCLE IN THE NETWORK OF LINKERS 
 ALL LINKERS 
THE CLUSTER 
OF THE INNER 
CIRCLE 
   
Edges 3728 1873 
Density 0.014 0.043 
Average degree 7.3 11.0 
Diameter 13 5 
Average path length 4.3 2.8 
Share of multiple ties (%) 0.094 0.078 
Average betweenness centrality 833 1555 
Average closeness centrality × 10-5 4.7 5.3 
N 514 171 
Note that comparisons between the network of the inner circle and the network of connected and the entire corporate 
elite are not possible, as all hangers from these networks are removed. 
Results: Who are the Inner Circle? The Reproduction of a Common, 
Unifying Culture 
Aside from sharing connections through membership of the same corporate board–based social 
circles, other traits may create greater cohesion within the dominant segment of the corporate elite. 
Shared educational background, along with elitist social background, helps form elite consciousness 
(Bourdieu 1996; Hartmann 2000; Useem and Karabel 1986) and ensure a feeling of common trust 
within the circle. The members of the inner circle do, in general, share common traits (see Table 2). 
More than five out of six (84.2%) inner-circle members have employment only within the corporate 
world (see Table 2.); 52% hold an executive position, of which around two-thirds (59) are in one of 
the top 100 corporations based on turnover; and the remaining 48% are professional board 
members and often former executives. The members of the inner circle are at—or just past—the 
apex of their careers, with the median and average age being 57.7 years, with a standard deviation of 
only seven years. With no inner-circle members younger than 41 years, and as seen also in the 
skewed gender distribution, this is an “old boys’ network” in all senses of the term. 
Only 14 of the 171 members (8.2%) of the inner circle are women, further underlining the social 
homogeneity and class-specific cultural norms where mastery of qualities traditionally ascribed to 
men is an advantage (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998). In the corporate elite as a whole, 13.6% of 
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the positions are held by women, indicating that even after gaining access to the boards, women are 
still excluded from the networks that form and validate classwide rationality. There are no signs that 
women in the inner circle have particularly good network positions and they are not more frequently 
tied to each other. This supports claims of token female presence (Kanter 1977) rather than 
empowering women’s networks to challenge the cohesion and cultural homogeneity of the inner 
circle. 
Only a few inner-circle members have careers outside the corporate sector. These are two academics 
tied to business schools, six lawyers, a single active politician3, three central members of the farmers’ 
organizations, and five top leaders of the Danish labor unions. These are included in the corporate 
elite primarily through their board memberships in pension funds and banks and are highly 
connected to each other. They are also tied directly to a quite large number of central corporate 
agents. The leader of the traditional right-wing blacksmith union (Dansk Metal), Thorkild E. Jensen, 
has the third highest number of connections of all members of the corporate elite. However, it is 
primarily the leaders of the strong unions with direct ties to industry who are included in the inner 
circle. Although it may be difficult to see these individuals as representatives of a classwide 
rationality, they may still be known well enough through these ties to be considered generally 
acceptable and non-subversive, akin to the “new men of power” described by Mills (1948). Thus the 
inclusion of labor union leaders into the inner circle should be seen as a remnant of the Danish 
corporatist capitalist economy based on class compromises as opposed to an inner circle fighting for 
the interests of untamed capitalism. 
 
 
  
                                                 
3 The mayor of a rural municipality, who serves as political representative on boards in several government-owned 
corporations. 
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TABLE 2: PROFILE OF THE INNER CIRCLE 
  N Percent 
Corporate position   
 Chief executive officer 59 34.5 % 
 Executive 30 17.5 % 
 Board chairman 40 23.4 % 
 Board member only 42 24.6 % 
Other position   
 Corporate only 144 84.2 % 
 Lawyer 6 3.5 % 
 Leader, farmers’ organization 3 1.8 % 
 Leader, trade union 5 2.9 % 
 Professor 2 1.2 % 
 Politician (mayor) 1 0.6 % 
 Owner of corporation 9 5.3 % 
Age   
 Mean (s.d.) 57.
7 
(7.1) 
Gender   
 Female 14 8.2 % 
Place of birth   
 Copenhagen area 44 34.6 % 
 Provincial cities (2.000-300.000) 
inhabitants) 
46 36.2 % 
 Rural 26 20.5 % 
 Outside Denmark 11 8.7 % 
 Not known 44  
Fathers occupation   
 Manager (or owner) 32 30.5 % 
 Professional 25 23.8 % 
 Junior manager 8 7.6 % 
 Self employed 15 14.3 % 
 Farmer 10 9.5 % 
 White collar 6 5.7 % 
 Blue collar 9 8.6 % 
 Not known 66  
Education type   
 Arts and humanities 4 2.5 % 
 Social sciences 5 3.1 % 
 Law 11 6.7 % 
 Business and administration 64 39.3 % 
 Economics 30 18.4 % 
 Engineering 25 15.3 % 
 Science or medicine 11 6.7 % 
 Professional 13 8.0 % 
 Not known 8  
Highest qualification   
 Doctorate 14 8.6 % 
 Higher degree 92 56.4 % 
 First degree 36 22.1 % 
 Professional qualification only 21 12.9 % 
 Not known 8  
 Total 171 100 % 
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Fewer than two-thirds of the inner-circle members have higher degrees or doctorates, which is 
comparable to the top Danish CEOs (Ellersgaard et al. 2013), but significantly fewer than would be 
expected in France or Germany, in particular (Hartmann 2010; Maclean et al. 2006). The degrees 
held are not very prestigious academically, as none of the academic titles obtained by inner-circle 
members have ever been among the top 25 programs as determined by the average grade required 
for admission, the sole criterion used since 1979. However, the inner-circle members originate from 
a select few university programs. Only four of the eight Danish universities and business schools4 
have more than one inner-circle member among their alumni. And only 12.3% of the inner-circle-
members have a university background outside business, economics, law, or engineering programs. 
The alumni of these different principal programs do not appear to form more cohesive subgroups 
within the inner circle. Thus little seems to suggest an internal division of the inner circle by 
particular professions, as is the case in France (Bourdieu 2005). 
For the 105 we have managed to trace, the social background of inner-circle members is quite 
exclusive. More than half of their fathers were placed at the top of corporate hierarchies and/or 
were managers or professionals. The parents of 23 inner-circle members (13.5%) are listed in the 
Danish equivalent of Who’s Who (Kraks Blå Bog), suggesting a very elitist background5. The 
birthplaces of the inner-circle members are more or less as geographically dispersed as the general 
population. This is somewhat surprising as the elite in Denmark are concentrated strongly around 
the capital of Copenhagen. This may suggest that the inner circle is recruited from a broader upper 
stratum based on habitual dispositions rather than from the core of a socially integrated 
metropolitan elite, perhaps because of the strong provincial and agricultural ties of Danish business. 
The general principal of admission appears to be having the right dispositions in the form of 
interests, manners, and ethics, rather than the inheritance of different forms of resources, such as 
connections and wealth. The differences in habitual dispositions between the middle and working 
classes may therefore explain the massive under-representation of working-class children. 
                                                 
4 The universities with more than one alumni in the inner circle are Copenhagen Business School (41), University of 
Copenhagen (30), Aarhus University (19), and Technical University of Denmark (11).  
5 There is little indication of network ties or more cohesive subgroups based on shared social background. 
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Recruitment to the networks of the corporate elite does not appear to be based primarily upon 
family ties, or an upper class principle (Useem 1982), although not being of too different a class origin 
certainly appears to ease access to the inner circle. 
Inner-circle Membership and Corporate Political Representation 
So far, we have seen that the networks of the Danish corporate elite seem to have a highly cohesive 
central circle and that the elite are organised along classwide principles, rather than solely from the 
corporate or upper classes—And yet a core feature must still be present before it is possible to 
identify this group as an inner circle; namely, the prerogative of being the primary ambassadors of 
business in other power spheres. In Table 3, we explore the political representation of the inner 
circle. Although the other groups of the business elite in total outnumber inner-circle members in 
these diverse power networks, it is also clear that members of the inner circle are far more likely be 
part of all these types of networks than are other members of the broader business elite. As the 
following summary of our findings of the political representation in different spheres will show, the 
members of the inner circle are not the exclusive political representatives of the corporate elite. 
However, the logic of inclusion of businessmen in other power networks appears similar to the 
principles behind inclusion in the inner circle. 
Perhaps the most important and least surprising sphere for political representation of the rationality 
of the inner circle is various business or employers’ associations, along with their branch- or policy-
specific subcommittees. This institutional setting is at the same time the most important institutional 
venue through which the inner circle can present and impose its interests as the interests of the 
wider corporate class. More than one-third of the members of the inner circle hold positions on the 
committees of Danish business associations, compared to less than one-fifth of the linkers and less 
than one-tenth of the rest of the corporate elite. More than 40% of the inner-circle members who 
have a seat on a business association committee sit on one of the 15 central committees. 
Furthermore, almost 10% of all members in the core committees—which include various specialists 
from both corporations and business associations—also belong to the inner circle. 
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TABLE 3: INNER CIRCLE REPRESENTATION IN OTHER PART OF THE FIELD OF POWER 
 
 
N Percent  N Percent 
ECONOMIC FIELD 
Membership of all business association committees 
Boards=464; Members=3659 
Membership of core business association committees† 
Boards=15; Members=257 
Inner Circle 57 33.3 % Inner Circle 23 13.5 % 
Linkers 67 19.5 % Linkers 20 5.8 % 
Connected 179 6.7 % Connected 40 1.5 % 
Corporate Elite only 149 5.0 % Corporate Elite only 21 0.7 % 
POLITICAL FIELD 
Membership of all commissions and advisory bodies 
Boards=73; Members=1038 
Membership of core commissions and advisory bodies† 
Boards=10; Members=250 
Inner Circle 26 15.2 % Inner Circle 20 11.7 % 
Linkers 19 5.5 % Linkers 6 1.7 % 
Connected 53 2.0 % Connected 28 1.1 % 
Corporate Elite only 20 0.7 % Corporate Elite only 5 0.2 % 
ACADEMIC FIELD 
Membership of other academic and research institutions 
Boards=1253; Members=109 
Membership of university governing boards 
Boards=8; Members=91 
Inner Circle 37 21.6 % Inner Circle 5 2.9 % 
Linkers 20 5.8 % Linkers 5 1.5 % 
Connected 43 1.6 % Connected 4 0.2 % 
Corporate Elite only 6 0.2 % Corporate Elite only 1 0.0 % 
CULTURAL AND MEDIA FIELD 
Membership of cultural organization boards 
Boards=71; Members=568 
Membership of media and public opinion boards 
Boards=23; Members=449 
Inner Circle 6 3.5 % Inner Circle 26 15.2 % 
Linkers 6 1.7 % Linkers 16 4.7 % 
Connected 21 0.8 % Connected 71 2.7 % 
Corporate Elite only 8 0.3 % Corporate Elite only 32 1.1 % 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Membership of all VL-networks 
Groups=114; Members=3823 
  Membership of core VL-networks 
Groups=9; Members=332 
  
Inner Circle 75 43.9 % Inner Circle 50 29.2 % 
Linkers 97 28.3 % Linkers 24 7.0 % 
Connected 260 9.8 % Connected 52 2.0 % 
Corporate Elite only 151 5.1 % Corporate Elite only 9 0.3 % 
SYMBOLIC CAPITAL 
Membership of foundation boards 
Boards=1394; Members=7179 
  Participation in royal events 
Events=73; participants=7374 
  
Inner Circle 75 43.9 % Inner Circle 49 28.7 % 
Linkers 90 26.2 % Linkers 47 13.7 % 
Connected 281 10.6 % Connected 132 5.0 % 
Corporate Elite only 115 3.8 % Corporate Elite only 50 1.7 % 
†Core business association committees and core commissions are identified by having the highest eigenvector, 
betweeness and closeness centrality scores in an analysis of these organizational networks 
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Politicians and state employees are made aware of the policy interests of business through various 
channels. These include lobbyism, direct personal meetings, and other social events. However, these 
contacts between top bureaucrats, politicians and corporate stewards are also institutionalized 
through commissions, councils and the advisory bodies of governmental agencies. Almost 15% of 
inner-circle members have participated in advisory bodies, councils, and commissions established 
from 2005 and onwards. More than one-third of all corporate elite representatives of core 
commissions are members of the inner circle, meaning that the proportions of inner-circle members 
in core commissions are more than 10 times higher than the rest of the corporate elite. When 
government wants to include the corporate community in policy debates, it is often the inner circle 
they turn to. Given the tendency to homophily in social networks, the recommended candidates will 
often be prominent in the networks of interlocking boards. 
By influencing universities, the elite may both help form the skill-set of future employees while also 
influencing the research agendas that could produce knowledge yielding competitive advantage. 
Making the voice of business heard in the academic world may involve funding research through 
foundations, as well as through participation on the boards of different academic institutions, 
including university governing boards, advisory boards of particular departments or national 
research centers, and various committees on higher education. In these networks, members of the 
inner circle are more than 100 times more likely to participate than the members of the corporate 
elite who are not connected to the large component of corporate interlocks. On the governing 
boards of eight Danish universities, one-third (five of the 15) university board members are part of 
the inner circle. The academic field appears to be quite selective when including business 
representatives on their boards and the prerequisites seems to be heavily associated with inner-circle 
membership. 
Further, representation on the boards of museums of art or history, theatres, and opera companies 
is, among other things, an opportunity for business representatives to defend upper-class culture. 
Even if only 3.5% of inner-circle members sit on these boards, the inner circle is still 
disproportionately represented compared to other parts of the corporate network. However, where 
the social and political legitimation of corporate interest is at stake, rather than merely looking to the 
reproduction of “high culture”, we see a stronger representation of the inner circle in the production 
of public opinion: 15% of inner-circle members sit on the boards of TV and radio companies, 
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newspapers, publishers, and the five major think thanks, making the inner-circle members three 
times more likely to sit on these boards than even the linkers. As an indicator of social capital 
outside the network of the boardroom, the participation in the VL network—groups of around 30 
members from business, state bureaucracy, media, and academia, who meet informally once a 
month—offers a glimpse of network cultivation strategies among the corporate elite. Almost half of 
the inner-circle members are active in the VL groups and 28.8% of inner-circle members are part of 
the nine core groups, identified by the prestige of their fellow members.6 Access to diverse top level 
networks thus appear closely tied to the logic behind inclusion into the inner circle. 
Inner-circle members hold positions bestowing high symbolic capital on their holders more often 
than other members of the corporate elite. This helps form a generalised trust in the good name and 
honour of inner-circle members (Bourdieu 2005). Membership on the boards of one of the 1394 
publicly registered foundations can be seen as an indicator of symbolic capital. These foundations 
administrate the fortunes and charity activities of rich family dynasties, and as a result indicate the 
social standing of its directors among the moneyed class. Foundation board membership also opens 
to influencing other sectors through donations and as a platform for intra-elite networking, and 
44.7% of inner-circle members hold a position on one or more of the foundations. 
The honour associated with being invited to a royal event is an indicator of a person’s social 
standing and importance within the elite as well as in the eyes of state agencies aiding the court in 
composing the guest lists. When looking at participation in major royal events—weddings, 
anniversaries, landmark birthdays, christenings of princes—as well as royal hunting parties and 
recent royal dinners, inner-circle members once again appear as the primary ambassadors of the 
corporate elite. Since 1998, twice as many (27.6%) inner-circle members than linkers have 
participated in one or more of the 73 recorded royal events. 
Useem (1978:227) originally used the amount of board memberships as an “appropriate though 
imprecise” measure of inner circle centrality. When compared to the inner circle identified in this 
                                                 
6 The indication of the core group status of a VL group is participation in these groups of government permanent 
secretaries, leaders of top business associations, editors-in-chief of national newspapers, and leaders of major public 
institutions such as universities and museums.   
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paper the same association of board membership and inner-circle centrality is found. However, 
when compared with the 206 members provided with Useem’s definition of the inner circle based 
on at least three board memberships, the 171 inner-circle members identified here are 1.257 times 
more likely to be part of institutions of the different power spheres identified in Table 3. Proximity 
within the most central parts of the corporate network is therefore a better, although more 
demanding, measure of inner-circle centrality. 
This is illustrated by Figure 5. The size of the points relates to the number of sectors (as defined in 
Table 3) in which each individual holds positions. The parts of the network with the densest 
connections also have the most well-connected individuals across sectors. The Matthew principle is 
clearly in operation. A quarter of the inner-circle members sit on at least three boards from sectors 
outside business, compared to 6% of the linkers and only 1% of the connected. From the 
unconnected part of the corporate elite, 94% are not part of any board outside business, whereas 
only 30% of the inner-circle members do not hold at least one of position outside business. 
However, Figure 5 also illustrates the somewhat arbitrary character of any classification. Just outside 
of the inner circle, there are several individuals, close to the inner circle, who connect across many 
sectors. These individuals might have had the necessary proximity if networks other than 
boardroom interlocks had been included in the definition of the inner circle. As Useem (1979) notes, 
the inner circle is bound together by many other forms of ties and further studies should try to 
include them as well. These reservations aside, it appears from this analysis that across all spheres of 
power, the inner circle are the primary ambassadors of corporate interest. 
  
                                                 
7 The ratio of inner circle members to holders of at least three board with regard to positions in other sectoral networks, 
see table 3, ranges from 0.90 (on cultural organization boards; the only ratio less than 1.06) to 1.53 (university 
governing bodies). 
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FIGURE 5: THE INNER CIRCLE IN NETWORKS OF OTHER PARTS OF THE FIELDS OF POWER 
 
Size of nodes indicates number memberships in the nine other power networks presented in Table 3. Only the core 
networks of business association committees, political commissions and VL-groups are included. 
 
Implications: The Power of the Inner Circle 
Even if the cohesion of the inner circle is demonstrated satisfactorily and its prominence in the 
representation of the business elite is indicated, the actual political influence of the inner circle is still 
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unclear. Scholars have tried to trace corporate influence by looking at direct political sponsorships 
(Bond 2007; Burris 2005), but the political campaign contributions are held secret by Danish 
political parties, making it difficult to “follow the money”. But even if the money trails could be 
documented, the influence gained through these donations is hard to estimate. Contributions are 
also made through the business clubs of the two main traditional right-wing parties. Two centers in 
the inner circle are former heads of these business clubs and thus can be used as extreme cases of 
the connections between the inner circle and others holding power or prestige. Henning Kruse 
Petersen, chairman of the Conservative Business Club, is ranked first in betweenness centrality, 
second on degree and third on closeness centrality. He is a former CEO of the largest Danish 
mortgage provider Nykredit and chairman of the board of the state’s crisis bank Finansiel Stabilitet, 
along with several other board positions. He is also very wealthy. 
Even wealthier is Fritz Schur, chairman of the Liberal Business Club, who owns a top 100 
corporation while also serving as chairman on the boards of three of the largest state-owned firms: 
energy giant DONG and the inter-Scandinavian airline SAS and postal service Posten Norden. 
Schur is ranked between 22nd and 26th in degree, closeness and betweenness centrality. He also plays 
a key part in the social elite Schur holds grand soirées in his mansion and an estimated 2000 
people—businessmen, royalty, politicians, and celebrities—pass through his salons annually 
(Sandøe, Sindbæk, and Svaneborg 2012). Furthermore, in less than 10 years he has ascended the 
honorary hierarchy of the royalty, reaching the rank of Kammerherre [Chamberlain]. The numerous 
connections of Fritz Schur all met at the celebration of his 60th birthday, where the royal family, 
current and former ministers of both the left and right, celebrated actors and authors, and many 
inner-circle members gathered to be entertained by, among others, Elton John. The social life of 
Fritz Schur may provide only anecdotal evidence of a generally closed world, but it hints at how the 
inner circle converts economic resources to symbolic power. 
These findings strongly imply that the inner circle in Denmark is part of a broader power elite (cf. 
Mills 1956). This power elite comprises overlapping circles that connect individuals centrally placed 
in the important institutions in Danish society. With the general decline in the cohesion of corporate 
elites elsewhere, this is surprising. Although our data do not tell us anything about the historical 
evolution of the corporate elite, they are quite precise on the current state of inner-circle integration 
with other power spheres. This suggests that in spite of corporate elite fracturing elsewhere, the 
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inner circle remains a valid concept, useful for exploring the social organization of the capitalist class 
in Denmark. However, the extended network outside the boardrooms also implies that inner circle 
formation is in no way restricted to the networks created by corporate interlocks. Several CEOs of 
the largest Danish corporations only have one directorship and are thus excluded from our 
definition of the inner circle, but hold several posts in other sectoral networks. Future scholars with 
interests in the inner circle should aim to incorporate these networks into one broader network of 
the corporate community. 
So far, the challenge of the emergent transnational business community to inner-circle cohesion in 
Denmark seems to be limited. Only two inner circle members are members of important informal 
networks, the European Round Table of Industrialists and the Trilateral Commission (Carroll and 
Sapinski 2010). One sits on several boards of European Fortune 500 corporations and four Danish 
corporations have been able to attract foreign directors of these corporations to their boards. Several 
inner-circle members are connected to the group of global interlockers through boards outside 
Denmark as well. However, these connections do not point to the formation of an international 
network in competition with the coherence of the Danish network, but rather as the fruits of 
success, granted only to the most prominent members of the inner circle in Denmark. The 
obligation to continue to fit into the unifying culture of the inner circle is seen by foreigners as the 
inner circle in Denmark. Ten of the 11 inner-circle members born outside Denmark are from other 
Nordic countries, primarily Sweden. Nevertheless, ties made across borders could change the 
allegiance and primary focus of some parts of business. Both intra- and transnational ties, and the 
temporal dimension, should be analyzed simultaneously in future research on interlocking 
directorates. 
Conclusion: The Accumulation of Power Through Networks 
Through a social network analysis of the 1037 most important corporate boards in Denmark, we 
identified an inner circle of 171 board members and executives. This inner circle is the most 
cohesive group tied through shared board memberships. The social background of the inner-circle 
members does not imply an upper class–based capitalism in which shared ownership and kinship 
relations are the integrating elements of the capitalist class. While showing a high degree of cohesion 
within the social networks of the boardrooms, the inner circle is also more connected to other 
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power spheres than the rest of the business elite. Thus, the inner circle is more likely than the other 
parts of the network of the corporate elite to take part in the activities and institutions that indicate 
representation in the field of power. From the economic sphere of business associations, to the 
forming of policies in political commissions, the governing of universities and research agendas, the 
central institutions of culture and media, and the symbolic status of participating in royal events, the 
faces of inner circle appear with stunning regularity. 
This study demonstrates the usefulness of the concept of the inner circle developed by Michael 
Useem for understanding the social organization of the corporate community in the case of an 
egalitarian society such as Denmark. In spite of the recent deterioration and internationalization of 
the inner circle elsewhere, the specific position of the capitalist class in Denmark seems to ensure 
continued cohesion. Rather than challenging inner-circle cohesion, the strong position of organised 
labor actually led to key private sector labor union leaders being included in the inner circle of the 
corporate network. The apparent egalitarianism of Denmark does not prevent a socially 
homogenous group of businessmen, recruited primarily from the upper echelons of society, from 
being tied closely through corporate boards and frequently invited to join the networks of other 
power spheres.  
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APPENDIX: CLUSTER ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING THE INNER CIRCLE 
 LINKERS 1ST 
CUTOFF 
IC I 2ND 
CUTOFF 
IC II 3RD 
CUTOFF 
IC III 4TH 
CUTOFF 
IC IV 5TH 
CUTOFF 
IC V 
Total number of 
clusters in HAC 1 2  3  7  19  33 
 
NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS OF CLUSTER          
Number of members 514 134 380 158 222 34 188 17 171 21 150 
Density 0.0283 0.0134 0.0335 0.0219 0.0418 0.0454 0.0411 0.0252 0.0427 0.0395 0.0431 
Components 1 43 1 28 1 4 1 9 1 4 1 
Diameter 13 - 7 - 6 - 5 - 5 - 5 
Average path length 4.3 - 3.0 - 2.9 - 2.9 - 2.8 - 2.8 
Transitivity 0.417 0.613 0.416 0.586 0.439 0.728 0.412 0.857 0.419 0.783 0.427 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLUSTER MEMBERS          
Share of total ties 1.0 0.124 0.876 0.238 0.638 0.106 0.532 0.030 0.502 0.057 0.445 
Average degree 7.3 3.4 8.6 5.6 10.7 11.6 10.5 6.5 11 10.1 11.1 
Average closeness 
×10-5 
4.7 3.7 5 4.5 5.3 5.1 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.2 5.4 
Average betweenness 833 265 1033 519 1400 907 1489 824 1555 1267 1595 
Common 
denominator of cut-
off 
 Minor 
boards 
 Minor 
boards 
Specific 
ownership 
groups  
 Bankers 
State 
ownership 
 Minor 
boards 
Lawyers 
 None  
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4. Who listens to the top? Integration of the largest 
corporations across sectoral networks 
 
By Anton Grau Larsen, Ph.D fellow, Department of  Sociology, University of  Copenhagen 
Abstract 
By creating ties to other powerful organisations, corporations may influence the rules, written or unwritten, 
that influence the market they operate in and avoid competition. The corporate interlocks created by board 
directors show how some corporations are more successful in integrating, not just in the corporate world, 
but also in other sectors. Neil Fligstein proposes that the best-organised dominating corporations, or the 
incumbents, are the most successful in stabilising their markets. An analysis of  the intersection between the 
interlocking directorates among the top 1037 corporations in Denmark and seven other sectorial networks 
drawn from a database containing more than 5,000 affiliations and 62,000 positions, how that the 
incumbents are better integrated across all sectors. The strong correlation between sectorial integration and 
turnover was decomposed and an independent effect of  prominence, or symbolic capital, was found. This 
suggests that, when creating affiliations within and outside the corporate world, it is not only the symbolic 
size that matters, but also the prestige of  the firm. 
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Introduction 
A prominent business chairman juggles with the responsibilities of  several top corporate boards, a national 
theatre, a public commission and committees in employers’ associations, all while attending the most 
glamourous events where the guest lists are a veritable who's who of  high society. Super-connectors like 
this man are on the lucky receiving end of  the Matthew principle, where more connections get you access 
to even more and better connections. Connections into the core of  the business world grant the possibility 
to influence not just the strategies and outlooks of  the corporate world, but also the state and society at 
large. When looking at these prominent figures it is easy to get lost in the details and character of  the 
individual. Where did they go to school? Who were their parents? Are they connected to public officials? 
These are all valid questions, but it is important to note that such great influencers may owe most of  their 
influence not to their individual particularities but to the strength of  the organisations they represent (Scott 
2003). These corporations do not lend out their most prominent employees and leaders willy-nilly, but 
because the ties they make matter to the survival of  the corporation. 
In economies with considerable volatility and frequent state intervention it is paramount for corporations 
to be ‘in the know’, because knowledge held by the powerful is power in its own right (Bourdieu 1996:386). 
Ties with state officials, top bankers and editors of  national newspapers all facilitate the necessary ‘business 
scan’ at a quality and speed that surpasses that of  hired consultants and experts (Useem 1984:46).Ties are 
not just the channels for ‘power gossip’; they also provide a means of  influence, sometimes in the soft 
form of  advice and at other times in the hard form of  orders and strategy formulation. The best-organised 
corporations are able to use these ties and other channels to form the regulations and the institutions that 
shape the rules around their most important markets (Fligstein 1996:662) 
This paper will focus on central characteristics, the symbolic and economic capital, of  the top 1037 
corporations, and on how these affect the degree to which they integrate with seven central sectors in 
Danish society. Drawing on concepts from Neil Fligstein and Pierre Bourdieu and applying a social 
network–analytic approach, this paper gives insights into the organisational underpinnings of  the networks 
of  the Danish corporate elite. 
Interlocking directorates within the business elite are a social phenomenon that has been the subject of  
intense attention from sociologists (Scott 1991a); social network analysis (Scott 1991b) is a preferred 
method for the study of  corporate interlocks (Mizruchi 1996). Recent studies have shown how interlocking 
directorates affect, among other things, CEO compensation programs (Wong, Gygax, and Wang 2015) and 
political donations (Burris 2005). Studies of  the relationship between the corporate elite and other sectors 
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have found considerable linkages between CEOs of  the largest corporations and NGOs (Moore et al. 
2002), between CEOs and universities (Useem 1981); and a decline in the number of  ties between state 
and corporations (Heemskerk, Mokken, and Fennema 2012). But studies of  interlocking directorates have 
been criticised by economic sociologists for being blind to the way histories, laws and states affect the role 
and influence of  the ties in the corporate network (Fligstein 1995). From this criticism it follows that it is 
important to situate the ties in the institutional framework of  each country. This includes the importance 
of  ownership structures, which affect how boards interlock (Bohman 2012) This criticism will be 
addressed by looking at some of  the key institutions that have influenced and continue to influence Danish 
economy; for example, the co-op movement, the financial sector with its unique relationship to unions and 
employers’ associations through pension funds, and the position of  the subsidiaries of  the largest 
multinational corporations. 
An open and negotiated economy 
To explain the integration into the corporate networks of  Denmark, I first a brief  describe the 
particularities of  the Danish economy. Denmark is a small but wealthy country with a business system that 
is primarily driven by oil, shipping, banking and food production. The Danish economy is dominated by a 
few very large corporations. The largest corporation in Denmark is the conglomerate A. P. Møller, with a 
turnover of  315 billion kroner. In 2012 it placed 154 on the Fortune Global 500 as the only Danish 
company. The largest employer in Denmark is ISS, with approximately half  a million employees. These two 
are some of  the few Danish corporations that are global players, but within certain markets there are 
several large Danish exporters, such as Novo Nordisk, Lego, Carlsberg, Arla, Danish Crown and Vestas. 
These exporters have the majority of  their sales outside Denmark and many have relatively few employees 
inside the country. The portant export markets are the other Scandinavian countries, United States, 
Germany and the rest of  the European Union. 
The Danish economy is an open (Binda and Iversen 2007; Iversen and Andersen 2008) with a strong 
presence of  the largest global corporate players, but the recruitment to Danish top management in these 
corporations is nevertheless very national (Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Munk 2013; van Veen and Marsman 
2008). This dichotomy between openness and nationalism is characteristic of  the Danish corporate 
network. Nationalism is reflected in the position of  Danish firms in the European network of  interlocks. 
Danish corporations are on the periphery, but in the period from 2005 to 2010 they have become 
integrated with countries outside of  Scandinavia (Heemskerk 2011, 2013). 
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As a coordinated market economy(cf. Hall and Soskice 2001), the Danish economy and labour market are 
regulated not by the state alone, but by a triumvirate of  the state, unions and employer associations. 
Through institutionalised negotiations and many different legal institutions, this triumvirate regulates and 
controls not only the labour market, but many other areas as well, from pensions and taxation to 
environmental policies. Although this system has declined since the 1980s (Blom-Hansen 2001), there are 
several consequences for the corporate networks of  the Danish economy. As an example, the vast majority 
of  pension funds are controlled by the triumvirate or directly by the unions. Having strong ties to large 
parts of  the Danish financial market also entails relations with unions. This division of  labour between the 
state and the triumvirate may explain why the Danish state has comparatively few state-owned 
corporations. Among the top 100 corporations in 1990, the Danish Government owned a dominating 
share in only 13.2%. In the same year in France, the country’s government dominated shares in 36.4% of  
corporations; in Finland, 27.6%; and in Austria, 33.9% (López de Silanes, La Porta, and Shleifer 1999; 
Pedersen and Thomsen 1997) is was in an economy where the state controlled 27% of  the GDP (Statistics 
Denmark 2012). 
Even if  the Danish state has fewer corporate ownerships than might be expected, corporate ownership in Denmark 
is still far from the Anglo-Saxon model of  dispersed ownership corporations. Of  the 170 corporations registered at 
the Danish stock exchange, only 88 were among the top 1037 Danish corporations and were therefore included in 
this study. This reflects a modest financialisation of  the Danish economy, which in turn may reflect the 
particularities of  the Danish corporate owners. The strong cooperative movement, business families and 
the widespread use of  foundations all account for this modest financialisation (Binda and Iversen 2007). 
Furthermore, legislation prevents executive directors from the banking sector from sitting on the boards of  
other corporations (Edling et al. 2012). In 1990 the co-ops accounted for ownership of  19.9% of  the top 
100 non-financial corporations in Denmark. This was the highest level of  co-op ownership among the 12 
countries included in the study by (Pedersen and Thomsen 1997). Even though the co-op movement was 
originally founded by Danish dairy farmers, co-ops also account for a substantial part of  the financial 
market in Denmark. This particular ownership structure affects the population of  directors on the boards 
of  Danish corporations. Co-ops have democratically elected board members and foundations often have 
board members from sectors other than private business. 
The institutional framework of  the Danish state, along with an open and negotiated economy and a 
tradition of  strong ownership, makes an interesting case for investigating the relationship between 
economic and symbolic resources and ties between the corporate and other sectors. 
The Danish case differs from other economies by having an interventionist state and a strong labour force 
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and therefore it serves as an exemplary case for small corporatist countries (cf. Katzenstein 2003). 
In brief, this paper uses the Danish case to investigate: 
1. which corporations are included in the corporate interlocks in Denmark 
2. which corporations are able to extend their network to other sectors, such as business associations, 
foundations, state institutions, interest groups, institutions of  science and education, cultural 
networks and symbolic gatherings (e.g. the royal balls). 
These will be explored by assessing the financial power and the symbolic resources at the disposal of  the 
corporation. 
Fields, incumbents and symbolic capital 
The networking practices of  a corporation are the result of  active decisions and strategies from the top of  
the corporation (Useem 1984). The position of  the corporation within the entire economic field and its 
relative dominance within its primary sectors are the determining factors for this strategy. This study draws 
on the notion of  the economic field coined by Pierre Bourdieu (2005) and the general field theoretical 
framework recently restated by Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2011). Although inspired by field theory, 
the present analysis is not a fully-ledged field analysis that identifies the dominant forms of  capital and 
divisions within the Danish economic field. Instead, this study zooms in on the characteristics of  the 
corporations and the relationship of  those characteristics to ties between corporations and other sectors, 
but still within a relational framework (Emirbayer 1997). 
In Neil Fligstein's (1996, 2002) economic sociology, markets are not defined by their product, but are best 
understood as socially constructed fields. These fields, or strategic action fields, have a governing structure 
and rules of  exchange. The governing structure is the institutions and legal framework that defines the 
rules for competition between the corporations within the field. The rules of  exchange are the rules 
governing exchanges between corporations. The rules of  exchange and the governing structure, along with 
the distribution of  power and resources within the field, set the space in which leaders within the top 
corporations struggle over the strategy and toolset used to navigate the field. The leaders who define the 
conception of  control (Fligstein 1996) are those who are best at defining a strategy that, using Fligstein’s 
conception-of-control terminology, avoids damaging price competition, stabilises the field and ensures the 
survival of  the corporation. 
In a stable market (or field), the dominant firms, the incumbent firms and the challenger firms form a clear 
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status hierarchy. The challengers may slowly renegotiate the governing structure of  the field, but according 
to Fligstein (1996), they are unable to fundamentally challenge the position of  the incumbents. Fligstein 
observed that radical change within the field primarily happens as a result of  exogenous shock. 
The state plays a central role in defining the governing structure of  the field. The state stabilises fields by 
enforcing laws and setting rules. These rules are never ‘neutral’ but give advantages to certain sets of  
actors, most often the incumbent corporations. As Fligstein (1996:662) argues:  
‘Laws and accepted practices often reflect the interests of  the most organized forces in society.’ 
Emphasis should be placed on the phrase ‘the most organized’. Corporations that, as a part of  their 
conception of  control, organise support for and formulate policies that may turn into regulation, have a 
greater chance of  forming the rules of  the field and thereby stabilising the field in a state that is beneficial 
to them. This resembles the perspective on the individuals who form the inner circle in the corporate 
network, formulated by Michael Useem (1982, 1984). These individuals formulate the class-wide rationality 
of  the organised capitalist class. If  we focus on the corporations instead of  the individuals, we could 
propose that corporations that are in a position where it is possible to influence state policies and have 
such intentions within their conception of  control, will form ties to the state in order to influence the rules 
that govern their field. The corporations that are able to influence the formulation of  the state policies are, 
according to Fligstein (1996), the incumbent corporations. 
Fligstein and McAdam (2011) give a specific prominence to the fields that make up the state, but in a 
Danish context this perspective is too narrow. As noted earlier, there is a substantial part of  the governing 
structure of  all markets that is not controlled by the state but by employers’ associations, business 
organisations and unions. Some markets are so strictly regulated by these institutions that competition has 
been removed almost completely, most notably the pension funds. 
To properly describe the relationship between incumbent corporations and the governing institutions it is 
necessary to broaden the perspective away from the state to an elite wide-integration. Or to stay in the field 
terminology, but from the French tradition, incumbent corporations within the economic field integrate 
with agents across the entire field of  power (Bourdieu 1996:267). 
The relative amount of  resources held by a corporation is what determines its position within the status 
hierarchy within the field and thereby which corporations are incumbent and challengers. Among 
corporations it would seem obvious that status position should be a result of  economic strength, measured 
in variables as turnover, equity and number of  employees. But this may well be far too simplistic. As 
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Bourdieu has shown in several works (Bourdieu 1986, 2005, 2007), there is a central symbolic component 
to economic rationality and to the distribution of  status among top corporations. The symbolic form of  
capital is, for example, honour, goodwill, reputation and favours (Bourdieu 1986), which also work as a 
form of  symbolic credit (Bourdieu 2005:200). But Bourdieu notes that these symbolic forms of  capital are, 
in the end, a disguised form of  economic capital (Bourdieu 2007:183). We would therefore expect symbolic 
forms of  capital to correlate strongly to the economic measures of  capital, but measuring symbolic forms 
of  capital is difficult if  the analysis is not part of  a full mapping of  the field. In the following analysis the 
number of  books about the firm and its media presence are used as indicators of  symbolic forms of  
capital. The number of  books about a firm indicates the extent to which people, often within the cultural 
field, have expended a considerable amount of  energy on producing often positive descriptions of  the 
corporation. It signals that the corporation should be noted and that it is worthy of  praise, or at least 
attention. Because the number of  books is the total amount of  books written about a corporation it is also 
a measure of  how long the corporation has been a notable player in the field, because older corporations 
have had a longer time to accumulate attention. It is not a measure of  how much attention and praise the 
corporation receives now; this is captured by presence on TV and radio. These measures are of  course very 
crude, but they are sufficient for the current analysis. 
The position within the field of  the corporation and the larger economic field in which these smaller fields 
are embedded is a determinant of  the conceptions of  control that guide the role played by ties between 
corporations and other sectors. The most prominent firms at the top of  the status hierarchy, the 
incumbents, will try to stabilise the field in a form that benefits them. The corporations with the most 
status will therefore try to make ties more frequently than others. Because they are more prominent, they 
will also more often succeed. 
Network data 
The data on the corporate network were taken from the boards of  the largest 1,024 companies registered 
in Denmark, in which there are 6,154 directors. The data were kindly donated by the private firm Biq.dk 
and originate from the official CVR (Central Corporate Register) register. The largest corporations were 
chosen according to turnover. Subsidiaries were excluded if  the board comprised only members from the 
mother company. The board of  each corporation included the chairman, ordinary members, the CEO and 
other senior managers and members representing the employees. With this sample size it is possible to 
describe the differences between the largest corporations and the rest, while avoiding  the inclusion of 
corporations in which board interlocks are governed by very different principles. In very small 
177 
 
corporations, boards often include lawyers, who may hold more than 30 or even as many as 100 board 
positions. 
Data on the other sectors were drawn from the Danish Elite Network (DEN) 2013 dataset with a near-
complete set of  official affiliations at the national or regional level. The dataset includes all NGO's with a 
hearing right, all commissions and cross-organisational affiliations in the state, all foundation boards, the 
leadership network Danish Management Society (VL), nd all subcommittees in the parliament. 
Furthermore, the data include several events, most prominently all publicly listed royal balls, dinners and 
hunting parties from 2009 to 2013. In addition to the set of  corporations described above, the dataset 
includes structurally important corporations, such as the media and law firms.  
Each affiliation in the DEN is  tagged with up to seven tags. The affiliations are tagged according to type, 
and most importantly the sector and the subject of  the operation. By constructing lists of  tags, it is  
possible to split the network into sectoral networks. The sectors are not mutually exclusive.  Table 2 lists 
the different sectoral networks, along with their size. 
TABLE 1: DATA SOURCES FOR THE AFFILIATIONS IN THE NETWORK 
 FROM 
ORIGINAL 
SOURCES 
EXCLUDED* ADDED IN 
SNOWBALL 
SAMPLE 
FINAL NUMBER 
OF AFFILIATION 
NETWORKS 
NO. OF 
RELATIONS 
State1 2,328 1,780 327 875 10,230 
Parliament1 153 101 31 83 970 
NGO1 749 144 922 1,527 16,436 
Corporations2 1,136 34 40 1,142 7,476 
Foundations2 1,380 18 83 1,445 8,181 
VL Networks3 117 3 0 114 3,845 
Commissions4 116 44 0 72 1,121 
Events5 74 0 0 74 14,582 
Total 6,053 2,124 1403 5,332 62,841 
1 Source: Danish Public Administration Database (www.foa.dk) 
2 Source: The list of  largest corporations according to turnover and list of  all foundations in the Danish Central Business 
Register (obtained through www.biq.dk) 
3 Source: Homepage of  VL networks (www.vl.dk) 
4 Source: Registration of  political commissions from 2005-2011 made by Danish weekly newsletter A4 Sources: Webpage of  
Danish Royal Family (www.kongehuset.dk) and private archive of  journalist. 
*Affiliation networks were excluded if: no board of  extra-orgazisational members existed; no information was available on the 
board, either online or through personal contact; the board was included in other sources as well; or the board entirely 
overlapped another board within the same organisation. 
 
The business organisations’ sector includes business interest organisations and employers’ associations. It 
consists primarily co boards and committees in smaller business interest organisations (e.g. the organisation 
178 
 
of  Danish Harbours), but also larger employers’ organisations like the Danish Confederation of  Industry. 
‘Culture’ is mainly made of  cultural foundations, museums, art galleries, theaters and design institutions. 
The interest groups’ sector comprises interest groups that are not present in the other categories, and 
includes organisations such as national sports associations, environmental protection organisations and 
charitable foundations. The ‘Science and education’ sector contains not only scientific institutions such as 
university departments, research institutions and foundations supporting science, but also state committees 
on science and education. The state sector includes commissions, leading affiliations in the military, state- 
oned corporations, committees within the state administration and ministry and leadership networks 
among leaders of  the public sector. The ‘royal’ network comprises primarily of  royal events such as, balls 
and dinners with official dignitaries, as the premier minister of  China. The ‘leadership’ sector focuses on 
networks that allow leaders to exchange ideas and contacts, working as social clubs to enhance elite 
cohesiveness (cf. Domhoff  1975).The most prominent of   these is the VL- groups, which gather together 
corporate CEO's and high-ranking public officials, editors of  newspapers, architects and politicians. ‘All 
non-corporate sectors’ is the sum of  all the networks except the corporate sector.  
Measures of economic and symbolic capital 
Data on turnover, equity and the number of  employees originates from the yearly reports of  2011, which 
means the data covers the size of  the corporation in 2010. This means that the three different data sources 
are from three different years. Corporate board memberships were taken from 2011 and sectoral networks 
from 2013. Although there has been some change in the size of  the corporations and especially in the 
turbulent years following the global financial crisis in 2008, there is no reason to expect substantial changes 
in the size of  the corporation or in the composition of  the boards. 
The data on corporate size are fairly reliable, but there are marked differences in accounting practices, 
especially when it comes to holding corporations with several subsidiaries. Some corporations aggregate 
the turnover and equity of  the subsidiaries in their holding corporations, and others transfer only the 
profits of  their subsidiaries. This means that the size of  some corporations was underestimated and may 
have been excluded from the sample or positioned relatively lower in the turnover distribution. 
Measures of  the prominence of  the corporation to the general public were based on the number of  books 
about the firm and the extent of  media presence. The National Bibliographic Database has an almost 
complete list of  books published in Danish or concerning Denmark. This database also includes most of  
the master’s theses written at the largest business schools in Denmark; these accounted for a large 
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proportion of  the relevant publications for each firm. The number of  media mentions for each firm was 
collected from the Infomedia database, which covers the media in Denmark. The number of  entries was 
based on a five-year period. Many of  the measures used in this analysis are prone to some measurement 
error as the name of  the corporation may not be widely known or may be used differently; for instance, the 
large conglomerate, Scandinavian Holding, owns several prominent companies but Scandinavian Holding is 
rarely mentioned. 
Analysis: Integration in sectorial networks 
The following analysis is presented in four steps. The first step presents a descriptive analysis of  the 
network of  corporate interlocks in Denmark, in order to understand the structure of  the corporate 
networks. The second step examines the integration between the corporate network and seven other 
important sectorial networks, to understand which are able to integrate with other parts of  the field power 
and thus establish or strengthen an incumbent position. The third step investigates the correlations 
between turnover and inclusion in the sectorial networks and identifies the size of  the class of  
corporations that are able to integrate. The fourth and final step presents a regression analysis of  central 
mechanisms for inclusion in the sectorial network to understand the importance of  economic and 
symbolic capital for inclusion in each sectorial network. 
TABLE 2: NETWORK PROPERTIES 
 Affiliations Positions Individuals 
Largest 
component 
Component 
diameter 
Highest 
degree 
Corporations 1,037 7,065 6,154 475 12 19 
Business organisations 487 5,188 4,180 343 10 49 
Interest groups 614 6,070 5,173 288 12 24 
Science and education 853 8,269 6,611 625 12 69 
Culture 490 3,830 3,198 305 10 51 
State 457 5,828 4,461 392 11 82 
Royal 91 8,343 5,311 63 3 45 
Leadership 122 3,888 3,856 18 4 8 
All non-corporate sectors 2,856 39,604 26,879 2,449 11 1,342 
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FIGURE 1: THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE CORPORATE WORLD 
 
The size of  each point (vertex), in Figure 1 equals the total number of  non-corporate memberships of  the 
corporation board members. The closer to the core, the more memberships the person holds. Among the 
isolates in the crescent-shaped cloud, there are only a few larger points. The central incumbents are very 
well-connected, both to each other and to other sectors. This are the corporations that form the 
organisational underpinnings of  Useem’s inner circle (Useem and McCormack 1981). 
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The largest component of  the corporate network integrates approximately half  (475) of  all corporations. 
This finding is consistent with Sinani et al. (2008). Parts of  the network are fairly unconnected, as the 
diameter is 12 degrees, which in network terms is a very long distance (Grannis 2010). The other sectorial 
networks in Table 2 are fairly similar in structure, but the relative size of  the largest component is often 
larger than in the corporate network. This tells us that the corporate network is fairly exclusive in character. 
Being a board member of  a top corporation is a larger investment for both firm and director than most 
other affiliations. But even if  the largest distances in the corporate network are large, there is nonetheless a 
core of  very well-connected corporations. The most connected corporation, the large financial co-op, 
Nykredit, has ties to 19 other corporations and 202 corporations have a diameter of  more than 5 degrees. 
This tells us that inside the largest component we find a denser core, within which are predominantly 
corporations that are leaders within their markets, as can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
The inner circle of the corporate world 
If  we look at the individuals who make up the corporate network we find that it is connected by 514 
individuals with more than one directorship. This is the group of  individuals who fit the methodological 
definition, if  not the theoretical definition, of  Michael Useem's inner circle, where inner circle affinity is 
defined as the directors with two or more directorships (Useem 1984:63). Of  these, 121 are CEOs and 209 
are chairmen in a top corporation. If  we remove all 3.628 directors who hold only ordinary memberships 
from the network, the largest component goes from a size of  475 corporations to a component with 420 
corporations. Thus, by removing half  of  all directors, only 55 corporations are disconnected from the 
largest component, which tells us that the network is connected primarily by the extraordinary board 
members, who are at the heart of  corporate governance. The network is not influenced by lawyers sitting 
on the boards of  shell companies. These lawyers are usually found in much smaller firms. This underlines 
the importance and selectivity of  corporate connections. We also find that the network is dependent on 
‘strong connectors’, directors with three or more memberships. But strong connectors have a tendency to 
also be chairmen or CEOs in big business and they therefore make the ties strong in another sense. 
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FIGURE 2: TURNOVER RANK AND SECTORIAL MEMBERSHIPS 
 
We turn now to the characteristics of  the corporation and how they correlate with sector memberships. In 
Figure 2, we see the correlations between the number of  memberships within each sector and the rank of  
the corporation’s turnover. The rank value reduces the differences in turnover to their purely relational 
character and ignores the actual differences in turnover. The correlations in Figure 2 have a very similar 
structure across the sectoral networks. There is a fairly flat line of  equal integration in other networks until 
around the top 250. From this point on we see a clear rise in the number of  memberships. In other words, 
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there is a local correlation between turnover and memberships. It is very interesting that the point where 
the correlation kicks in is almost identical across sectors, which indicates a discrete class-like structure. In 
the eyes of  the other sectors there may only be the ‘top 250’ and ‘the rest’. It is very important to note that 
these correlations underestimate how much easier it is for a top 250 corporation to get a membership than 
it is for a smaller corporation. If  a director is a member of  both a small and a large corporation and he is 
invited onto a state commission because his network profile spans both large and small corporations, he 
adds memberships to both the small and the large corporation. In this way it may not be the particular 
attributes of  the small corporation, but those of  the large corporation, that gets them the state connection. 
The high level of  institutionalisation of  the Danish economy is seen by the fact that, on average, 
corporations are tied to more than one business organisation through their board members. Furthermore, 
the negotiated nature of  the Danish economy is evidenced by the fact that the average number of  ties to 
state institutions or science and education networks is between 0.7 and 0.9. 
If  a corporation is amons those with the highest turnover within their business sector they are deemed to 
be incumbents, at least within the Danish economy. So the top 20% of  corporations within, for example, 
banking or fashion, may vary considerably in size as a result of  the size of  their markets, but they hold 
similar positions within their sectors (or fields). This is also reflected in Table 3, where the 25 % of  firms 
who are incumbent are above-average in all sectoral networks and have a mean number of  memberships in 
all non-corporate sectors that is twice the average of  all corporations. These findings underline the 
importance of  the relative position of  an organisation within its own field, in addition to its absolute size. 
 
TABLE  3: MEAN NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIPS WITHIN SECTOR, PER CORPORATE BOARD 
 Incumbent Finance Co-op Global 500 All 
      
Corporations 4.6 5.9 4.0 0.3 2.8 
Business organisations 2.3 2.4 3.3 0.6 1.2 
Interest groups 1.3 1.6 1.6 0.1 0.6 
Science and education 1.9 2.2 2.0 0.3 0.9 
Culture 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.5 
State 1.4 2.7 1.5 0.1 0.7 
Royal 1.7 1.3 1.3 0.1 0.7 
Leadership 1.5 1.5 1.2 0.3 0.9 
All non-corporate sectors 10.4 12.0 10.9 1.5 5.1 
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Although incumbents have a clear networking advantage, corporations that are tied to social movements 
(e.g. the co-ops) and those positioned prominently within the economy (e.g. in the financial sector) have 
some of  the same advantages. The Global 500 corporations are not tied into the institutional structure that 
governs the Danish economy. They are peripheral in all networks, with a mean number of  memberships 
well below average in all sectors. Although they may be important players in the Danish economy, their 
leadership is not embedded in the Danish economic field. Global 500 subsidiaries are often led by a Danish 
CEO but have a foreign-controlled board, or they may have a small and low-profile board. This reflects 
reduced decisional power in the Danish subsidiary, as most of  the influence is at the global level. This may 
also be a barrier for inclusion in other sectoral networks, as the leaders of  the Danish subsidiary cannot 
represent the corporation fully. 
This barrier is amplified when considering that the majority of  directors with multiple directorships are 
either chairmen or CEOs. Ties between corporations and other institutions occur mostly at the top of  the 
organisation, and that level excludes foreign subsidiaries. 
In clear contrast to the Global 500, the financial corporations and the co-ops are much better integrated 
and have considerably more memberships than the average corporation. The financial corporations are 
particularly well-connected to the state networks. This could be explained by the fact that pension funds 
and the largest investment funds in Denmark are owned or controlled by unions and the employers’ 
associations. The two largest pension funds are the state-owned ATP and LD. Their boards are dominated 
by union and state officials, and employers’ associations. Union leaders and the leaders of  the employers’ 
associations are strongly positioned across all sectors and that gives the financial institutions some of  their 
prominence. But the largest banks are also very well-connected, not just to the rest of  the corporate sector 
but also to politics and science. The co-ops are particularly well-connected to the business associations and 
interest groups, which represents the close ties between the co-op–controlled corporations and the much 
broader co-op movement. 
 
Symbolic components of sectorial integrations 
The descriptive analysis presented above provided insights into the correlations between turnover and 
inclusion in networks across the different sectors. It also showed the relative centrality of  incumbent firms, 
co-ops and finance. Turnover has been used as the main measurement of  size, but this measure does not 
capture the symbolic component of  the dominance of  the incumbent firms. The following regression 
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analysis will look into the particular role played by two measures of  symbolic resources in the general 
public: (a) the total number of  books written about a corporation; and (b) TV and radio presence. These 
measures are controlled for the influence of  the financial size and other characteristics of  the corporation. 
When looking at the results of  the regression analysis in Table 4, the first thing to notice is that turnover, 
one of  the most common measures of  corporation size, has no significant explanatory power over 
inclusion in the sectorial networks. This does not mean that turnover is unimportant, but that it can in 
some degree be decomposed into these other variables. The next thing that should be noticed is the 
consistent importance of  the symbolic forms of  capital: books, and radio and TV-presence. These two 
forms of  capital have strong effects across all sectorial networks, even within business organisations and 
corporate networks. This shows that even if  the indicators of  symbolic forms of  capital are very strongly 
correlated to turnover, equity and employees, there is an important and independent symbolic component 
to network inclusion across all sectors. In the network of  corporations, the estimates for equity, number of  
employees, and radio and TV presence are all fairly equal. The relative centrality of  co-ops, incumbents, 
and finance shown in Table 3 is still present in Table 4. The same is true for the Global 500 corporations, 
which have fewer memberships across most sectorial networks. 
The two types of  capital influence the number of  memberships across the different sectors differently. The 
cultural, royal and state sectors have preference for ties with corporations with a high volume of  books 
written about them. Which means that prominent corporations with a long history in Danish society are 
more likely to gain memberships within these fields. Some of  these prominent firms (e.g. Mærsk, 
Scandinavian Tobacco, Novo Nordisk, Rockwool and Carlsberg) are owned by old families controlling 
charity foundations that support cultural institutions and artists. The Queen and the royal court also appear 
to have a preference for the corporations rich in symbolic capital, with only small effects from equity. The 
royal court is also connected to the old dynasties. Several of  the dynasties have members who have 
received decorations, titles and positions from the royal family. 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
 
TABLE 4: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 Range Corporations 
Business 
organisations 
Interest 
groups 
Science 
and 
education Culture State Royal Leadership 
All non-
corporate 
sectors 
Mean number of  memberships 
Max. number of  memberships 
2.8 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 5.1 
24 25 15 31 17 27 22 9 71 
Turnover, ranked [1:1007]          
Employees, ranked [1:987] 0.0026 *** 0.0009 **  0.0009 ** 0.0004 *   0.0009 *** 0.0035 ** 
Equity, ranked [1:1007] 0.0019 *** 0.0008 * 0.0006 ** 0.0009 **  0.0007 * 0.0008 ** 0.0006 *** 0.0047 *** 
Incumbent [0:1] 0.9525 ** 0.5543 * 0.3245 *    0.5956 **  2.3704 ** 
Finance [0:1] 2.3382 *** 1.5497 *** 0.9259 *** 1.0359 ***  2.3255 ***   6.3668 *** 
Co-op [0:1]  2.2072 *** 0.6420 ** 0.8366 *     3.5109 ** 
Global 500 [0:1] -1.8642 ***  -0.4421 ** -0.5423 * -0.3819 *  -0.6794 ** -0.4706 ** -3.0986 ** 
Books [0:262] 0.0305 ***  0.0230 *** 0.0345 *** 0.0385 *** 0.0316 *** 0.0359 *** 0.0160 *** 0.1636 *** 
Radio and TV [0:983] 0.0030 *** 0.0031 *** 0.0011 ** 0.0029 ***  0.0018 ** 0.0018 *** 0.0007 * 0.0111 *** 
R squared  0.29 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.37 
 
*** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05 
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The state has a profile very like the royal family, which might not be surprising as the guest lists of  many 
royal events are written in collaboration between relevant ministries and the royal court. But unlike the 
state, the royal family has a specific preference for incumbents. What is interesting is that co-op ownership 
does not have an effect in these three sectors. This indicates that strong ties to the co-op movement, and 
thereby the unions and the farmers movement, are not important by themselves, although it may also 
indicate that board members from co-ops are more likely to be integrated more closely with their 
respective movements than with the haute bourgeoisie and the state. The sectors where pure economic 
capital is most prominent are the corporate networks, business organisations, science and education and the 
leadership networks. 
Conclusion 
A connected corporation is an influential firm. The influential corporations form the environment in 
which they compete with their competitors. They are able to stabilise the market in a state that benefits 
them. The corporate network in Denmark is fairly exclusive, with only half  of  the corporations taking part 
in the single large component connecting the large Danish businesses. The exclusive character of  the 
network of  interlocking directorates is underlined by that fact that a substantial part of  the network is 
connected by CEOs and chairmen. The ordinary members play a minor role in the integration of  the 
network. But even if  this component is exclusive and ties are globally rare, there is a very connected core. 
In this core the incumbent corporations are strongly connected with each other and also to other sectors. 
This indicates that, as Neil Fligstein proposes, it is primarily the best-organised incumbent firms that are 
able to wield influence. The incumbent corporations are of  course also the largest in terms of  turnover, 
therefore there are also clear correlations between the number of  memberships in the different sectorial 
networks and turnover. This correlation is not a global one, however; it is only at the top of  the 
distribution. A clear bend in the correlations around the top 250 corporations is fund. It could be argued 
that there are two classes of  corporations at the top of  the 250 largest corporations, and then there are the 
rest. 
Although in economic terms corporate size is of  substantial importance to corporate integration, it is only 
a part of  the picture. Symbolic forms of  capital — the recognition that a corporation is honourable, 
prestigious and prominent — have an independent impact on the degree to which a corporation is able to 
create cross-sectorial ties. The effect of  indicators of  symbolic capital varies across the different networks. 
The state, the royal court and culture connect primarily with corporations strong in symbolic capital. 
However, the influence of  symbolic capital is a substantial factor towards the corporation’s inclusion in all 
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sectorial networks. 
But it is not only the position of  each corporation within the economic field or the market that influences 
the degree of  integration. If  a corporation is positioned or owned by owners with a particular affinity to 
the Danish elite, it will tend to be better integrated. Co-ops and financial corporations are vastly better 
integrated than other corporations. On the other hand, the subsidiaries of  Global 500 corporations may be 
strong in both economic and symbolic forms of  capital, but they are less central than could be expected 
because of  their weaker ties to the Danish elites. 
Recent studies have found declines in the cohesion of  nationally embedded corporate networks 
(Bühlmann, David, and Mach 2012; Heemskerk 2007; Mizruchi 2013). The decline in nationally embedded 
networks is in the Netherlands paralleled by a decline in the connections between the corporate sector and 
the state (Heemskerk et al. 2012). The decline in the prominence of  the corporate network may be a result 
of  an emerging transnational or European corporate network (Carroll and Fennema 2002; Carroll, 
Fennema, and Heemskerk 2010; Heemskerk 2013). Directors and corporations are in some countries 
increasingly integrated into regional or global networks, because the business scan they can achieve from 
these networks is more pertinent to their situation than those from within their nation-state. It may also be 
argued, however, that corporate cohesion is the result of  external pressures from state and labour 
(Mizruchi 2013; Moran 2008; Useem 1982) and the declining cohesion reflects the waning influence of  
competing elites. As this study shows, internationalisation in the corporate networks in Denmark is not 
prominent. Few of  the corporations have foreign ownership and foreign board members, but those that 
have foreign owners are more often isolates, and this may be a reflection of  the destabilising effect foreign 
take-overs on the network. The Danish business community may be guarded from foreign influence by the 
large extent of  protective forms of  ownership in Denmark. But it may also be the case that only the largest 
of  Danish corporations are able to play a successful part in the emerging global field of  power, and 
therefore most companies stay within the nation-state. 
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5. The Danish elite network 
By Christoph Houman Ellersgaard & Anton Grau Larsen,  Ph.D.-fellows, Department of  Sociology, 
University of  Copenhagen 
Abstract 
This article presents the extensive Danish elite network. Collected during 2012 and 2013, the data 
comprises 62,841 positions within 5332 affiliations, and connects 37,750 individuals. The affiliations are 
between the largest Danish corporations, the most important state institutions, organisations recognised 
politically by the state and other potentially powerful or integrative networks such as social clubs or royal 
events. Data were gathered through an inclusion principle, adding all potentially interesting affiliations. 
Procedures of  name-matching and quality control are presented. Finally, the data are introduced: made 
available through a package for R, which enables the creation of  subnetworks and weights. 
Introduction 
Since C. W. Mills wrote his seminal work, The Power Elite, elite research has struggled to defining elites 
empirically. In 1956, Mills offered a compelling definition of  the power elite as: ‘… those political, 
economic and military circles which as an intricate set of  overlapping cliques share decisions having at least 
national consequences’ (Mills 1956:18). Mills himself  had to rely on the positional method (see Knoke, 
1993) and could not map the overlapping circles directly. Later, social network analysis was used to identify 
power elite–like structures as social circles within policy discussion networks (Alba & Moore, 1978; 
Bovasso, 1992; Higley, Hoffmann-Lange, Kadushin, & Moore, 1991), but as topics change, these networks 
also change and may not give a clear picture of  more lasting elite relations. Furthermore, policy networks 
require the cooperation of  elite individuals, which is increasingly difficult to get. 
By collecting a two-mode network of  all nationally integrating publicly available and official affiliations in 
the small nation-state of  Denmark, ‘The Danish Elite Network’ dataset permits the identification of  the 
central individuals, affiliations and cross-cutting social circles that compose the power elite. (See Ellersgaard 
and Larsen 2014; 2015). The data can easily be split into parts according to sectors such as politics, 
business, organisations and state, allowing more detailed studies of  sub-elites, but still with reference to the 
total structure. Because Denmark is a small society with strong traditions of  transparency in decision-
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making processes and widespread use of  websites for both public and private organisations, it was possible 
to attempt a complete registration of  all official elite affiliations. Collected during 2012 and 2013, the data 
contain 62,841 positions in 5,332 affiliations and connect 37,750 individuals. The attempt was made to 
include all nationally relevant official positions, such as company boards, committees, foundations, advisory 
boards. Data on the corporate and foundation boards are drawn from public registers. All other data were 
collected manually from affiliation websites. 
In the following sections we present the data collection process with its strengths and weaknesses, we 
introduce the available data files and, finally, we present a table with the data details. 
Data: The extensive elite network 
The data were collected in four fairly discrete phases: 
1. The generation of  lists of  affiliations 
2. Affiliation collection 
3. Name-matching and quality control 
4. Tagging 
 
The generation of lists of affiliations 
First, we created large initial lists of  organisations and groups. The included groups are not affiliations 
themselves but lists of  names of  organisations and groups, their type, their addresses and preferably their 
website. These initial lists provided the basis for a small snowball procedure for each organisation. Using 
self-reported organisational information, such as organisational diagrams, we identified all the relevant 
committees, boards, sub-committees, board of  representatives, and other groups. The names of  all 
members were collected, along with their affiliation, role (e.g. chairman, director), a long string with their 
description (if  available) and the link to the website describing of  the affiliation. The initial lists of  
organisations and groups were constructed according to the inclusion principle, which dictated that all 
possibly relevant organisations were included in the dataset. This was ensured by constructing the lists 
from exhaustive official databases. 
In Table 1, the organisations in the initial lists are grouped according to their source. The excluded 
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organisations are those that were removed from the data because they did not form ties between 
organisations. The final number of  affiliations from each source is the number remaining after removing 
those that formed no ties between organisations and adding the snowball samples. The list of  state 
organisations was drawn from a large public database of  governmental and non-governmental entities, the 
–Danish Public Administration Database (FOA, www.foa.dk). The FOA contains a hierarchical database 
placing each of  the ‘offices’ in the Danish state organised in a nested structure, with names of  leading 
personnel, addresses and sub-offices. All offices working at the regional level or above were made into an 
initial list. This excludes ‘offices’ working at the local level, such as public schools, individual churches, 
police and fire departments, but includes high schools and large hospitals. The state offices are often 
governed only by the office one step higher in the structure and as a result, many do not form boards or 
committees. This seems to be reserved for more autonomous entities higher in the structure. 
TABLE 1: AFFILIATION NETWORKS INCLUDED IN THE DATA 
 From 
original 
sources 
Excluded* Added in 
snowball 
sample† 
Final number 
of  affiliation 
networks 
No. of  
relations 
State1 2,328 1,780 327 875 10,230 
Parliament1 153 101 31 83 970 
NGO1 749 144 922 1,527 16,436 
Corporations2 1,136 34 40 1,142 7,476 
Foundations2 1,380 18 83 1,445 8,181 
VL Networks3 117 3 0 114 3,845 
Commissions4 116 44 0 72 1,121 
Events5 74 0 0 74 14,582 
 
Total 6,053 2,124 1,403 5,332 62,841 
1 Source: Danish Public Administration Database (www.foa.dk) 
2 Source: The list of  largest corporations according to turnover, and the list of  all foundations in the Danish Central Business 
Register (obtained through www.biq.dk) 
3 Source: Homepage of  VL networks (www.vl.dk) 
4 Source: Registration of  political commissions from 2005-2011, made by Danish weekly newsletter A4. 
5 Sources: Webpage of  Danish Royal Family (www.kongehuset.dk) and private archive of  journalist. 
*Affiliation networks were excluded if: no board of  extra-organisational members existed, no information on the board was 
available (either online or through personal contact), the board was included in other sources (i.e. data was not duplicated), or 
the board entirely overlapped with another board within the same organisation. 
† Includes both sub-committees within the organisations on the original list and the 142 networks obtained by snowballing the 
affiliations of  prominent agents. 
 
The list of  commissions was produced by the weekly newspaper A4. The list contains all commissions 
from 2005 until 2011, and was supplemented by the authors to 2013. 
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The list of  parliamentary committees was taken from the official parliamentary website, along with other 
institutions tied to the parliament. 
Affiliations were snowballed from the top 1,000 corporations according to turnover and their independent1 
subsidiaries. Structurally important corporations such as media and financial institutions were then added 
to the list. Both corporations and a complete list of  boards of  foundation originated from The Central 
Business Register (CVR). Advisory boards and sub-committees of  the major foundations2 were added to 
the list of  foundation boards. 
The list of  NGOs was drawn from the FOA database and includes all organisations with the right, given by 
the state, to be consulted on legislation All unions, employers organisations, national sports associations, 
environmental groups, animal rights groups and many more are included in this list. To the NGO list were 
added various organisations that did not fit with other lists, such as publicly known elite networks. The 
largest of  these, the VL groups, is split into a separate list. The list of  events includes all publicly listed 
balls and official dinners, and royal hunting parties held by the royal family from 2009 to 2013. The 
collected events differ considerably in size from the rest of  the affiliations. The state affiliations have on 
average 11 members, whereas the events have around 200. Any analysis that uses these events along with 
the other affiliations should consider using a multiplex network or weighting the data. Some of  the events 
(e.g. royal hunting parties) are recurring and can therefore be merged into a single set of  events. 
The inclusion principle: Connecting organisations at a national level 
Three rules of  inclusion guided the many small snowball samples: 
1. All affiliations should be able to connect individuals across organisations. This excludes affiliations 
that are reserved to employees of  an organisation or that are purely internal. When looking at 
nested organisations (e.g. a holding company and its subsidiaries), this distinction can be difficult to 
maintain. 
2. All affiliations must meet physically at least once a year and therefore create face-to-face interaction 
                                                 
1 Independent subsidiaries have board members who are not employed by or on the board of  the parent corporation and have a 
high enough turnover to be part of  top 1,000 corporations. 
2 Major foundations were identified by the Danish consultancy, Kraft & Partners. 
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between their members3. 
3. All affiliations must operate at a regional or national level. They operate at a regional or national 
level if  they integrate individuals at a regional or national level, thereby excluding local affiliations 
such as environmental groups working for the preservation of  a particular forest or a local shelter 
for the homeless. 
All three rules can be ambiguous in their application, but this is resolved by the general inclusion principle: 
if  two data collectors disagree as to whether an affiliation should be included in the data, it is included. 
Name-matching and quality control 
Systematic and algorithm-guided quality control is paramount when working with this type of  data. The 
affiliation network was checked for complete or almost complete overlap between groups. Affiliations 
where at least one affiliation has an overlap with another affiliation had their uniqueness tested. Some of  
these affiliations are nested into each other, like a general assembly and a board of  directors. 
All names were matched and duplicate names were coded as the same person only with confirmation from 
several sources. These sources would often be the collected descriptions from the affiliation websites, but 
could also be addresses and official registers. But this procedure slightly underestimates the ties, erring on 
the side of  caution. The name-matching process was performed by sorting the list according to first name, 
last name and full name. In some instances an individual may not use the same name in all instances; most 
commonly, a middle name was not used. The sorting procedure captures this practice but is very vulnerable 
to people changing their first name, sometimes using a middle name as a first name. If  this practice was 
suspected, a search for possible alternative first names was made; however, it is impossible to achieve 
perfect-name-matching quality and the data therefore underestimates the number of  connections. 
Tagging: Ordering data 
All affiliations in the data were tagged with up to seven tags. The tags are thematic: culture, music, science, 
education, social politics, and foreign relations. Tagging is different from categorising, because tags are 
non-exclusive and the number of  tags for each affiliation varies. The tags were based on affiliation 
                                                 
3 Some groups, like the group of  49 lay judges in the labour courts, only meet a few individuals at a time, but considering the 
number of  cases each year, all individuals are likely to meet. 
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descriptions from the web-pages. All tags were controlled for consistency by two coders and very specific 
tags were later merged or removed. The network can be split into sector by combining the relevant tags 
into subjects and then extracting all affiliations with a relevant tag. The affiliations related to the Danish 
state can, for instance, be extracted with this collection of  tags: ‘State administration’, ‘Ministry’, ‘State 
corporation’, ‘State’, ‘Military’, ‘Public leaders’ and ‘Commission’. 
Data files and formats 
Data is provided in the Danish_Elite_2013_Relations.csv file separated with “|” and encoded in UTF-8. It 
is organised as a case-affiliation edge list with a few attributes attached to each relation. 
 
The relations matrix has the following variables: 
  
NAME The matched name of  the individual. All names are unique. 
AFFILIATION The name of  the affiliation with its function in parenthesis. 
  
ROLE The role of  the individual within the affiliation. This information is not always 
included for the top 1,000 corporations. 
GENDER The gender of  the individual. The gender is determined by the first name. 
DESCRIPTION The description of  the individual taken from the affiliation website in relation to 
this position. 
SOURCE The source of  each relation and affiliation.  
BIQ_LINK If  available it is the link to the BIQ.dk database. 
CVR The CVR number for each corporation and foundation. 
TAG1-7 More than 350 thematic tags for each affiliation. 
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The main datasets can be broken down into separate datasets with the use of  the ‘source’ variable. This 
allows a partial analysis of, for instance, the corporate interlocks of  Denmark or the Danish parliament. 
The dataset is also made available via the R package soc.elite, currently available on Github: 
github.com/antongrau/soc.elite. The package includes functions for sub-setting by tags, descriptive 
functions, and functions for cleaning, coding and plotting. Furthermore, the package includes analytical 
functions that replicate the analysis made in Ellersgaard and Larsen (2014). By distributing the data along 
with relevant functions, the reproducibility of  results based on ‘The Danish Elite Network’ is greatly 
enhanced. 
In the package there are datasets that can be merged with ‘The Danish Elite Network’, such as biographical 
data on a core of  423 individuals. A dataset with biographical data on a core of  171 core business leaders 
and a dataset with data on size, turnover, number of  employees and the like, on the top 1,042 corporations. 
The package also serves as a valuable tool in courses on social network analysis or elite sociology. 
Researchers who analyse the data available in soc.elite are encouraged to send their code to the package 
maintainer and it will be published in the package along with proper citations. 
Data details 
Response rate N/A 
Non-respondent bias N/A 
Theoretical grouping No questionnaire was used 
Publications using these data Stahl and Henriksen (2014) 
Ellersgaard and Larsen (2013, 2014, 2015) 
Data context Database of  a national elite 
Respondents  
Longitudinal No 
Temporality Most positions last several years, although individual 
careers end within days. Some data points are 
separated by up to 2 years, for events up to 4 years 
and commissions up to 8 years 
Analytical or pedagogical utility The data allow for analysis of  inter- or cross-
sectorial ties. As they are divided into many sectors, 
students can choose sectors that interest them. 
Known issues Underestimates the amount of  connections due to 
the name-matching procedure. 
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6. Identifying power elites – a social network 
analytic approach 
By Anton Grau Larsen & Christoph Houman Ellersgaard,  Ph.D.-fellows, Department of Sociology, 
University of Copenhagen 
 
Abstract 
Specifying network boundaries and structure is of vital importance in the study of the social 
organisation of the most powerful: the power elite. However, traditional methods fail to offer clear 
criteria on either size or composition of the elite, and rely on numerous ad hoc decisions. 
The authors constructed a large database comprising 5,332 affiliation networks with 62,841 positions 
shared by 37,750 individuals. Drawing on this, the article proposes a methodological framework that is 
both inductive, reproducible and suitable for comparative research. 
A three-step procedure was used to identify the power elite. First, a comprehensive dataset was 
assembled of the affiliation networks of all potentially powerful sectors. These were supplemented by 
snowballing further affiliations in the data collection process and lists of participants from key social 
events. 
Second, these heterogeneous affiliation networks were subjected to a weighting procedure to account 
for the potential level of social integration. This was based on the number of participants in the 
affiliation network, with an baseline of 14 or fewer participants. 
Finally, the most cohesive subgroup of the network, a core power elite network of 423 individuals, was 
identified using a modified k-core approach focusing on social proximity rather than direct ties. From 
analysis of the composition of this core, we discuss the potential and stability of using this methodology 
for comparative analysis of power.  
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Introduction: Who are the elite? 
Labelling a political opponent ‘élite’ is a powerful rhetoric. In the 2008 US presidential election, Barack 
Obama was shown to be an elitist for discussing the price of arugula in the Iowa primaries, while the 
Democrat campaign responded by pointing to the amazing wealth of John McCain’s family. Both 
performed the anti-elite discourse of Keyser Süze elites (Du Gay 2008), trying to convince others that 
they themselves were not elites. But who are the elite? The political struggle for who forms part of the 
elite is a central, public debate, and yet, the social sciences have failed to deliver a credible 
methodological conception of this group. Without this framework, discussions about the men of power 
remain a playground for conspiracy theorists and demagogues. By narrowing the field of enquiry to 
power elite and by applying network analysis, we propose and apply a research design that is capable of 
identifying the core of the power elite in a vast array of key organisations in Denmark, including large 
corporations, government, state and public institutions, non-government organisations (NGOs), 
foundations, and social clubs and events. 
The notion of elites is one of the most misused categories in the sociological vocabulary, referring to 
both powerful and distinguished groups (Scott 2003). The power elite, as described by C. Wright Mills 
(1956), comprises the key decision makers in society. In the US of the 1950 and 1960s, Mills found the 
power elite to comprise the management of large corporations, the military chiefs and the political 
directorate. However, the image of a society dominated from above was challenged both theoretically 
and empirically by pluralists (e.g. Dahl 1958), who preferred a vision of societal power as a stalemate 
between leadership groups representing a broad spectrum of interests. Because of the different 
methodological prescriptions of these positions, the primary battleground for this debate turned to 
theoretical definitions of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Dahl 1957; Lukes 1974). Proponents of the 
elitist or ruling class perspective invigorated the empirical debate through the methodology of power 
structure research (Domhoff 1978; Freitag 1975; Mintz 1975). Scholars attempted to show the 
existence of a ruling class by documenting strong and multifaceted ties between politics and business 
(Burris 2005; Moran 2006), or the social club affiliations tying the elite together (Bond 2012; Domhoff 
1974, 1975). However, the question of the composition of this ruling class or power elite remained 
theoretical. This study contributes to the discussion by using empirical strategies of power structure 
research to form a methodological framework capable of identifying the power elite across various 
countries. 
The empirical challenge when identifying this core group, the boundary specification problem 
(Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983), is a key concern within relational sociology (cf. Emirbayer 
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1997). What should be regarded as key institutional hierarchies? Traditionally, scholars have relied upon 
organisational position, reputation among other powerful individuals or decision-making processes 
(Hoffmann-Lange 2006; Scott 1991). However, all of these approaches rely on the researcher’s 
theoretical presumptions about the size and the composition of the power elite. Does the power elite 
comprise a small circle of, say, 300 people or a larger group of up to 7,500 individuals? Is the size of the 
elite in some way correlated with the size of the country, as seems to be the assumption of most elite 
studies (Burton and Higley 2001:189)? At what stage are all relevant members included? Which sectors 
should be included and to what extent? These issues are of course most prevalent in the positional 
approach. However, the selection of decision-making processes or assessors of reputation is also 
implicitly tied to these questions. Furthermore, even after these theoretical assumptions about the size 
of the elite and its ‘sectors’ have been made, more ad hoc decisions await. What should be the inclusion 
criteria for CEOs? If corporation turnover, then commercial industries are over-sampled. And worse, 
how to identify key artists? The theoretical stalemate between pluralists and elitists carries over to 
technical decisions about who to include in the elite population. There is a lack of criteria for defining 
the size and composition of the power elite in an exhaustive, reproducible way while limiting more or 
less ad hoc decisions. In this context, ad hoc decisions are informed theoretically or empirically, but by 
theories that are not sufficiently specific. Although numerous brilliant studies on particular elites have 
been based on sound, theoretically informed ad hoc criteria, ad hoc decisions remain a barrier to 
comparative studies and reproducibility. 
In the methodological design proposed and applied in this paper, we present a two-step procedure for 
bypassing the boundary specification problem. First, we applied an inclusion principle for the selection of 
affiliation network data. If a registered gathering of some sort (e.g. a corporation board, a social club or 
a royal ball) within the limits of our sociological imagination can be conceived as potentially either 
powerful in its own right or a vehicle for social integration between elite individuals, it was included in 
what we defined as the entire power network. However, because all networks were included as part of a 
deliberate search within all power spheres of Danish society, this vast network of 5,332 organisations 
and 62,841 positions is not quite ‘big data’, but ‘data of the middle range’. Secondly, we used the 
structure of this network to identify the cohesive core of this network, the power elite. Because the 
affiliations included in the network were quite heterogeneous, we constructed a weighting system by 
identifying the level of social cohesion created by different ties. Inspired by Doreian and Woodard 
(1994), we identified the boundaries of the power elite by applying a k-core collapse sequence, although 
we also included ties the core form to their extended network, subject to the above-mentioned weight. 
By replacing ad hoc criteria of power elite positions with an inclusion principle and offering a socio-
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metric criterion of power elite membership through network analysis of these inclusive data, we devised 
a reproducible method for identifying power elite size and composition. By applying this approach we 
identified a power elite of 423 individuals in Denmark. 
 
Background: Identifying elites 
Identification of power elites or leadership groups, whether local or national, has traditionally followed 
one of four distinct strategies: the positional, the decisional, the reputational and the relational (Knoke 
1993). Much of the debate surrounding the superiority of any one of these methods is rooted in the 
theoretical stalemate between elitist and pluralist positions (Mintz et al. 1976). However, as Knoke 
(1993:29) notes, ‘which actors belong to a national political domain cannot be specified a priori. They 
must ultimately be determined empirically’. As we shall see, despite their many proven strengths, none 
of these methods delivers criteria for exhaustively identifying the size and composition of a core group 
while at the same time avoiding the ad hoc decisions that fuel theoretical division and fail to advance 
theoretical understanding. 
Of the  four strategies outlined, the positional method is still the most widely used (Hoffmann-Lange 
2006), hence we turn first to the issues with this approach. The main problem within the positional 
method is that it offers no clear criteria for sector-inclusion. Although religious leaders are undoubtedly 
important in Iran, the same criterion does not necessarily apply in secular societies. Likewise, the 
importance of unions is clearly dependent on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). Whether 
based on Marxist or pluralist perspectives, inclusion is based on the researcher’s presumption of who 
forms part of the ruling classes and its ideological apparatus, or who represents legitimate interests. The 
most important question, of who rules, is answered in the methodological design, not by the data. 
Secondly, the positional approach offers no empirical criteria for sampling each of these sectors. Should 
the ratio of artists from the cultural elite to CEOs of the economic elite be 1:5, and is this independent 
of population size and country? Often it is assumed that included members share roughly the same 
relative power, but without empirical criteria the size of each sector included, and thus the size of the 
power elite, is inaccurate at best. Thirdly; inclusion criteria within each sector are again based on 
preconceptions rather than reflexive  criteria. Even among business leaders, where the size of each firm 
can be assessed by, for example, turnover, number of employees and assets (as done convincingly by 
Maclean, Harvey, and Press 2006), peculiar local arrangements of owners and management force 
researchers either to make ad hoc decisions or, worse, stick to rigid criteria (e.g. excluding or including 
management of all subsidiary firms from the analysis), despite the relative autonomy of the particular 
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subsidiary. This is especially the case when making comparisons across time, as shown in the recent 
debate between Carroll and Fennema (2002, 2004) versus Kentor and Jang (2004, 2006) about how to 
select top global corporations across decades. Even so, compared to politics or government, let alone 
NGOs or the cultural field, the economic elite has by far the most obvious criteria, economic strength 
and relatively clear hierarchies. Clearly, positional methods render no clear empirical criteria for either 
size or composition of the elite, and in addition require several ad hoc decisions based on theoretical 
assumptions that are not easy to replicate across different epochs or countries. 
When identifying elites by decision-making criteria (see e.g. Polsby 1960), the problem of whom to 
include becomes which decision to focus upon. Although Mills was perhaps correctly criticised for 
looking at major historical decisions (Rovere 1968) when arguing for power elite dominance, this 
criticism can also be applied to Dahl’s (1961) work on decision-making in New Haven. First, what is 
the criterion for inclusion of ‘significant issues’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1962)? Secondly, how does one 
rank the elite without very clear guidelines for preferences, relative importance and the expectations of 
chances of success for different groups (Domhoff 2007; Mintz et al. 1976)? Furthermore, as Domhoff’s 
(1978) thorough and critical re-examination of Dahl’s analysis of political processes shows, failure to 
include all institutions and actors in the entire process leading up to the decision can lead to severe 
flaws in the analysis. Finally, the power of a group to exclude issues from decision-taking, what 
Anthony Giddens (1972) refers to as decision-making, is not taken into account. If power is regarded as 
a relational entity of a process (cf. Emirbayer 1997), decisions are constantly made under the radar of 
the researcher, who is narrowing in on decisions taken. Identifying an elite group’s ability to remove 
issues from the political agenda thus constitutes a serious problem for any decision-making criteria for 
investigating the position of various groups within the power structure. 
The shortcomings of the positional approach affect the reputational approach as well. Originally 
developed by Hunter (1953), the reputational approach identifies the powerful group according to the 
level of power attributed to it by other key members of the community power structure. Ad hoc 
decisions occur in the selection of persons who evaluate the powerful. Although a number of 
perspectives can be secured by thorough sampling and snowballing, the informant, himself a key player, 
is at risk of increasing his or her own status. Furthermore, any missing responses from key agents can 
exclude important perspectives. In addition, the informants’ preconceptions of power—and their 
inclination to hide or enhance their own privileges and importance—can lead to identification 
problems. In the identification of a core group rather than an analysis of power structure, these issues 
are most pressing. Pluralist critics such as Wolfinger (1960) emphasise the problems of ambiguity of 
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power definitions for both respondents and researcher, and ad hoc decisions on the inclusion of 
different powerful institutions. Ironically, the pluralist themselves faced the same issues when deciding 
organisational salience, in identifying key informants by key decisions. 
The issues regarding identification of the size and composition of the power elite has been addressed 
by applying the relational approach using social network analysis. By combining the positional and 
reputational approaches, the relational approach draws on the Simmelian notion of social circles to find 
a central circle of policy makers within the elite (Kadushin 1968). The circle is identified by prominent 
members naming others as key policy discussion partners, thus allowing the inclusion of power brokers 
overlooked by the researcher. In this tradition, inclusion in the central circle of these power networks is 
viewed as an indicator of the power structure and membership of the elite social circle (Alba and 
Moore 1978; Higley et al. 1991; Moore 1979). Identifying social circles—informal groups without clear 
leadership (Kadushin 1968)—‘not only identifies collectivities with an important type of internal 
structure, but also leaves open the possibility that they do not exist, and thus that a network is 
fragmented’ (Moore 1979:680). Furthermore, the tendency for members of the core group to interact 
with each other rather than with their respective constituencies can be used as an indicator of social 
closure within the power elite (Bovasso 1992). Hence, the socio-metric approach can offer an empirical 
definition of the size and composition of one or more core groups, allowing identification of both 
pluralist and elitist power structures. Within this framework, elites are a social group tied through 
internal cohesion, where internal reputation plays a central role. This is similar to the inner circles of 
American and British business elites studied by Michael Useem (1984). However, when applied to 
national elite networks, as in the excellent study by Gwen Moore (1979) on data from the American 
Leadership Study, this method suffers from two challenges. First, it requires a very high response rate 
among the elite respondents to ensure the inclusion of all ties and to identify the social circles, because 
these are based on the extent to which cliques overlap, which is highly sensible to missing data (Knoke 
1993). Secondly; the respondents name policy discussion partners within the field in which they deem 
themselves most influential. This leads to a focus on the issues subject to decision-taking, whereas 
decision-making, through consensus within the elite social circles, is more likely to be overlooked. A 
bias towards the field of politics is probable. 
The use of inclusion in power networks as a vantage point should not be discarded because of the 
problems of the relational approach. These networks offer insights into the balance of power of 
societal institutions. When defining the concept of the power elite, Mills (1956) specifies a group 
simultaneously holding command positions in top institutional hierarchies and forming part of 
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overlapping social circles between them (Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet, and Thine 2011). To make a tie 
with another power broker is also to recognise the legitimacy and value of the other’s power resources, 
resources which are primarily based on the institutions and organisations of the individual (Scott 2008). 
As the possibility of exchanging power resources is key to holding an elite position (Khan 2012), the 
level of inclusion in these networks is a strong indicator of which institutional hierarchies other elite 
members hold in high regard. Individuals outside of these elite networks may wield other power 
resources (e.g. capability to mobilise the masses, attract media attention or amass economic capital), but 
have not yet been invited into—or have refused to take part in—the everyday maintenance of the social 
order. The network of the power elite is the source of stability, not change. Denmark, along with the 
other Scandinavian welfare states, has evidenced extraordinary social stability (Campbell and Hall 2006). 
 
Methodology: Elite networks in data of the middle range 
To avoid the shortcomings associated with the above-mentioned traditional elite identification 
strategies we devised a two-step procedure for elite identification, applying social network analysis to an 
affiliation network. The first step was a data collection strategy governed by an inclusion principle. The 
inclusion principle was used to move beyond ad hoc decisions on which sectors, and who within them, 
to include. The second step addressed the boundary specification problem by applying a k-core 
clustering algorithm to a weighted affiliation network. This procedure for identifying the size and 
composition of a distinct national core elite is reproducible and is based primarily on empirical findings 
rather than theoretical concepts. 
The ad hoc decisions regarding which networks to include risk the pitfalls of the pluralist–elitist debate. 
Using the inclusion principle, instead of assessing whether a particular group is important or not, all 
potentially powerful networks are included. Instead of asking theoretically defined elite informants who 
they regard as peers, observational data, data on who they and everyone else include in formal 
networks, are used. If sources show that a list of individuals has met, this can be included in the analysis 
as social ties between these individuals. The objective is to describe the social cohesion created through 
these ties, rather than the strategic network positions available. Thus, this approach expands the design 
used in the classical studies of corporate interlocks (Allen 1974; Mizruchi 1996), transnational capitalist 
classes (Carroll 2003), and interlocks between business, government, policy planning groups and the 
non-profit sector (Domhoff 2013; Moore et al. 2002), by including not only data on corporate boards 
and a few selected other organisations, but data from a vast array of formalised or semi-formalised 
networks. 
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With the growing number of publicly available sources of corporate boards, think-thank affiliations, 
government bodies and so on, it is possible for empirical sociologists to embrace the challenges of big 
data  by including as many affiliation networks as possible (with certain technical modifications to be 
described later)—offers a way to embrace the challenges of ‘big data’ to empirical sociologists (cf. 
Savage and Burrows 2007). As the main aim of this study was to identify cohesive groups, the inclusion 
principle was not used with lists of individuals that merely indicated some sort of common 
denominator without implying actual interaction (e.g. Twitter-followers, co-citations and other sources 
used in analysis of big data). Rather, it was used when there existed the potential for the face-to-face 
interaction that is so crucial for the creation of internal group solidarity (cf. Collins 2004); this enables a 
move from big data to data of the middle range. Other types of networks, such as informal contacts, 
friendships, family and kinship ties, may also create cohesion and serve as vessels for communication. 
Data collected through this inclusion principle offer little value in a strict analysis of advantageous 
network positions (see Burt 2004; Granovetter 1973; Vedres and Stark 2010) and primarily offers 
insight on the levels of social cohesion between individuals, thus following the tradition of G. William 
Domhoff (1974, 1975, 2013). 
Data: The extensive elite network 
The data collection process that generated the two-mode elite network can be thought of as four 
relatively discrete phases: 
1. Generating lists of networks 
2. Network collection 
3. Name-matching 
4. Quality control 
The first of these phases was the generation of large initial lists of organisations or groups that form the 
main corpus of networks. These initial lists are not networks themselves, but lists of names of 
organisations and groups, their type, their addresses and preferably their website. These lists formed the 
basis for Phase 2, network collection. The network collection consisted of finding the self-reported 
organisational information on the organisation’s website, including all the relevant committees, boards, 
sub-committees, boards of representatives, and other groups. The names of the individuals, along with 
their affiliation, role (e.g. chairman, director), description and link to this affiliation were then added to 
the data. This amounted to a small snowball procedure for each organisation. During Phase 3, the 
name-matching process ensured that all instances of the same name referred to the same individual and 
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that each individual was represented in the data with only one name. This process was very time-
consuming, as each of the tens of thousands of matches had to be validated, from the descriptions 
collected or individual investigation. In Phase 4, data quality was ensured by checking for duplicates, 
perfectly overlapping groups and matching errors. 
Phase 1: Generating lists of networks 
The initial lists of organisations and groups were constructed according to the inclusion principle, 
which dictates that all possibly relevant organisations are included in the dataset. This was ensured by 
constructing the lists from exhaustive official databases. Table 1 provides an overview of the total 
number of organisations considered, how many were excluded because they did not create forums for 
inter-organisational ties, and finally the new organisations that were included through the many small 
snowball procedures. The organisations were grouped according to their source. The parliament list 
comprised all political party sub-committees and other institutions tied to the parliament, taken from 
the official website. The state list was constructed from a large public database of government and non-
government bodies and the FOA (The general public administration database. FOA is a database of the 
hierarchical structure of the state, and all its offices, with names, addresses and key employees). A list 
was created of all state offices working at the regional level, but excluding the local level. As a result, 
high schools were included, but not public schools. The state offices are often ordered strictly 
hierarchically, and as a result they do not form relatively independent boards or committees. The 
commissions list was drawn from a mapping of all commissions from 2001–2009 by the weekly 
newspaper A4, supplemented by our own research. The list of corporations included the top 1000 
corporations according to turnover, as well as an extra sample of structurally important corporations, 
such as media and financial institutions. This approach resembles that of the positional method. The 
list of foundations was a complete list of all foundations and their boards, taken from the official 
Danish Corporate Register. These boards were supplemented with advisory panels of the major 
foundations. The list of NGOs was taken from the FOA database and includes all organisations 
officially recognised as having the right to be consulted on legislative issues, including all unions and 
their main organisations, employers’ organisations, national sports associations, environmental 
organisations, and so on. This list was supplemented with networks of various character that did not fit 
with other lists, such as publicly known elite networks, like the groups in The Danish Management 
Society (VL-groups). The list of events included all publicly listed balls and official dinners held by the 
royal family from 2009 to 2013. Also included were the annual meetings of top state bureaucrats, royal 
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hunting parties and special events with royal attendance, and major royal events, dating back to 2009. 
Some of the older guest lists were kindly donated by journalists. 
TABLE 1: AFFILIATION NETWORKS INCLUDED 
 From 
original 
sources 
Excluded* Added in 
Snowball 
sample† 
Final number of 
affiliation 
networks 
No. of relations 
State1 2,328 1,780 327 875 10,230 
Parliament1 153 101 31 83 970 
NGO1 749 144 922 1,527 16,436 
Corporations2 1,136 34 40 1,142 7,476 
Foundations2 1,380 18 83 1,445 8,181 
VL-Networks3 117 3 0 114 3,845 
Commissions4 116 44 0 72 1,121 
Events5 74 0 0 74 14,582 
 
Total 6,053 2,124 1403 5,332 62,841 
1 Source: Danish Public Administration Database (www.foa.dk) 
2 Source: The list of largest corporations according to turnover and list of all foundations in the Danish Central Business 
Register (obtained through www.biq.dk) 
3 Source: Homepage of VL-networks (www.vl.dk) 
4 Source: Registration of political commissions from 2005-11 made by Danish weekly newsletter A4. 
5 Sources: Webpage of Danish Royal Family (www.kongehuset.dk) and private archive of journalist.  
*Affiliation networks were excluded if no board of extra-organizational members existed, no information was available on 
the board neither online or through personal contact, the board were included from other sources as well or the board was 
entirely overlapping with another board within the same organization. 
†This includes both subcommittees within the organizations on the original list and the 142 networks obtained through 
snowballing the affiliations of prominent actors. 
Phase 2: Network collection 
The inclusion of groups in the networks by the many small snowball samples was guided by three rules. 
First, the groups must connect individuals across organisations. This excluded groups that were internal 
to organisations. When looking at nested organisations, such as a holding corporation and its 
subsidiaries, this distinction could be difficult to maintain, but if the group, such as the board of a 
subsidiary, had members whose primary occupation was in a different organisation or across several 
organisations, then the group creates interorganisational ties and was therefore included. The second 
rule of inclusion in snowball samples was that groups must have face-to-face interaction. All groups 
must meet physically at least once a year. The third rule of inclusion was that all groups must take 
decisions or integrate individuals at a national level. Making the distinction between the national and 
the regional level was the most difficult to do systematically. If two data collectors were in doubt as to 
the level of the group, it was included. 
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The events included in the dataset stand out from the rest of the groups collected by size and character. 
The mean number of individuals present at each event was 485, with a standard deviation of 608. 
Because they were events, they had attendees, not members. In the period 2009 until 2013, most of the 
74 events were recurring royal events. Because they were recurring, such as hunting parties or dinners 
honouring foreign dignitaries, it was possible for smaller events to be aggregated into larger events. 
This aggregation also formed the basis for the weighting principle for events, which will be addressed 
below. 
Phase 3: Name-matching 
The quality of the data was controlled by name-matching and analysis of overlaps between groups. This 
required special attention as data quality is more important within social network analysis than in most 
quantitative methods. Missing or false ties have an impact on the most prominent centrality measures, 
but the analysis of cliques and group memberships is especially vulnerable. Each of the 62,841 positions 
in the data were checked to ensure recurring names referred to the same individual and which 
individuals shortened names referred to. This was a very time-consuming and conservative process, as 
it relied on the descriptions that were collected from the organisations’ webpages, and on web searches. 
Duplicate names were treated as the same person only with confirmation from several sources. Checks 
were made for names with different spelling and additional middle names used only occasionally.  
Phase 4: Quality control 
Positions and groups were also checked for doublets, e.g. groups that have been collected twice under 
different names. This was essential as the method is vulnerable to this error. As a result, all groups with 
a 75 per cent overlap were checked for uniqueness. 
Many methods and principles for data collection set heavy restraints on what can be included in the 
data and these restraints often result in relatively arbitrary decisions on the inclusion of borderline or 
grey-area data. The inclusion principle used here is a viable principle for a collaborative project that 
uses several data collectors. 
 
Methods: How to account for heterogeneity of the networks 
With data from such diverse sources as those mentioned above, arises a problem of heterogeneity of 
affiliations. As seen in Figure 1, 4189 of the 5332 affiliations had 14 or fewer members. However, the 
larger groups, and particularly the events, had up to 2184 participants. The largest network, the 
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participants at the celebration of the 40-year reign of the Danish Queen, thus contained more than 
24,000 times more edges than a board of 14 members. If not weighted in some way, these networks 
would be the primary sources of integration, especially as the number of ties created by each affiliation 
is the squared number of participants. If regarding the affiliation networks as ‘focused gatherings’ (cf. 
Goffman 1961), the vast differences in network size should be handled by taking into account the 
potential for production of solidarity through interaction (Marsden and Campbell 1984). We suggest 
two weighting procedures: first, a weight based on size of the affiliation; and second, a weight based on 
a reduction of the integration created between individuals with multiple ties. A simple weighting 
procedure to take into account the particular nature of events is proposed. 
FIGURE 1: AFFILIATIONS BY NUMBER OF MEMBERS  
 
The character differences of affiliation networks raise another problem associated particularly with 
events. Events are unique gatherings, happening only once, as opposed to, for example, the monthly 
meetings of corporate boards. Therefore, events were grouped according to their type and generated a 
full tie only between participants of all the events within the group. Guest who took part in only some 
of the events received a tie strength proportionate to the share of the events they took part in together. 
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To account for the heterogeneity in cohesive potential for each affiliation, each edge created by an 
affiliation was subject to a weight, 𝜔𝑒 , of decreasing tie strength: 
 𝜔𝑒 = √
𝜎
𝑛𝑎
 𝑖𝑓 𝜎 <  𝑛𝑎    (1) 
 𝜔𝑒 = 1 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.   (2) 
where 𝑛𝑎 is the number of members of each affiliation and 𝜎 is a constant referring to the number of 
individuals that causes the network participation of each member to drop. We set 𝜎 = 14, as action-
taking subgroups are usually formed around no more than 10 participants (James 1951). Adding to this, 
14 is roughly equal to the maximal size of human ‘sympathy groups’, usually ranging from 10 to 15 (see 
Buys and Larson 1979; Zhou et al. 2005). Furthermore, by gathering data on the affiliation networks, 
we observed that the greater the number of participants, the less frequent were the meetings. This 
weighting therefore takes into account both level of participation and frequency of meetings. In this 
case, gatherings of 14 fewer members were seen as equally integrative, whereas a gradual decrease in tie 
strength ( 𝜔𝑒) or level of integration between participants, was seen to be created in affiliations with 
more than 14 participants. 
Several individuals had multiple ties. Meeting in more than one setting of course creates potential for a 
stronger tie. Hence, after applying the weight based on affiliation size as mentioned above, we added 
another weight using the sum of all ties between all pairs of individuals, ∑ 𝑒𝑖 𝑗 .  
𝜔𝑒𝑖 𝑗 = 1 + ln(∑ 𝑒𝑖 𝑗) 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑒𝑖 𝑗 < 1  (3) 
 𝜔𝑒𝑖 𝑗 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖 𝑗  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.   (4) 
However, this effect wanes when one is tied not just twice or trice, but seven or eight times. Therefore, 
a logarithmic decrease in the integrating effects of mutual affiliations was added for pairs of individuals 
closer than a tie strength of 1. A tie strength of 1 is therefore equal to that of two individuals sharing an 
affiliation on a board of 14 or fewer members, and any further ties are valued less than 1. By inverting 
𝜔𝑒𝑖 𝑗, it is possible to calculate the distance, 𝑑𝑖 𝑗 , between two connected individuals: 
 𝑑𝑖 𝑗 =
1
𝜔𝑒𝑖 𝑗
    (5)   
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This conversion is important when calculating the shortest paths between individuals. A tie with a 
weight of 2 translates into a shortest path between the two individuals equal to two steps in an un-
weighted network. 
For computational purposes, the analysis of this affiliation network can be reduced to individuals who 
participated substantially in the social integration of the elite network. By excluding Individuals for 
whom the sum of all weighted affiliations ∑ 𝜔𝑎𝑖 , ≤ 1, we are left with individuals with more than one 
affiliation and having a level of participation corresponding to more than one sub- 𝜎 members group. 
In this case, those individuals who were included were part of at least one affiliation with 14 or fewer 
members and some other affiliation and thereby had an amount of total weighted affiliations adding up 
to more than one. Following this procedure, we reduced the members of the elite network from 37,750 
to 7,400. Furthermore, 151 of the 7,400 were not connected into the giant component, leaving us with 
7,249 linkers in the elite network. Thus, the weights served a dual purpose: to handle the different levels 
of social integration created by affiliations with huge differences in member number; and to ease the 
computational process by reducing the number of individuals in the network in a simple way. 
 
The accumulation of network resources by the elite 
The linkers are interesting not only for technical purposes. The fact that only one in five of the 
members of the elite network were substantial participants stresses how network resources are 
accumulated by a small proportion of actors, even within a highly egalitarian society such as Denmark. 
With an adult population of 4,378,227, less than one per cent of Danes were among the 37,750 with 
any affiliations in the elite network, making even this group very exclusive. In the entire network, only 
916 affiliations were not connected to each other in some way. The largest component comprised 
33,035 individuals, more than 900 times larger than the second largest component with 36 members, 
underlining the clustering tendency within the power network. 
Even within this large component, there were vast differences in the level of integration. As seen in 
Figure 2, all centrality measures (see Faust 1997; Freeman 1979) followed a power law distribution 
(Barabasi and Albert 1999), with a very small group at the top of the distribution. When looking at the 
reach (the number of individuals assembled within a distance of 2.1 or less) and closeness centrality, it 
appears that a rapid increase in centrality arises around the 400 most central individuals. Thus, it 
appears that only about one in 20 of the linkers composed a core of well-connected individuals. 
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FIGURE 2 CENTRALITY MEASURES IN THE DANISH ELITE NETWORK OF LINKERS 
 
Distribution of centrality measures in the network of linkers (having a sum of all weighted ties: ∑ 𝜔𝑒𝑖 , > 1). Betweenness 
and closeness centrality have been normalized. Note that the 30,501 that are not linkers would lead to graphs with an even 
clearer power law distribution. Weighted memberships is calculated as ∑ 𝜔𝑒𝑖 ,. 
216 
 
 
Identifying the core elite group 
The elite network showed a clear core/periphery structure and a small group of individuals appeared to 
be part of a cohesive subgroup. However, it is difficult to go from continuous centrality measures to 
discrete groups in a reproducible way. Groups identified through other techniques, like those based on 
clique membership, such as social circles (Alba and Kadushin 1976; Alba and Moore 1978) or clique-
percolation (Palla et al. 2005; Vedres and Stark 2010), are difficult to use in affiliation networks. 
Affiliation networks are inherently organised into large cliques, where each affiliation forms a clique. 
Block modelling (Boorman and White 1976; White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976) focuses mainly on 
identifying actors occupying similar roles rather than being part of cohesive subgroups (Burt 1978). 
Thus, the aim of identifying the core is to establish a cohesive, central group, rather than to identify a 
group of key actors who play an important role in the diffusion of information (Borgatti 2006; Moody 
and White 2003) or who share structurally advantageous positions bridging different sectors (Burt 2004; 
Vedres and Stark 2010). 
Instead, we suggest using a modified version of k-cores developed by Seidman (1983). K-cores are a 
central subcomponent within which all individuals have the highest possible numbers of internal ties. 
Each individual is assigned a coreness score corresponding to the minimum degree of individuals they 
are connected to. By decomposing an entire component, or progressively removing individuals with the 
lowest degree until further removal of individuals from the component leads to a decrease in the 
minimum degree, we eventually arrive at the core group. The final group with the highest coreness 
score is the only group in the network in which every individual is connected to at least k other 
individuals. K-core decomposition also assigns a coreness value of all other individuals, corresponding 
to the minimum degree of individuals when removed from the core. Hence, the coreness score also 
describes how close an individual is to the core of the network. 
This allows us to see all connected individuals as part of nested groups. By using weighted ties, Doreian 
and Woodard (1994) suggest a threshold, w, for identifying boundaries between levels of integration 
within networks. Whereas Doreian and Woodard used the threshold to include only individuals who 
are strongly directly connected with the core, Friedkin (1984) showed that shared social circle 
membership and the quantity of shared contacts increases the likelihood of consensus, particularly 
among those not directly tied. Hence, we suggest a solution that allows cohesion to be made through 
indirect ties as well, by constructing an adjacency matrix based on weighted shortest paths of 2.1 or 
less. Pairs of individuals can have the same strength of relation, whether connected through one large 
217 
 
affiliation or through an intermediary. When identifying the core, we suggest using a threshold for the 
maximum reach, r, at which two individuals can still be seen as connected. If r is set at 2.0, individuals 
not directly tied can only be tied through an intermediary if at least one has several ties to the 
intermediary, or they are both tied to the intermediary in affiliations smaller than the value 𝜎. To make 
the core a little less sensitive to the exact value of 𝜎 compared to individuals tied through larger 
affiliations or with strong ties to intermediaries, we suggest setting r = 2.1. However, the exact value of 
r should be assessed considering the total amount and character of all included affiliations. 
FIGURE 3: CORE COLLAPSE SEQUENCE OF THE DANISH ELITE NETWORK 
 
Core collapse sequence of the network of linkers where everyone within reach 2.1 is regarded as connected. Color denotes 
number of individuals removed in each sequence. 
 
Analysing the entire network, a group of 443 individuals all have a coreness score of 199. This means 
that no individuals can be removed from this group without lowering the minimum degree of group 
members. Of the 443 in the core, 20 are secondary actors (cf. Faust 1997), only having affiliations that 
are a sub-sample of another individual’s affiliations. Because of the weighting procedure outlined 
above, sharing ties to very central individuals could have the effect of having many ties only because of 
several shared memberships with central agents. This problem is worsened by differences in 
institutional organisation, for instance where a large organisation has many external subsidiaries with 
relatively independent boards, but the heads of the large organisations are present in all subsidiaries. 
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Because this could lead some actors to become very closely tied, we suggest that secondary actors are 
removed from the core. However, removing individuals should always be subject to investigation of the 
reason for their network overlap. In the Danish case, the affiliations of the Prince Consort Henry are 
completely embedded in that of Her Majesty Queen Margarethe II, even though alone he is part of 37 
affiliations and events. Thus the Prince Consort is included as part of the core group, as he has four 
times the number of affiliation memberships than any other secondary actor. 
FIGURE 4: THE NETWORK OF LINKERS IN THE DANISH ELITE NETWORK BY CORENESS SCORE 
 
As seen in Figure 3, the core value increases as individuals are gradually removed. Individuals removed 
at a later stage can be regarded as embedded in a larger core with a lower core value (Seidman 1983). 
Therefore, the coreness score can also be used to separate the rest of the network according to 
proximity to the central core. By simply dividing the rest of the networks of linkers into thirds by their 
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coreness score, an approximate division of the linkers according to their proximity to the power elite is 
possible. Hence, as shown in Figure 4, we can identify four nested groups in the power network: 423 
members of the power elite; 1,094 in higher middle levels of power, whose connections are close to 
bringing them into the power elite; a lower middle level of power containing 1,661 members and the 
group of 4,071 in the periphery of the power network. In addition, there are of course the 27,152 not 
included in the network of linkers and the rest of the population totally excluded from the Danish elite 
network. Note that no large subgroups were excluded at any point in the core collapse sequence. This 
suggests that the network has a single core, to which groups with lower coreness value are more or less 
connected, rather than several centres that collapse in blocks. 
TABLE 2: KEY INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED THROUGH POSITIONAL METHOD IN THE CORE 
Key Positions* 
Not part 
of the 
core 
group 
Included in the 
core 
Percent 
included 
    
Academia1 7 13 65.0% 
Administration2 17 13 43.3% 
Upper class (20 most wealthy)3 16 4 20.0% 
Business leaders from top 50 corporations4 48 52 52.0% 
Church (all Bishops) 10 0 0.0% 
Culture5 4 3 42.9% 
Media6 22 5 18.5% 
Organisations7 8 24 74.2% 
Politics8 19 13 40.6% 
Royalty9 0 4 100.0% 
    
All 151 131 46.5% 
*Note that one individual, e.g. the Prime Minister, who is also leader of a political party, can hold more than one position. 
1 University principals and chairmen of university boards and leaders of the public research foundations and the scientific 
society. 
2 Permanent secretaries, Director and Chairman of National Bank, President of the Supreme Court, Chief of Police, Chief 
of Defense, director and elected chairman of regional and municipal organisations and Head of Economic Council 
3 List of 100 most wealthy individuals and families in Denmark. Source: http://www.business.dk/dkrigeste2013 
4 Chairman and CEO of the 50 largest Danish corporation (no subsidiaries included) according to turnover. 
5 Directors of the National Museum of Art and History, Director and Chairman of the Royal Theatre and largest publisher 
and chairman of the state art foundation. 
6 Director-general and chairman of the board of the two state-owned broadcasters, editor-in-chief, chairman of the board 
and CEO of all national newspapers with more than 20,000 daily copies. 
7 Presidents of all unions with more than 40,000 members, President and director of all major business associations, CEO 
and chairmen of pension funds controlled by these organizations. 
8 Cabinet, leaders of all political parties in the Parliament and Speaker of Parliament. 
9 Queen, Price Consort, Crown Prince and Crown Princess. 
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As seen in Table 2 and 3, the core group deviates quite significantly from a formalistic definition of 
powerful positions. Almost all individuals within the population defined by this positional approach are 
included in the affiliation network. While formal leaders in the royalty, trade unions, business 
associations, academia and the largest corporations to a large extent are members of the core, only little 
more than half (52) of the business leaders fund through the positional method are part of the core. 
Considering that 179 businessmen are part of the core, this highlights that economic size does not 
translate directly into social capital. The corporate positions excluded from the core, however, are from 
less prestigious, peripheral firms, from corporations controlled by cooperatives or representing foreign 
capital not symbolically integrated into the Danish power elite. This is underlined by the fact that very 
few of the extremely wealthy families are represented in the core. The very rich who are included are 
largely tied to the large corporations that their families own. From politics, only key cabinet ministers, 
such as the prime minister, secretary of state, treasure and minister of commerce are included. Leaders 
of political parties without government experience do not form part of the core and very few members 
of parliament are represented. Rather, the 24 politicians in the core are, if not key cabinet secretaries, 
key regional leaders, particularly mayors from the largest cities. Very few individuals in the core hold 
positions in cultural life and less than one-fifth of the people with key positions in the media are 
included in the core. The strength of business, business associations, unions and the scientific 
community—with economists in a central position—is indicated by many individuals from these 
groups forming part of the core without having a leading position in their sector. 
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TABLE 3: CORE INDIVIDUALS  INCLUDED IN POSITIONAL METHOD 
Sector affiliation of all core members* 
No 
position in 
positional 
approach 
Position 
in 
positional 
approach 
Percent 
Included 
    
Business: Investment and Pensions 15 4 21,1% 
Business: Medium-small 29 7 19,4% 
Business: Multiposition1 46 9 16,4% 
Business: Top 200 37 37 50,0% 
Culture and Law: Culture and charities 3 1 25,0% 
Culture and Law: Law 8 0 0,0% 
Interest groups: Consumers 3 0 0,0% 
Interest groups: Employers and business 30 7 18,9% 
Interest groups: Farming 10 1 9,1% 
Interest groups: Unions 38 11 22,4% 
Science and education: Economists and political scientists 14 1 6,7% 
Science and education: Education 8 0 0,0% 
Science and education: Other scientists 15 4 21,1% 
Science and education: University leaders 3 7 70,0% 
State and politics: Politics 24 10 29,4% 
State and politics: Public Officials 19 11 36,7% 
State and politics: Royal court 7 4 36,4% 
    
All 309 114 27,0% 
* Sector is defined according to full-time employment. Source: Either description in data or personal profile on the web. 
1 Multipositional denotes working chairmen that do not have a primary employer, but who have spent the bulk of the career 
in the corporate community. 
 
Discussion: A comparative methodology for power elite identification? 
The methodology outlined above—gathering affiliations through the inclusion principle, weighting the 
ties according to affiliation size and identifying the largest k-core within a distance of r as the cohesive 
elite—circumvents the problem of determining boundaries of the power elite. By following this 
approach, both the size and composition of the power elite are defined through empirical analysis. 
Furthermore, the approach can be reproduced in different nations or over different periods of time. Ad 
hoc decisions are reduced to:  
1. The baseline of members in a network, 𝜎, to be treated as equally integrative 
2. The value of the distance threshold, r, for a pair of individuals to be treated as tied together and 
the application of the weight on having multiple ties between pairs of individuals.  
222 
 
As we will discuss now, the results of the overall analysis are relatively robust even when networks are 
excluded or the parameters changed within reasonable limits. Furthermore, we will show the relative 
importance of the different sources in identifying affiliation networks. 
FIGURE 5: CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGES TO 𝜎 AND R 
 
Changes to both 𝜎 and r determine the size of the identified elite quite simply, as seen in Figure 5. The 
larger the values at which both are set, the more individuals are included in the core, the coreness value 
rising accordingly. However, when 𝜎 and r are set below the value suggested in the present analysis and 
fewer individuals are included in the core the members of the smaller cores identified are also members 
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of the core identified at the thresholds from this analysis. When these constants are set low, the most 
cohesive organisation in the elite network, the government, composes almost the entire core. When 
changing these parameters it is necessary to consider the role of affiliation size, the probability of 
integration across more than one tie and evaluation of the types of affiliations included. Changes to 
these parameters affect which actors are included in or removed from the periphery of the core, while 
the central actors remain the same. Yet the question of the size of the power rests on the assumptions 
implied in the values of 𝜎 and r. 
FIGURE 6: MEASURES OF CORE STABILITY WHEN DELETING THE MOST CENTRAL GROUPS AND WHEN 
DELETING GROUPS FROM THE PERIPHERY 
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The strength of using the inclusion principle as a way to address the boundary specification problem is 
seen in Figure 6. As the least central affiliations, according to their weighted in-degree, are removed 
from the analysis, the coreness score of the k-core, core size and number of individuals remaining in 
the core identified using all affiliations all remain roughly the same, until about 1,000 affiliations remain. 
When affiliations among the 1,000 most central groups are removed, the size of the core drops 
dramatically; however, those remaining in the core still belong to the core identified when analysing on 
the entire affiliation network. When deleting the central affiliations, the results are more troublesome. 
After removing about 60 of the most central group the size of the core group has doubled, leaving only 
about three-quarters of the original core group in this much larger core. The internal cohesion of the 
group, as shown by the coreness value, is also halved from 199 to about 100. Clearly, it is of paramount 
importance to include the majority of the most central affiliations. This requires the researcher to be 
thorough when snowballing affiliations from key actors and to focus their effort on gathering data from 
central affiliations. 
If this proposed methodology is to be applied to other settings, the analysis needs to be somewhat 
robust to the removal of some the sources described in Table 1. If all affiliations from a source are 
removed, the approach offers roughly the same overall analytical results, as seen in Table 4. The 
weighting procedures ensure that even if removing two-thirds of all edges by taking out all events, 91% 
of the core—a core still composed of about 400 individuals—is made of the same individuals. 
However, removing all affiliations from the state and NGOs would lead to a much smaller core, of 
which nearly a quarter is not part of the power elite in the complete analysis. Removing corporate 
networks creates the smallest core of fewer than 300 individuals. Thus, affiliation networks from the 
state, organisations recognised by the state, and the large corporations are essential for reproducing this 
methodology, whereas limits to access to other sources are of less importance, at least in the Danish 
case. Removing sources usually led—with affiliations from corporations as the notable exception—to 
the identification of a numerically smaller core with a lower minimal degree per core size. However, 
removing the most exclusive network—the commission and snowball networks—actually expands the 
core, but lowers the coreness value drastically. 
Removing key sources not only removes individuals from the core, but also has a profound impact on 
which sector representatives remain in it. Surprisingly, as seen in Figure 7, removing organisations 
affects individuals working in the corporate sector, showing how ties made in business associations and 
policy planning groups are key for business integration in the power elite. Removing state ties not only 
leads to fewer individuals working in the central administration and the scientific sector, but also has 
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TABLE 4: NETWORK AND CORE CHARACTERISTICS IF ALL AFFILIATIONS FROM EACH SOURCE ARE REMOVED 
Source* 
removed: 
Size of 
component 
Number 
of edges 
Density Core-
ness 
value 
Core 
size 
Core 
value 
per 
core 
size 
Excluded 
individuals 
from core  
New 
indivi-
duals 
Share of 
Secon-
dary 
actors 
1. 
Power 
Elite 
2. 
Higher 
levels 
of 
Power 
3. 
Middle 
levels 
of 
Power 
4. 
Lower 
levels 
of 
Power 
Individuals 
in core 
holding a 
position 
from 
positional 
approach 
Represented 
positions 
from 
positional 
approach in 
core 
State 5385 238426 0.016 135 330 0.41 
169 
(40%) 
76  
(23%) 
9% 
358 
(7%) 
698 
(13%) 
1229 
(23%) 
3100 
(58%) 
81 
(25%) 
98 
(39%) 
Parliament 7127 302010 0.012 194 428 0.45 
25 
(6%) 
30  
(7%) 
6% 
453 
(6%) 
986 
(14%) 
1655 
(23%) 
4033 
(57%) 
94 
(22%) 
107  
(43%) 
NGO 4428 209786 0.021 115 350 0.33 
154 
(36%) 
81  
(23%) 
14% 
398 
(9%) 
925 
(21%) 
1256 
(28%) 
1849 
(42%) 
107 
(31%) 
121  
(48%) 
Corporations 6124 290390 0.015 167 295 0.57 
129 
(30%) 
1  
(0%) 
5% 
308 
(5%) 
969 
(16%) 
1603 
(26%) 
3244 
(53%) 
87 
(29%) 
103  
(41%) 
Foundations 6125 273052 0.015 170 381 0.45 
89 
(21%) 
47  
(12%) 
7% 
409 
(7%) 
936 
(15%) 
1584 
(26%) 
3196 
(52%) 
100 
(26%) 
117  
(47%) 
VL-Networks 6661 305290 0.014 190 393 0.48 
65 
(15%) 
35  
(9%) 
8% 
425 
(6%) 
1069 
(16%) 
1625 
(24%) 
3542 
(53%) 
91 
(23%) 
106  
(42%) 
Commissions 7057 315013 0.013 183 475 0.39 
27 
(6%) 
79  
(17%) 
7% 
508 
(7%) 
897 
(13%) 
1698 
(24%) 
3954 
(56%) 
120 
(25%) 
138  
(55%) 
Events 6885 102270 0.004 187 393 0.48 
65 
(15%) 
35  
(9%) 
6% 
418 
(6%) 
1014 
(15%) 
1700 
(25%) 
3753 
(55%) 
92 
(23%) 
105  
(42%) 
Snowball† 6842 299878 0.013 157 448 0.35 
69 
(16%) 
94 
(21%) 
7% 
448 
(7%) 
1122 
(16%) 
1811 
(26%) 
3461 
(51%) 
102 
(23%) 
120 
(48%) 
                
All sources 
included 
7225 326746 0.012 199 423 0.47 - - 5% 
423 
(6%) 
1094 
(15%) 
1661 
(23%) 
4071 
(56%) 
107 
(25%) 
124 
(50%) 
*See table 1 for description of each source. 
† These include only the 142 affilations added trough following networks of key actors. 
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FIGURE 7: SECTOR AFFILIATION OF INDIVIDUALS NO LONGER INCLUDED IN CORE AFTER REMOVING SOURCES 
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profound consequences for the involvement of unions and business associations in elite networks. 
Although removing events, as mentioned above, does not cause the core to alter much, members from 
the royal court and also politicians would not be part of the core if events data had not been included. 
The importance of the social integration created by the neutral spaces of common public recognition 
should lead researchers to focus on networks created by symbolic events. 
Extensions: Organisations, dominance, informal and former ties 
As a two-mode network, the ties that integrate the affiliations can be subject to the organisational 
weight in Equations (1) and (2).  Ties between affiliations can then be viewed as directed ties; small 
affiliations receive considerable information and integration by being tied to larger affiliations because 
the smaller forum can discuss and listen to perspectives from each member more thoroughly. Thus, the 
power of organisations can be assessed as well (see Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1993). 
Although the inclusion principle assures that a great variety of affiliation networks is included in the 
analysis, several types of relations have been overlooked in our approach. Two types of relations that 
create stronger cohesion would be particularly important to include: 
1. Informal relations, such as friendship or kin 
2. Relationships created in the past. 
Friendship relations could be investigated through surveys, but would probably lead to a massive boost 
of centrality among respondents compared to non-respondents. Data on family and kinship could be 
obtained through biographical databases, newspaper archives or public registers, but would be limited 
to the most publicly covered part of the population, skewing ties towards prominent individuals. 
Furthermore, ties of politicians and members of the press could tend to be more informal, as 
institutional ties to other powerful institutions could lead to claims of conflict of interests. Inclusion of 
ties made through co-authorships, co-appearances in the media and at events could shed more light on 
the cohesion between politics, media and the rest of the power elite; however, the demands of checks 
and balances could still lead to some separation in the power elite. 
Former ties should be included in the analysis of elite social integration if reliable and comprehensive 
data are available. If a database such as the one used in this analysis is updated yearly, former ties could 
be included fairly easily; however, the relative loss of integration as years go by should be accounted 
for, perhaps by subjecting each weighted tie to a half-life, t½, each year. This would be especially 
important for those with elite careers spanning different sectors. This would enable the researcher to 
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better assess the level of integration within the power elite. Former ties would prove especially valuable 
for understanding the connection from politics and central administration to other spectral institutional 
hierarchies; politicians, for example, often affiliate themselves with other sectors after their political 
career—a sort of cohesion created by elite circulation through individual career paths, described in 
France as ‘pantouflage’ (Bourdieu 1996:266). 
The perspective on elite cohesion created through formal ties is in no way an exhaustive account of 
how the observed affiliation network works. As Urry (2004) points out, the actual content of the ties 
remains very much in the dark. Whereas the ties can probably serve as vehicles for information 
exchange (cf. Granovetter 1973), symbolic integration through co-membership, and perhaps cohesion 
created through the solidarity of interaction ritual chains (cf. Collins 2004), actual control and 
prominence, cannot be assessed by the analysis of undirected ties (Knoke and Burt 1983). To 
understand how the diverse affiliations aggregated in this analysis work in actual power struggles, it is 
necessary to obtain much more empirical detail of the actual interaction patterns of each affiliation. 
Furthermore, cohesion cannot be assessed only through socio-metric proximity or role equivalence. 
Integration in the elite, as discussed in elite theory (Bourdieu 1996; Giddens 1972; Miliband 1969; Mills 
1956), is also tied to common social background, ties made in elite schools or universities, and the 
social homogeneity created through shared career and life experiences. 
As data on networks from key social institutions in different national settings become accessible 
through the digital revolution (Savage and Burrows 2007), the approach outlined here becomes viable 
for comparative analysis of elite configurations across societies. Finding core groups in different 
nations was an ambition of the policy discussion network studies of American, German and Australian 
elite circles (Higley et al. 1991). Although Denmark is perhaps a paradigmatic case for the level of 
institutionalisation and publicly available data, as we have shown, the inner core of institutionalised 
power networks can also be approximated through data of a much lower granularity. Thus, historical 
comparisons should also be feasible. However, if power structure in formal networks has not 
crystallised, the inner core of the network is less likely to coincide with the power elite. This is especially 
the case if several groups openly fight for power—what Jeffrey Winters (2011) has called ‘warring 
oligarchies’, when power relations are based solely on symbolic relationships, such as kings and their 
subjects or the dominance exercised by clerics under theocracy. The proposed approach is therefore 
likely to apply only to modern democratic societies. 
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Conclusion: The power law of elites 
Using the tendency of powerful individuals to cluster in certain affiliations, the question ‘Who are the 
elite?’ can be answered by identifying the core of an extensive elite network. This inductive approach 
lets the actual formal interaction between all holders of potentially powerful positions determine the 
boundary and composition of the elite. This approach requires data for a vast number of affiliations 
that connect individuals and organisations across sectors. The collection of these affiliations should be 
guided by an inclusion principle that prescribes the inclusion of all potentially powerful affiliations. 
However, the integrative effect of these affiliations—ranging from the comfort of the boardroom to 
the splendour of the royal ball—wears down as the number of participants increases. By applying a 
weight, 𝜎, the integrative effect of very heterogeneous affiliations can be compared. Furthermore, 𝜎 
can be adjusted according to the assumptions of the researcher. In this case, affiliations of 14 or fewer 
participants are deemed to be equally integrative, whereas the integrative effect of affiliations above 14 
members gradually deteriorates. 
The power elite can be identified as the core group in a two-step procedure. First, including everyone 
within a certain sociometric reach, r, is deemed to be tied to each other. Once again, this parameter is 
adjustable to the assumptions of the researcher. In the present analysis, r is set at 2.1, thereby 
connecting individuals tied either directly through larger affiliations or indirectly through smaller 
affiliations. By finding the largest k-core in this network, the group in which most people are tied to the 
highest number of individuals within this group forms part of a cohesive elite. By using data gathered 
through the inclusion principle, following the weighting procedure of ties outlined above and finding k-
cores of a certain reach, the number of ad hoc decisions for the boundary specification of the elite 
group can be reduced substantially. The assumptions used for 𝜎 and r are transparent, reproducible and 
easily changed. 
Thus, power elites can be identified from the intersection of institutions’ hierarchies across time and 
space. The identification of elites through social network analysis thus offers a truly comparative 
methodology for investigating and understanding differences in elite composition for elite scholars in 
different settings.  
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7. The power elite in the welfare state – key 
institutional orders of the power networks in 
Denmark 
Christoph Houman Ellersgaard & Anton Grau Larsen, Phd. Fellows, Department of Sociology, 
University of Copenhagen 
Abstract 
In Denmark, within a vast power network of 5,322 potentially powerful affiliations containing 37,750 
individuals, a core group of 423 individuals was identified using social network analysis. The position of 
the core as the main broker between overlapping sectoral networks fits the definition of the power elite 
proposed by C. Wright Mills in 1956. The power elite sit where the circles of the key institutional 
orders within society overlap. The composition and size of this core group reflect the relative 
importance of different institutional orders and the concentration of power within the limits of the 
nation-state. 
The key institutional orders in Denmark were identified by looking at the main employer of each power 
elite member. A small majority (52%) of the elite members were employed in the world of business as 
CEOs, chairmen of large corporations, or leaders in employers’ and business organisations. Three other 
institutional orders – state and politics, science and unions – showed a strong presence, each 
constituting between 12% and 18% of the power elite. All of the institutions are central to the 
negotiation and regulation of the economy. 
While spanning very different organisations, the power elite were integrated by factors other than their 
shared connections. They fit the bill of middle-aged white men with prestigious backgrounds. Only 
19% were women. The offspring of a very exclusive upper class outnumbered elite individuals with a 
known background in the working classes by more than four to one. Almost half of the power elite 
(47%) had attended just eight university programs and were educated predominantly in economics, law, 
engineering, political science and business administration from a select set of Danish universities. The 
elite shared lifestyles, as seen by their geographic concentration in the most exclusive neighborhoods in 
Copenhagen. 
Power elites in the 21st century Scandinavian welfare state reflected the historical process of integrating 
challengers to the networks of established elite without compromising the position of the incumbents. 
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Who are the members of the power elite in an egalitarian welfare state? 
For each epoch and for every social structure, we must work out an answer to the question of the 
power of the elite. 
C. Wright Mills (1956:23) 
 
Who holds power and which major institutions, such as business or the state, do they work for? What 
are the governing interests in society? Are the elite unified or are there fundamental divides? What is 
the relative strength of labour versus employers? What is the role of the cultural and scientific elite? 
These question are difficult to answer, but by mapping the institutional networks of affiliations between 
elite members we may get closer to answering these important questions. The case of Denmark, one of 
the most egalitarian, wealthy and stable nation-states in the world, is in many aspects the extreme. 
When Charles Wright Mills (1956) famously dissected The Power Elite in America in the 1950s, three 
pillars of society were represented at the apex: the corporations, the president’s cabinet and the military. 
But why were these institutions central to Mills’ analysis? Through revolving doors, shared upper-class 
background, ties made in elite boarding schools and Ivy-league universities and, most importantly, the 
overlapping cliques of these three institutional orders, the potential elite were able to forge bonds to 
promote their shared interests in a way that was not open to members of institutions at lower levels of 
power, or the mass society. However, Mills (1956:269) was very much aware that this particular 
configuration of power was a result of historical struggles of ‘institutional shifts’ rather than the 
immanent distribution of power in modern societies. Raymond Aron (1950:9) attributed the differences 
between sub-elites performing different functions to ‘the degree of separation between the groups and 
their relative strength’. Without assuming the dominance of business, generals and cabinet secretaries, 
the Millsian notion of the power elite can be used as a metaphor in identifying the key institutional 
orders, by asking: Which institutions are involved in the everyday decisions made across a nation-state? 
Denmark provides an extreme case for the application of the notion of power elites, as it is a political 
economy in a small state with a coordinated market economy and a redistributive Scandinavian welfare 
system known for collective bargaining and lack of military power. 
The use of an approach based on identifying the core group in a vast network of all institutionalised 
power networks (see Ellersgaard and Larsen 2014) allows the identification of the institutional orders 
active in the core to remain an empirical question. The lure of the power resources generated by 
different institutional orders is indicated by the centrality of institutional representatives in the power 
network. This was identified by looking at the formal shared affiliations of the most central individuals. 
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The power network was generated from 2012 and 2013 data on the affiliation memberships of a broad 
range of institutions that potentially could be part of the key institutional orders in Denmark. The 
primary sources were the governing bodies of state institutions, organisations recognised officially by 
the state, and the large corporations, as well as participation in symbolic events or semi-formal 
leadership forums. This approach was thus inspired by the tradition of power-structure research 
(Domhoff 1975, 2013) and identification of elite social circles (Alba and Moore 1978; Higley et al. 1991; 
Moore 1979). However, the use of more than 5,332 affiliations, including more than 62,481 positions, 
allowed hitherto-neglected institutional orders to be identified as part of the overlapping cliques in the 
core of the power elite. 
Because the power elite are based on the overlap of different institutional orders, their ability to achieve 
cohesion is hampered by the different interests vested in each domain and the characteristic differences 
of the organisational hierarchies through which elite members ascend. Although cohesion is generated 
through their social interaction across affiliations, it is also strengthened by shared social conditions, 
such as similarities in social background and education, but most importantly, their current lifestyle. 
This similarity highlights their distance from the general population. 
To explore the composition of the power elite in the Danish society, we first show how central 
networks positions are concentrated among a very small minority; next, we show that this minority 
represents key institutional orders; and finally we show that in spite of functional differences between 
these institutional orders, there are social similarities that support the formation of the power elite. 
First, we turn to the particular Danish case. A power elite in a corporatist state with high levels of 
equality – a least likely case (cf. Flyvbjerg 2006) – does not only tell a story about elites in welfare state; 
it also shows how power elites, through the process of elite settlements, handle pressure from below in 
the form of strong social movements. 
Elite circulation in the welfare state 
Any stable elite must have the ability to incorporate new powerful groups, otherwise the incumbent 
elite are condemned to the historical ‘graveyard of aristocracies’, as Vilfredo Pareto (1991) famously put 
it. However, Pareto’s notion of virile challenging elites replacing incumbents through violent 
revolutions, according to another classical elite theorist, Roberto Michels (1949), does not account for 
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the fact that parts of the ancient elites still maintain privileged positions1. When a contending faction of 
the elite successfully accumulates substantial power, in any form, they are commonly incorporated 
within the elite in a fashion that does not entail the complete removal of former elites, but rather a 
reconfiguration of the balance of power in a process of amalgamation. In tracing the origins of the 
three-headed American power elite, Mills (1956:269–78) showed how the relative strength of 
institutional orders – shown by their involvement with one another – has developed over time. 
Institutional orders enter the power elite in what Burton and Higley (1987) calls ‘elite settlements’. 
Such an elite settlement gradually took place in Denmark (Higley and Burton 2006) with the 
establishment of genuine parliamentary democracy at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
incumbent political elite, based on the landed aristocracy, industrialists, higher civil servants and military 
officers, was challenged by groups based first in rural and then in urban areas (Pedersen 1976). These 
political challengers – since tied to the most popular political parties – originated by and large in social 
movements. The rural challengers were an organised liberal movement among farmers gathered around co-ops, 
folk high schools and farmers’ associations. The urban challengers, on the other hand, were tied to the labour 
movement. Later, other social movements were successful in obtaining political influence or change. The 
pressure from suffragists and other social movements helped Denmark to be the first country in the 
world to grant universal suffrage in 1915. After the Second World War, consumer groups and 
environmental activists also achieved significant political influence. Furthermore, the above-mentioned 
social movements, in particular the farmers’ associations and labour unions, not only gained political 
influence but also became part of other elite spheres through state committees, corporations and a wide 
range of civil society organisations. For others, the experience and prestige from working in these 
movements and the social ties made through these movements aided a career trajectory ascending to 
elite positions. 
The unions in particular engaged power resources in the class-related distributive conflict and partisan 
politics, which Walter Korpi (2006) attributed to welfare state development. The strength of organised 
labour led to a cross-class alliance between unions and business, resulting in a highly institutionalised 
system of collective bargaining – starting with the September settlement between unions and employers 
in 1899 – while also ensuring the representation of both organised labour and employer organisations 
towards the state (Due et al. 1994; Jensen 2012). In 1933 the alliance was broadened to include the 
                                                 
1
 The persistence of privileged groups at the apex of society has also been shown though the reoccurrence of surnames in 
prestigious academic institutions (Clark 2014) and through the importance of multigenerational ties (Mare 2011). 
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farmers, helping the latter through the Depression while introducing a social reform granting welfare 
rights to the population at large. With welfare states being challenged for several decades by the politics 
of retrenchment (Korpi and Palme 2003), the political ties of unions have weakened. The position and 
relative strength of these new institutional orders, which are based around social movements, remain 
unclear. 
The institutionalisation of class conflict and a strong civic society have famously been used by Francis 
Fukuyama (2011) to describe ‘getting to Denmark’ as the best practice of many parameters in state-
building. As a consensually united elite (cf. Higley and Burton 1989), challengers to elite power are 
amalgamated into the incumbent elite through a ‘negotiated economy’ (Pedersen 2006). Thus, violent 
overthrows of government arise neither from rural challengers, nor urban challengers based in labour 
unions, nor suffragists, even if the threats of uprising aided the willingness to integrate new elites by the 
incumbent elite. Still, the royal family has officially proceeded as heads of state almost without 
interruption for the millennium. The elite consensus is further strengthened by the fact that no political 
party – nor rarely even an ideologically united block – has held majority in parliament alone during the 
last century. Rather, in a system of high political stability politics is generally made through compromise 
between left and right. 
In spite of the integration of new elites and high levels of general equality (Campbell and Hall 2006), 
there is a strong concentration of wealth and material power resources in Denmark (Winters 2011:278–
80). Although the income of the one per cent has not risen as dramatically as in the US or UK since the 
1970s (Alvaredo et al. 2013), studies (Davies et al. 2009) of somewhat problematic wealth data suggest 
that wealth is increasingly distributed quite unevenly, despite welfare state politics. Furthermore, large 
proportions of the largest Danish corporations remain under family or foundation control. Adding to 
the power of individual corporation owners, Danish business associations remain well-organised – 
particularly the Confederation of Danish Industry, which holds the majority vote within the 
Confederation of Danish Employers – and are highly active politically (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and 
Pedersen 2014, 2015). Thus, corporate interests are promoted by both super-rich owners and efficient 
organisations rather than through the dispersed ownership of individual investors. However, the 
relative strength of corporate interest compared to union, political and state leaders within the Danish 
power elite has not been clarified. 
Along with being consensually united and open to new elite groups, the elite in Denmark have also 
shown a higher propensity to include the offspring of non-elite families. Compared to other countries, 
access to the elite is more open than in other countries and has become even more so during the 
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twentieth century, thereby making it a potentially less exclusive, elite group (Christiansen and Togeby 
2007). Furthermore, the elite are characterised by separate career paths to each elite sector, with little 
apparent importance given to an exclusive elite program of higher education. According to Michael 
Hartmann (2010), this has led to a weakened internal integration, and thus lesser concentration of 
power, in the elite circle. However, these findings explore the Danish elite according to potentially 
powerful groups defined a priori thorough the positional method (cf. Knoke 1993) rather than by 
analysing which groups are actually part of an elite group. This means that the historical specificities of 
the making of the Danish power elite described above are neglected in favour of an elite definition 
based upon the usual suspects: powerful societal sectors such as business, politics, state administration, 
organisations, law, science, culture and media. Rather than exploring the Danish power elite, previous 
studies have described groups that are regarded as powerful according to academic tradition. The 
power elite of the welfare state has escaped attention. But before we try to identify the Danish power 
elite, we consider the important theoretical discussion of the concept of the power elite and its 
relationship to the broader sociological framework. 
Division and cohesion in the power elite 
The notion of the power elite was vigorously contested in the 1950s (see e.g. Bell 1958; Dahl 1958), 
particularly the extent of power concentration within the elite group. The discussion between elitists 
and pluralists soon turned towards the theoretical definition of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Dahl 
1957; Lukes 1974). The elitists, joined by a new generation of Marxist scholars, turned their attention to 
the disproportionate influence and internal organisation of business (Domhoff 1978; Mintz and 
Schwartz 1985; Useem 1984; Zeitlin 1974). Neo-pluralists conceded that in some periods, business has 
a more privileged position to influence politics (Domhoff 2007). As such, the disagreement between 
elitists and pluralists has turned to question the very notion of power rather than whether or not some 
groups hold more power than others. In this context, the Millsian notion of the power elite becomes 
open to establishing the empirical boundary of the group that holds disproportionate power. 
When describing the power elite, Mills (1956:385–6) focused on four aspects. First, the elite head the 
top institutional hierarchies. Second, the interlock of these ‘circles’ forms an ‘intricate set of 
overlapping cliques’ (Mills 1956:18). Third, the integration in these circles in turn creates a set of 
common values in these circles by ‘co-optation of social types’ (Mills 1956:281). Fourth, the common 
experience of heading up central institutions, everyday interaction and the shared values leads to a 
common moral view that in turn leads to some degree of coordination. 
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The power elite are thus composed of individuals leading large organisations that frequently interact 
with one another. This led Mills (1956:288–90) to picture the power elite consisting of: 
1. ‘The inner core […] who interchange commanding roles at [the] top of one institutional 
order with those in another’ 
2. ‘Men […] not necessarily familiar with every major arena of power… who moves in and 
between perhaps two circles’ 
3. ‘The outermost fringes of the power elite – which change more than the core – consist of 
“those who count” even though they may not be “in” on given decisions of consequence nor 
in their career move between hierarchies.’ 
‘Each member…’ of the group does not ‘personally decide every decision that is to be ascribed to the 
power elite. Each member, in the decision that he does make, takes the others seriously into account’. 
This marks the difference from the ‘middle levels of power’ located outside the core of the elite circles, 
who may have influence on matters within their sector, but are not taken generally into account. Finally, 
the fragmented and passive ‘mass society’ are those entirely removed from the circles of power (Mills 
1956:324). 
As mentioned above, Mills identified the power elite primarily as leaders of large institutions. However, 
Mills is less clear on exactly how to determine which institutions to include. Instead we suggest that the 
power elite of different epochs and social structures can be analysed with the overlapping circles as a 
point of departure. This allows us to analyse power elites as a group and thereby draw the broader 
sociological framework. When seen through the structuralism and group theory of Georg Simmel, the 
power elite becomes a group that, when it includes new members one by one, maintains its overall 
group characteristics (cf. Vedres and Stark 2010). In turn, the social integration of these Simmelian 
cross-cutting social circles can be enhanced by secrecy (Mills 1956:294; Simmel 1950:361). Adding to 
this, Randall Collins’ (Collins 2004:53ff) theory of interaction ritual chains emphasised how interaction 
– particularly physical co-presence – produces both solidarity and cohesion within the group, while also 
defining group boundaries. The group must interact continuously to uphold cohesion, values and moral 
(Collins 2004:32–49). Thus, the cohesive core group of the power elite can be traced through patterns 
of interaction. 
These patterns of interaction also function to uphold power relations and status differences through 
chains of interdependence, according to Nobert Elias. In his study, described in his book, Court Society, 
Elias (1983) showed how courtiers must achieve or maintain sufficient status to be considered an 
insider. The successful courtier learns to navigate the social games of the court in part by sensing the 
status and interests of the other courtiers, a status defined primarily by proximity to the king, Louis 
XIV, in both a physical and a social sense. Likewise, Erving Goffman (1951:299) proposed that 
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membership in prestigious networks with connections to powerful people becomes a status resource, as 
a result of the scarcity of personal connections. 
As in the court banquets described by Elias, power was defined relationally by Pierre Bourdieu. 
Through the notion of the field of power, Bourdieu (1996:265) showed that struggles between elite 
groups consist of determining the ‘exchange rate’ between forms of capital and establishing the 
‘dominant principle of domination’. Following Bourdieu (1996:263, our emphasis) these struggles take 
place within: 
[…] a complex universe of objective relations of interdependence (established in and through 
intersecting patterns of domination) among subfields that are both autonomous and bound 
together by the organic solidarity of a genuine division of the labor of domination. 
In other words, the agents in the field of power have to take one another into account. While having an 
interest in promoting their own specific form of capital, the holders of dominant positions share 
common interests, needing other forms of capital in order to legitimise and reproduce dominant 
positions. As such, the field of power becomes both a source of power and a locus for the struggles 
over power. 
The field of power is a field of forces structurally determined by the state of the relations of 
power among forms of power, or different forms of capital. It is also, and inseparably, a field of 
power struggles among the holders of different forms of power. 
Bourdieu (1996:264, our emphasis) 
When analysing the field of power, Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1996:270; see also Wacquant 2005:143) 
described subfields, each organised in homologous fashion to the general cleavages in the field of 
power. These subfields – the artistic, the scientific, the bureaucratic, the juridical and the economic 
fields – each have their own field-specific form of capital. Capital is ‘accumulated labor’ (Bourdieu 
1986:241), but certain advantageous positions allow for the appropriation of the labour so that 
dominant positions may accumulate capital (Savage, Warde, and Devine 2005). The accumulation of 
different forms of capital, tied to specific subfields, follows the logic of accumulation of power within 
the major institutional hierarchies2 described by Mills, but the field-analytic approach adds 
accumulation of power resources outside of the more bureaucratic organisations with formal 
leadership, such as science or the arts. Mills (1956:9) asserted that ‘only within [institutions] and 
                                                 
2
 As is the case with the institutional orders of Mills, Bourdieu regarded the particular form and conversion rates of capital 
as a product of historical struggles within the field of power rather than an intrinsic feature of society (Wacquant 1993), even 
if ‘strategies of reproduction’ (Bourdieu 1996:272ff) maintain a relatively stable configuration.  
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through them can power be more or less continuous and important’. However, the field-analytic 
approach of Bourdieu shows how fields are organised in a highly hierarchical way, even without a 
formal chain of command. Although institutional orders are always highly likely to take the form of 
fields, fields are not necessarily institutional orders. Extending the notion of institutional orders to 
include less formal hierarchies through the notion of fields extends the criteria of sector-inclusion into 
the core of the power elite. Rather than looking only at formal leaders, the question of inclusion in elite 
circles turns to whether or not the form of capital assessable by participating in the struggles within the 
field has value in the field of power. However, the accumulation of capital may also take place in a field 
with a high degree of autonomy. With this autonomy comes the risk of the field-specific form of capital 
losing transferable value. The inclusion of a field in the field of power rests upon the fact that this form 
of capital holds some sort of exchange value in that field. Or, as put by Shamus Khan (2012:362), ‘elites 
as those who have vastly disproportionate control over or access to a resource… [t]he resource must 
have transferable value’. 
But how does this conversion of capital between fields or institutional orders take place? To answer 
this Mills (1956:11) turned to the relations between the elites. There is ‘a qualitative split’ based on ‘a set 
of overlapping crowds and intricately connected “cliques”… [a] kind of mutual attraction among those 
who “sit on the same terrace”’. Mills (1956:19) added: 
If these hierarchies are scattered and disjointed, then their respective elites tend to be scattered 
and disjointed; if they have many interconnections and points of coinciding interests, then 
their elites tend to form a coherent kind of grouping. 
Following the group sociology of Simmel and Collins, we may add that relations based on interaction 
add to the cohesion of the power elite but also create internal trust, or potential for organic solidarity 
among holders of different forms of capital or power resources. 
Even if the holders of these forms of power are divided by their divergent interests as holders of 
different forms of capital, they are still related through their mutual interdependence, because they 
engage with – and thus show interest in and symbolic recognition of – the forms of capital held by one 
another. They integrate socially to form a consensually united elite (cf. Higley et al. 1991), accepting the 
overall legitimacy of the positions of the other elite sectors and their forms of capital, while still 
attempting to promote their specific base of power. If new forms of capital or institutional orders arise, 
these will be co-opted into the social spheres of the power elite, while continually struggling to 
determine the exchange value of their form of capital. Alternatively, they will remain outside the elite 
networks as counter-elites seeking to overthrow the current elite or be condemned to the middle levels 
of power, to be taken into account by the power elite only on specific occasions. 
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If the form of capital of an institution has transferable value, the individuals sitting at the top of these 
institutions will tend to interact with each other. If the transfer of forms of capital has stabilised, the 
interaction will tend to have been formalised. At the core of elite networks, we find representatives of 
the key institutional orders. In short, you are powerful if others with power think you are. You hold 
power if you know others who hold power. Although this may appear to be a mere tautology, using 
social network analysis, we may define the power elite as the core of the formalised elite network. This 
enables us to identify the institutional orders that are part of the core of the elite network. Of course, 
this does not mean that the network centrality associated with being part of the core is the only source 
of power. Network centrality is only one form of power, but one that is strongly correlated to other 
forms of power. Network centrality can be seen as a proxy for the social capital of an individual, which 
‘depends on the size of the network connections he can effectively mobilize and the volume of capital 
(economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected’ 
(Bourdieu 1986:246). However, if one is excluded from others in the network, the ability to use one’s 
power resources across institutions is seriously hampered by either isolation or dependency on others 
to create alliances. Before we use the connections between institutional orders and their presence in the 
power elite to assess their prominence in Danish society, we look at the method used to identify the 
power elite in Denmark. 
Identifying power elites through social network analysis 
In order to define the key institutional orders in the power elite empirically, we use a method developed 
to solve the boundary specification problem (for a further elaboration of the method and data used, see 
Ellersgaard and Larsen 2014). This method is key to empirical studies based upon a relational 
framework (cf. Emirbayer 1997; Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983). All potentially powerful or 
symbolically integrative affiliation networks within Denmark were recorded if a complete list of 
participants was available. The affiliation network was collected through various sources (see Table 1). 
The affiliations derived from inclusive lists of state offices, non-government organisations (NGOs) 
with a hearing right, the top 1,000 corporations listed by turnover, all registered foundations and guests 
lists from events, primarily hosted by the royal family. All affiliations, such as committees, boards and 
advisory boards, were collected from each of the original 6,053 organisations. In effect, each 
organisation formed the starting point of a small snowball collection of affiliations. This procedure was 
guided by an ‘inclusion principle’: if any affiliation could be considered to be nationally important in 
any sense, it was included. The majority of the included affiliations are the boards of large corporations, 
political organisations, foundations or state agencies. 
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In total, 5,332 affiliation networks were recorded for the year 2012, containing 62,481 positions held by 
37,750 different individuals. Each recurring name was tested individually for the validity of the overlap. 
If there was doubt as to whether two with the same name referred to the same person, they were 
treated as two separate individuals. By using the inclusion principle we ensured that the data 
comprehensively covered the official networks of every possibly important institutional order, from 
clergy, media and culture, to business, law and sport, and their potential ties. 
TABLE 1: AFFILIATION NETWORKS INCLUDED 
 From 
original 
sources 
Excluded* Added in 
snowball 
sample† 
Final number of 
affiliation 
networks 
No. of 
relations 
State1 2,328 1,780 327 875 10,230 
Parliament1 153 101 31 83 970 
NGO1 749 144 922 1,527 16,436 
Corporations2 1,136 34 40 1,142 7,476 
Foundations2 1,380 18 83 1,445 8,181 
VL Networks3 117 3 0 114 3,845 
Commissions4 116 44 0 72 1,121 
Events5 74 0 0 74 14,582 
 
Total 6,053 2,124 1,403 5,332 62,841 
1 Source: Danish Public Administration Database (www.foa.dk) 
2 Source: The list of largest corporations according to turnover and list of all foundations in the Danish Central Business 
Register (obtained through www.biq.dk) 
3 Source: Homepage of VL networks (www.vl.dk) 
4 Source: Registration of political commissions from 2005-11 made by Danish weekly newsletter A4. 
5 Sources: Webpage of Danish Royal Family (www.kongehuset.dk) and private archive of journalist. 
*Affiliation networks were excluded if no board of extra-organisational members existed, no information was available on 
the board either online or through personal contact, the board members were included from other sources as well, or the 
board entirely overlapped with another board within the same organisation. 
†This includes both subcommittees within the organisations on the original list and the 142 networks obtained through 
snowballing the affiliations of prominent actors. 
 
The comprehensive nature of the data means that the affiliations vary considerably in size and nature. 
To account for this, the weighting of tie strength was gradually reduced after the number of affiliation 
members began to rise above 143 4. As the number of members increases, the potential for interaction 
                                                 
3
 The weighting of ties was applied as follows: Each affiliation is subject to a weight,  of decreasing tie strength: 
       (1) 
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drops and the larger gatherings tend to meet less frequently. For gatherings of about 30 (typical for the 
more informal networks) participants’ tie strength was two-thirds the strength of boards with 14 or 
fewer members, whereas for more ceremonial gatherings with around 100 participants, tie strength 
reduced to one-third. To further account for the heterogeneity of affiliations, affiliations with almost 
identical members were removed if they were in fact part of the same organisation. If two affiliations 
were embedded in each other, only the strongest tie between a pair of individuals was retained. 
Following the same logic, events (which, unlike boards meetings, only gather the same individuals once) 
with largely the same set of participants were merged into one affiliation. Individuals who had 
participated in only some of the events had their tie strength to other participants reduced according to 
the proportion of the merged events they participated in. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
      (2) 
 where  is the number of members of each affiliation and  is a constant referring to the number of individuals 
that causes the network participation of each member to drop.  
 
4 Furthermore, several individuals have multiple ties. Meeting in more than one setting of course creates potential for a 
stronger tie, but as the number of meetings increase this each new tie adds less and less. Hence, after applying the weight 
based on affiliation size mentioned above, we added another weight using the sum of all ties between all pairs of individuals, 
.  
  (3) 
     (4) 
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FIGURE 1: THE NETWORK OF THE 7,249 LINKERS IN THE DANISH ELITE NETWORK, BY CORENESS 
SCORE 
 
The core group of the power elite was identified in a three-step procedure. First, all individuals without 
more than one weighted tie were removed, reducing the population to 7,400 individuals. Of these, 151 
were not connected to the largest component of 7,249 linkers. In this network of linkers we identified a 
k-core (Seidman 1983) using a modification inspired by the w-threshold of magnitude of network ties 
developed by Doreian and Woodard (1994) to allow use of the extended network: everyone within a 
reach of 2.1. A reach of 2.1 roughly corresponds to a pair of individuals being tied either: through one 
intermediary, if both affiliations tying them to the intermediary have a size of 14 members or fewer; or 
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directly in an affiliation with 50 or fewer members5. A group of 423 individuals6 form part of the most 
cohesive core, having a coreness score of 199. No individuals can be removed from this group without 
lowering the minimum number of 199 individuals within the reach of the least connected member of 
the core of the elite network. 
We used biographical data to analyse the social character of the core. The biographical data on the 423 
members were collected using a variety of sources, primarily Kraks Blå Bog, the Danish equivalent of 
Who’s Who, and information from websites of the organisations to which elite members were affiliated, 
LinkedIn profiles and the Danish Corporate Register (CVR.dk). Although data from these sources were 
mostly self-reported, the information – particularly on parental occupation – was not always entirely 
valid for the theoretical interest of identifying the class background of the elite. As well, the highest 
prevalence of missing data on public profile occurred among the least prestigious elite individuals. This 
may lead to an image of the elite slightly tilted towards the established elite. 
The primary occupation of the 423 members of the power elite core was recorded and tied to eight 
different sectors: business, organisations, politics, state administration, law, science and education, 
media, culture. Some of these were divided further into subsectors based on characteristics of the 
included institutions; for example, splitting organisations into four groups: unions, business 
associations, interest groups related to farming and interest groups representing consumers (see Table 
2). These constitute the empirical identification of the key institutional orders. Some members of the 
elite did not have one primary position but were instead employed as non-executive directors on several 
boards. They were multipositionals, moving from one institutional order to another. In this instance, they 
were coded according to their last full-time employer. After identifying and coding the institutional 
orders of the members of the power elite, all 5,332 affiliations were then tagged to record whether or 
not they belonged to any of these institutional orders, enabling an analysis of subnetworks such as state, 
corporations, unions or media (see Figure 2). This classification of networks was also used in the 
creation of network profiles of key individuals (see Figure 8), tracing the origin of the network ties of 
the most central individuals, other holders of key positions and notable absentees. 
                                                 
5 A third way to move within a reach of 2.1 of one another is if one or both of the individuals share several affiliation 
memberships with the intermediary between them, potentially reducing the sociometric between them and the intermediary 
below 1. 
6  Furthermore, 21 individuals have a coreness score of 199, but these are secondary actors (cf. Faust 1997), having only 
affiliations that are a subsample of another individual’s affiliations. Of these, 20 were removed from the identified power 
elite and added to the second layer of elite integration, the ‘upper levels of power’, because they potentially act only as 
liaisons and do not add new ties to the network of the elite. However, the Prince Consort was retained in the core elite 
group as he alone is included of 37 affiliations and events, four times the number of affiliation memberships than any other 
secondary actor.   
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The group of notable absentees was identified from an elite population gathered through the positional 
method. This population is composed of holders of key political, organisational and state positions, as 
well as management in the largest corporations and a list of the richest Danes7. These lack the network 
centrality to be part of the core group, but hold positions usually associated with power or influence. 
Members of this group thus worked throughout the analysis as cases to help understand the dynamics 
of inclusion and exclusion in the core of the elite network. Key individuals from each sector identified 
with the positional method, but not among those with the highest network centralities are also explored 
further. 
In the following analysis we will first describe the overall character of the network and the particular 
role the power elite plays in the network. For this we compare odds ratios between memberships in 
different parts of the network. Then we look into the composition of the power elite and from that 
discuss the key institutional orders in Danish society. Next, we move on to individual cases and discuss 
notable absentees, after which we look at the social character of the elite. 
The network of the power elite 
When looking at the elite network as a whole, the concentration of powerful positions in a perceived 
egalitarian country such as Denmark springs to mind. As mentioned above, there are 62,481 positions 
held by 37,750 different individuals in the dataset, meaning that the adult population has less than a 
0.9% chance of being part of the elite network. In other words, members of the elite network 
constitute the network resource equivalent of the one per cent popularised by Thomas Piketty (2014). 
The general population have only a 0.016% chance of being among the linkers, those with two 
affiliations. Fewer than one in 10,000 are part of the core group, the power elite. However, even within 
this most central group there is an extremely unequal distribution of network resources, as seen in 
Figure 2. The number of affiliation memberships varies from eight to 37 for the 427 linkers with the 
most memberships, whereas the remaining 6,821 linkers have between two and seven affiliation 
memberships. Other measures of centrality confirm this trend of a very small group of around 500 
individuals (even less when looking at the distribution of betweenness centrality) actually connecting 
the various parts of this network. The very small group characterized by high scores in betweenness 
                                                 
7 The list of notable absentees was supplemented by a couple of interesting cases, the world-famous filmmaker Lars Von 
Trier and  lawyer Knud Foldshack, who with 18 affiliation memberships ranked 8 with regard to weighted number of 
memberships in the entire network, and yet is not part of the power elite.  
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centrality suggests that position of brokers (cf. Burt 2004), or perhaps, rather, as trusted intermediaries, 
who is well integrated in both groups (cf. Vedres and Stark 2010), is very exclusive. 
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRALITY IN THE NETWORK OF LINKERS 
 
Distribution of centrality measures in the network of 7,249 linkers. Note that the 30,501 who are not linkers would lead to 
graphs with an even clearer power law distribution. 
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The concentration of network centrality is also found when looking at the networks of subsectors. 
When odds ratios of holding a central position in subsector networks are compared, individuals holding 
positions in the central affiliations within the network of each sector are much more likely to hold 
central positions in other networks as well (see Figure 3). In particular, holders of prominent positions 
in state, science and education, corporations, business organisations, interest groups and unions are 
much more likely to be members of the power elite, with odds ratios ranging from 17.1 to 33.8. The 
prominent participants of sector networks in law, culture, politics and media appear to have less, if still 
substantial, overlap with the power elite, with odds ratios between 5.3 and 13.7. 
Not all holders of prominent positions in subsectors hold prominent positions in other subsectors 
because of the particular logics of some of these sectors, such as the exclusion of prominent union 
members holding positions in prominent business associations. Likewise, the networks of the political 
and juridical sectors are less open to other sectors. The associations between prominent positions in 
various sectors also reveal the overlap of prominence, particularly for three networks. All of the 
following have odds ratios above 5. First, the holders of prominent positions in corporations are much 
more likely to sit on prominent boards in networks of science and education, interest groups, culture 
and the state administration. Secondly, prominent members in the network of business associations are 
tied to science and education, state administration and perhaps not surprisingly, corporations. Thirdly, 
prominent positions in networks of unions are open for participation in other prominent networks, 
particularly law and state administration. Fourth, the association between the official power groups of 
Denmark is seen in the overlap between prominent royal and political positions with an odds ratio of 
12. Note that these overlaps of prominence mean not only that prominent members meet on neutral 
ground in social clubs, which operate like networks, but also that prominent members from the other 
sectoral networks are invited into the most central boards within other sectors. In other words, if the 
dominant of one sector are invited to participate in another sector they are able to convert their capital 
in the most exclusive circles of another sector. 
Figure 3 shows that the elite are massively overrepresented in all other sectors, with odds ratios up to 
33. The elite as a group are strongly connected across all sectors and have a very strong preference for 
the most central affiliations within each sector. It seems the network has a structure with fairly 
unconnected sectors at a low level of centrality, with the vast majority of the affiliation members having 
only 1 position. But the most central affiliations in each sector are very likely to connect into the power 
elite and thereby connect with the rest of the network. The elite function as brokers between different 
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sectors or fields, but the brokers in the power elite are not recruited equally among the sectors in the 
network. 
FIGURE 3: ODDS RATIOS OF SUBSECTOR CENTRALITY 
 
The odds ratios of holding a position for the members of the top 20% most central affiliations in mutually exclusive 
subsector networks, compared to all other individuals in the power network. ‘Other’ denotes position in the less exclusive 
affiliations of the subsector networks. 
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TABLE 2: SECTOR AFFILIATION1 OF THE 423 IN THE CORE OF THE NETWORK 
      
Sector Subsector N Percent 
      
Business 
 
184  44%  
 
Top 2002  74  18% 
 
Multiposition3  55  13% 
 
Investment and Pensions4  19  5% 
 
Medium-small5  36  9% 
 
     
Interest groups 100  24%  
 
Employers and Business Associations   37  9% 
 
Unions  49  13% 
 
Farming organisations6  11  3% 
 
Consumers  3  1% 
 
     
State and Politics 75  18%  
 
Politics  34  8% 
 
Public officials  30  7% 
 
Royal court7  11  3% 
     
Science and Education 52  12%  
 
University principals  10  2% 
 
Educational institution principals  8  2% 
 
Economists and political scientists8  15  4% 
 
Other scientists8  19  5% 
 
     
Culture and Law 12  3%  
 
Culture and charities9  4  1% 
 
Lawyers  8  2% 
   
 
 
 
Entire core of the elite network 423 423 100% 100% 
1: Sector affiliation is identified as the sector of the primary occupation, or latest former occupation of the each elite 
individual. 
2: Chief executives in the 200 largest Danish corporations based on turnover. Of the 74, 46 are Chief Executive Officers. 
3: Multiposition denotes businessmen now working as non-executive directors or board members in the corporate sector, 
but who may also have – and indeed usually do have – several board positions outside business in political committees, state 
institutions or charities. 
4: Includes leaders of pension funds, hedge funds and investors of seed capital. 
5: Chief Executive Officers of firms not in the top 200 according to turnover and not in Investment and Pensions. Several 
of these are also owners of their corporation and many have key elected non–full-time positions in Business Associations as 
well. 
6: Includes farmers and landed aristocracy with only elected positions in the farming organisations. 
7: Includes both the royal family and key employees of the court. 
8: All are full professor or the equivalent on either a university or a key research institution. 
9: Includes both leaders of cultural institutions, an art critic and two large philanthropists having inherited their fortune.  
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When looking at the composition of the power elite, one sector dominates (see Table 2). Of the 
members of the power elite, 44% have primary employment in the corporate sector. If the 9% 37 
employed by business associations are added to the corporate sector they compose just over half of the 
power elite. But all actors of the collective bargaining agreements of the Danish labour market are 
present in the power elite, as 13% are union representatives. Furthermore, power elite members 
employed in state administration and politics, or in science and education, each compose between 18% 
and 12% of the power elite. Economists make up a substantial share of the scientist elite members. 
Economists are connected into the official organs that advise and regulate the labour market and the 
economy and therefore hold a strong position. On the other hand, leaders from social movements, 
such as the women’s movement or the environmental movement, are absent, even though several had 
career trajectories through these movements. But the farmers’ movement has a presence in the power 
elite. Culture and media are also sparingly represented. The elite are predominantly derived from the 
four core institutions that make up the Danish labour market system: the state, unions, employers’ 
organisations and corporations. But even with this dominance they still have strong ties into the top 
level of the other sectors, as can be seen in Figure 3. 
In spite of the overlap of networks between prominent members, some clustering tendencies of 
institutional orders in the network of the power elite can be seen in Figure 4. In particular, unions 
appear to be centred in the upper right hand corner, whereas business is located in the bottom left. 
Furthermore, the network of the royal family – all dark purple – form a clique near business in the 
bottom of Figure 4, whereas representatives of government and senior civil servants – in black and 
light purple – are located as another tightly knit clique at the right. If the positions of each institutional 
order are analysed separately, as shown in Figure 5, the role of business associations as intermediaries is 
generally located between business and unions. Other intermediaries appear to be scientists and 
politicians. 
The clustering tendencies should not, however, be interpreted as cleavages within the network. When 
analysing the ties between overall institutional orders, and the number of internal ties, in a reduced 
graph (see Figure 6), it is clear that business in particular, of course because of its relative strength in 
size, has strong ties to all other institutional orders. Thus 14.5% of all ties that cross the institutional 
orders in the network go from business to science and education, 16.7% to state and politics, 11.9% to 
business associations, 3.9% to culture and law, but also 6.0% directly to union representatives. Relative 
to their size, unions also have strong ties to business associations while also being the institutional order 
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with the highest prevalence of internal ties. Rather than being a fragmented elite network, most 
institutional orders are strongly tied with the corporate sector at centre stage. 
FIGURE 4: THE NETWORK IN THE POWER ELITE 
 
Line intensity equals tie strength. Icon size equals their degree. 
 
 256 
 
FIGURE 5: THE NETWORK OF SECTOR MEMBERS 
 
Line intensity equals tie strength. Icon size equals their degree. 
 
In the network of the power elite, it is clear that some institutional orders fraternise with others more 
frequently. However, unlike the results of the Swedish Power Study (Statens Offentliga Utredningar 
1990), there are no clear sign of two rival groups competing for power, nor are there signs of the highly 
functionally differentiated pluralist elite described in the Danish Power Study (Christiansen and Togeby 
2007). When looking at the members of the power elite, they include the majority of powerful 
individuals identified through a positional method, such as the Prime Minister, the Queen, top senior 
civil servants, leaders of the largest unions, management of the most important corporations, university 
principals and so on. 
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FIGURE 6: A REDUCED GRAPH OF NETWORK OF SECTOR EXCHANGES IN THE POWER ELITE 
 
A reduced graph of the network of the power elite. Icon size denotes the number of individuals in each sector. Tie intensity 
and numbers are the share of the total amount of inter-sectoral ties in each tie. Ties containing below-average proportions 
have been removed. Color indicates the proportion of ties of sector members to members of the same sector. Note that 
calculations do not take sector size into account, as it is more informative to know the probability of, for example, 
businessman having ties to other businessmen, rather than that probability relative to the probability of other groups. 
  
The key institutional orders and the division of labour of domination 
If we look at the organisations employing the elite members – the principal, but not the only, basis of 
the individuals’ power according to Mills (1956:9) – we get a good grasp of the interests that are being 
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promoted in the networks of the power elite. Although some individuals may become part of the core 
of the elite network by virtue of their wealth, fame, family or friendship ties, the following analysis will 
show that most of these people are also leaders or play key roles in major organisations. But which 
organisations then have their leaders well-positioned with regard to network centrality? 
Within the pillar of business, the largest organisations dominate. Of the elite individuals in the 200 
largest Danish corporations (by turnover), 74 are executives, 39 of the 55 multipositionals have a board 
membership, and a further four have formerly held a management or board position. Adding to this, 
the multipositionals and top 200 executives are more often among the most central in the network of 
the power elite as measured by reach (see Figure 7). If executives from smaller businesses are part of 
the elite, they almost always also hold secondary positions in business associations. Smaller businesses 
have difficulty getting enough contacts and positions for their directors on their own and have to rely 
on the business associations. The three most central members from the business associations all 
represent the Confederation of Danish Industry. It is important to note that the votes of the member 
corporations in the two major business associations are proportionate to their total wages. The political 
strategy of these organisations are therefore often in line with the interests of the largest corporations. 
It appears that big business represent the corporate sector politically, as described by Michael Useem 
(1984), and dominate challengers politically, as suggested by Niel Fligstein (1996). 
However, it is not just the size of the corporation that matters in terms of network centrality. Whereas 
owners, board members and CEOs of the largest Danish corporations are placed at the very top of the 
network as shown in Table 3 (e.g. Jørgen Mads Clausen, chairman, former CEO and owner of 
industrial firm Danfoss; CEO Thoman Hofmann-Bang of NKT, board member of security firm Falck, 
insurance company Codan, state-controlled DONG energy; industrial producers William Demant and 
Georg Jensen, Lars Nørby Johansen), others of equal fortune or firm size are excluded. Only 20% of 
the 20 wealthiest Danish families actually form part of the core. A major line of division with regard to 
network centrality appears to be the classic differences in status between the well-established 
bourgeoisie and the nouveau-riches (cf. Bourdieu 1996:181). This is seen in the case of notable 
absentee, the extremely rich owner of the commercial chain Jysk, Lars Kristinus Larsen, who holds a 
position only within his own corporation (see Figure 8 and Table 4). However, even among the families 
with old money, to achieve a sufficient amount of network centrality one must have taken part in the 
management of the corporation, as seen by the fact that Ane Uggla, the heir of and chairman of the 
foundation controlling by far the largest corporation in Denmark, A.P. Møller – Mærsk, is not part of 
the core of the elite. However, seven executive officers from Mærsk are among the 423 power elite  
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FIGURE 7: REACH BY INSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
 
Members of each sector according to their position in the distribution of reach within the network of the power elite.
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members, along with a further three employed by Mærsk-owned or controlled corporation, ensuring 
that the interests of the corporation are heard across the power elite network. In short, the internal 
hierarchies of the economic field in Denmark favouring well-established owners and old industrial 
corporations (cf. Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Munk 2013; Larsen and Ellersgaard 2012) are also seen in the 
network dynamics of the corporate institutional order within the network of the power elite. 
An interesting feature of the network is that several of the most central individuals – and in fact the 
most central individual in the network, President of the Union of Metalworkers, Thorkild E. Jensen – 
are union members (see Table 3). As seen in Figures 4, 5 and 6, union representatives in the network of 
the power elite are more tightly integrated than others. Furthermore, it appears that a few of these have 
a very high number of external contacts, with Thorkild E. Jensen (with the largest icon in Figures 4 and 
5) spearheading the union block into the elite network. But why is Thorkild E. Jensen, then president 
of a union with around 115,000 members and thus only the fourth largest working class union, so 
central? Much of the answer probably lies in the position of the metalworkers in the collective 
bargaining system. As holder of the majority code in the confederation of industrial workers, and along 
with the Confederation of Danish Industry, the Union of Metalworkers, as the leaders of The Central 
Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark, negotiate the standard agreement, an agreement 
that all other collective bargaining agreements are not allowed to exceed (Ibsen 2013:113). In short, 
what corporate negotiators can make Thorkild E. Jensen agree upon, they can impose on the rest of the 
labour force. 
By contrast, the leader of the third largest working class union (the Union of Public Sector Workers 
[FOA], representing approximately 190,000 unskilled and semi-skilled public sector manual workers), is 
notable absentee Dennis Kristensen, who is not even part of the power elite. Kristensen is infamous 
for his public popularity, media profile and tendency to report from closed meetings. However, 
Kristensen’s charismatic challenge to power elite consensus coincides with a very different network 
profile than that of Thorkild E. Jensen (see Figure 8). Whereas Jensen’s 28 memberships span 
prominent corporate boards, science and education, law, media, politics, and state administration, 
Kristensen’s six memberships are in less prominent corporations, a single prominent state committee 
and unions. It is not enough to head up a powerful organisation and have strong potential for 
mobilisation to become member of the power elite. It is also necessary to accept the unwritten rules of 
negotiations and the legitimacy of the other power elite members. In short, one must participate in the 
division of labour of domination. 
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTION AND CENTRALITY SCORE OF MOST CENTRAL INDIVIDUALS AND OTHER HOLDERS OF KEY POSITIONS 
Name Position Gender Member
-ships 
Degree Closeness 
rank 
Between-
ness rank 
Core
-ness 
Reach Reach 
rank 
TOP 10 (REACH) 
Thorkild Engell Jensen Leader, Union of Metalworkers M 29 137 1 1 199 2042 1 
Lars Nørby Johansen Multipositional, Business M 26 118 2 5 199 1885 2 
Bente Sorgenfrey Leader, Union of Public Sector Employees (FTF) F 23 79 3 4 199 1699 3 
Lars B. Goldschmidt Director, Confederation of Danish Industry M 24 102 4 3 199 1682 4 
Jørgen Mads Clausen Owner, Top 100 Corporation (Danfoss) M 24 92 7 13 199 1606 5 
Sten Scheibye Multipositional, Business M 24 110 6 6 199 1601 6 
Thomas Hofman-Bang CEO, Top 100 corporation (NKT) M 16 74 5 20 199 1537 7 
Peter Schütze Multipositional, Business M 22 87 8 9 199 1528 8 
Kim Simonsen Leader, Union of White Collar Workers (HK) M 20 90 10 34 199 1475 9 
Harald Børsting Leader, Confederation of Danish Unions (LO) M 17 81 11 125 199 1452 10 
OTHER HOLDERS OF KEY POSITIONS IN THE POWER ELITE 
Jens Oddershede Principal, University (SDU) M 16 66 15 11 199 1338 16 
Henrik Wedell-Wedellsborg Lawyer M 23 85 33 8 199 1160 29 
Peter Gæmelke Former Chairman of Danish Agriculture & Food Council M 15 48 71 21 199 949 62 
Dronning Margrethe Queen F 34 47 95 87 199 808 93 
David Hellemann Permanent Secretary, Treasury M 15 53 104 176 199 786 103 
Merete Helene Eldrup CEO, TV2 Media F 10 34 213 286 199 590 188 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt Prime Minister F 20 45 192 175 199 575 207 
Poul Erik Tøjner Director, Louisiana Art Museum M 7 20 301 526 199 509 254 
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TABLE 4: DESCRIPTION AND CENTRALITY SCORE OF NOTABLE ABSENTEES 
Name Position Gender Member
-ships 
Degree Closeness 
rank 
Between-
ness rank 
Core
-ness 
Reach Reach 
rank 
NOTABLE ABSENTEES 
Peter Skov-Jakobsen Bishop M 16 38 437 73 193 467 305 
Morten Bødskov Secretary of Justice M 13 40 376 2303 198 446 327 
Ingrid Stage Leader, Union of Academics in Humanities (DM) F 13 30 312 83 198 394 410 
Knud Foldschack Lawyer M 18 31 557 148 168 393 414 
Dennis D. Kristensen Leader, Union of Public Sector Workers (FOA)  M 6 30 547 399 198 390 421 
Børge Dahl President of the Supreme Court M 13 15 745 422 173 233 938 
Maria Rørbye Rønn CEO, DR Media F 5 5 805 2104 179 211 1066 
Ane Mærsk Mc-Kinney Uggla Heir to Corporation (A.P. Møller – Mærsk)  F 6 10 1107 3526 179 171 1400 
Eelco van Heel CEO, Top 100 Corporation (Rockwool) M 3 7 1470 6585 158 175 1366 
Pia Merete Kjærsgaard Chairman, Danish Peoples Party F 9 14 2476 3470 99 105 2308 
Jesper Lien CEO, Top 100 Corporation (Coop) M 1 - - - - - - 
Lars Kristinus Larsen Owner, Top 100 Corporation (Jysk) M 1 - - - - - - 
Ole Wæver Professor, Political Science M 1 - - - - - - 
Lars Von Trier Film Director M 0 - - - - - - 
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Among politicians there is a clear divide between members of parliament and those politicians with 
current or former positions in government or local administrations. The most central politician is 
actually capital Mayor Frank Jensen of the Social Democrats. In fact, 13 out of 34 politicians are from 
local or regional administration. Not all government secretaries are part of the power elite. However, 
the ministries responsible for the economy, labour market, education and foreign relations are all 
included, as are the permanent secretaries of these ministries. The Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-
Schmidt, who spends much of her time outside the networks of the power elite in Denmark working 
on foreign relations, is tellingly ranked only 207 for reach in the network of linkers. She is still part of 
the elite, but is placed at the periphery along with the rest of the government (see Figure 4). Again, the 
lower network centrality of the Prime Minister does not necessarily mean that she is less powerful than 
the mayor of Copenhagen, but her political power appears to be tied less formally to other forms of 
power than that of the mayor, limiting her venues. Another member of Cabinet, Morten Bødskov, the 
Secretary of Justice – historically a prestigious position, but located outside the regulation of the labour 
market due to the strength of the collective bargaining system – is one of those who just misses out on 
being part of the power elite. The boundaries of the outermost fringes of the power elite, following 
Mills (1956:290) are less stable than the core, meaning Bødskov could just as easily have been at the 
periphery of the power elite network as outside it. However, several members of government (e.g. the 
Secretary of Health, Astrid Kragh, ranked 703 according to reach) are quite far from joining the circles 
of the power elite. 
The most telling case of the difficulties of transferring political capital in network centrality in the 
power elite is seen in the peripheral position of the leader of the third largest political party, the 
populist Danish People’s Party, Pia Kjærsgaard. Kjærsgaard is ranked only 2,307 for reach in the 
network of linkers and only holds positions in parliament and at official royal events. This also shows 
that the restraint of certain fields (e.g. the political field), where the risk of being regarded as guilty by 
association is bigger, may change the willingness to participate in the more formalised parts of elite 
network studied here. The relative weakness of the institutional hierarchy of politics could be explained 
by politicians refraining from participating because it would put them at risk within their own field. 
However, upon leaving politics, several members of government have not been able to use the 
revolving door into the top of other institutional hierarchies but have had to settle for positions as 
lower level lobbyists. The value of political capital in Denmark should not be overestimated. 
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FIGURE 8: NETWORK PROFILES OF MOST CENTRAL AND NOTABLE ABSENTEES 
 
Network profiles of the most central individuals, other holders of key positions and notable absentees (see Table 3). ‘Top 
affiliations’ denotes holding positions in the top 20% most central affiliations in mutually exclusive subsector networks. 
‘Other affiliations’ denotes position in the less exclusive affiliations of the subsector networks. 
As with political capital, the power to mobilise civic society behind the climate or environmental cause, 
on social policy or gender equality, is not enough be become part of the power elite. Of the interest 
groups not tied to organised labour or corporate interests, only 14 are part of the elite. Of these, 11 are 
closely tied to the interests of the agricultural industry and the original rural challengers to the 
incumbent elite. However, since the rural challenge, farmers have joined forces with the landed 
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aristocracy, so that three of the 11 representatives of interests groups of farmers are also part of the 
Danish nobility. The only other interest group that has gained access to the power elite is the state-
subsidised Council of Consumers, which has three directors in the network of the power elite. Other 
social movements remain at the middle levels. They may be taken into account in matters regarding 
their specific area of interests but are not allowed to impose their concerns on other issues that may 
have indirect consequences on their issue of concern. The key actors of the social reforms and 
institutionalised bargaining system from the start of the twentieth century are still the only 
representatives of civil society with network centrality high enough to enter the circles of the power 
elite.   
Three other institutional orders traditionally regarded as central in liberal democracies – law and culture 
– also have marginal positions in the network of the power elite. Tellingly, the president of the Supreme 
Court, Børge Dahl, is ranked only 938 for reach in the network of linkers. Of the eight lawyers in the 
power elite, the most central, Henrik Wedell-Wedellsborg, ranked 29 and lawyer for Her Majesty the 
Queen, is part of the Danish nobility and has many ties to the haute bourgeoisie. The representatives of 
the cultural field who have sufficient network centrality to enter the power elite mostly head up large 
institutions. One such is Poul Erik Tøjner, ranked 254 and Director of the Louisiana Museum of 
Modern Art while also holding positions in the foundations of the royal family and in the largest 
publisher, Gyldendal. No artists or architects are part of the power elite. Internationally renowned 
filmmaker Lars von Trier has no position in the network. This shows how holders of very high 
amounts of field-specific cultural capital are not necessarily able to convert their capital in the networks 
of the power elite. If anyone within the realm of culture is allowed into the circles of the power elite, it 
is the administrators and leaders of well-established bourgeois culture. 
The position of media resembles that of culture. Only two members of the power elite hold media 
positions: the CEO of the state-owned commercial broadcaster TV2 and former civil servant Merete 
Eldrup, ranked 188; and the CEO of the media house responsible for publishing three of the highest 
circulated Danish newspapers, Lars Henrik Munch, ranked 137; hence, they belong to the large group 
of chief executives of the top 200 corporations. Both hold other corporate board positions, for 
example in the financial sector. No journalists or editors-in-chief manage to enter the core of the elite 
network, although several editors are quite close. Even the newly appointed Secretary-General of the 
national broadcaster DR – Maria Rørbye Rønn, ranked 1066 - is not part of the power elite. Like the 
political field, this lack of formal integration could be the product of a negative inclination within the 
journalistic field towards socialising with the powerful. However, it could also imply that the media are 
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of less importance – something to be handled by subordinates – to the core members of the power 
elite. 
Unlike culture, law and media, the institutional order of academia seems to play a significant role in the 
Danish power elite. All principals of the eight Danish universities are members of the elite, along with 
several principals of university colleges and technical colleges. But 34 scientists are also part of the elite, 
with 44% coming from the field of economics. As formal counsellors of government, these economists 
are tied to leaders from unions and the corporate sector, which underlines that when it comes to 
political influence of the social sciences, the economic profession has taken centre stage (cf. Chwieroth 
2007; Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan 2015; Lebaron 2003, 2008). However, the number of natural 
scientists tied to the power elite through foundations, and also tied by smaller entrepreneurial firms, 
indicates that collaborations within academic capitalism (cf. Slaughter and Leslie 1997) could tie the 
academic and the corporate order closer together (see Figure 6). This also means that the parts of 
academia that are most relevant for the corporate sector– economists, natural and particularly technical 
scientists – can exchange their specific form of academic capital in the field of power, whereas faculties 
of arts or humanities remain excluded from the circles of power as artists or journalists. One example 
of this could be the highly renowned political scientist Ole Wæver, one of the key architects behind the 
Copenhagen School of International Relations, who only holds one position in the entire power 
network. Academic prestige alone does not lead to network centrality. To become part of the power 
elite, one must have relevance for the establishment of the economic order. 
The elevated elite – cohesion of the organised minority 
When looking at the members of the power elite, one thing comes to mind – they look very much alike. 
Dressed in suits – no matter which institutional order they adhere to, with the scientists as the most 
likely exception – the core of the elite network are very often middle-aged white men. As seen in Table 
5, fewer than one in five of the power elite members are women and only a fourth are under 50 years 
of age, with only nine individuals under 40. Furthermore, only a single member of the power elite – 37-
year-old Soulaima Gourani, of mixed Moroccan and Danish descent – is not white, and only 10 were 
born outside Denmark, half of these to Danish parents. As Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) argue, 
the cohesion of the power elite is thus further strengthened by their homogeneity. Even though 10 
members of the power elite live abroad, active participation and presence in Danish society appears to 
be a prerequisite to enter the core of the power network. Although some sectors are more open 
towards women, particularly unions (46% women) and science and education (27% women), men 
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remain the majority in all sectors. In spite of a universal welfare system, government-provided child and 
health care access to education and the efforts of suffragist and feminists that has existed for many 
decades, the contemporary Danish power elite bear a striking resemblance to power elites of the past. 
TABLE 5: DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE POWER ELITE 
    
  N PERCENT 
   
Gender   
 Female 82 19.4% 
 Male 341 80.6% 
Age   
 Less than 40 years 9 2.1% 
 40-49 years 87 20.6% 
 50-59 years 144 34.0% 
 60-69 years 129 30.5% 
 At least 70 years 16 3.8% 
 Unknown 38 9.0% 
Place of birth   
 Copenhagen 94 22.2% 
 Upper class Copenhagen suburbs 26 6.1% 
 Other Copenhagen suburbs 25 5.9% 
 Major provincial cities (+100,000 inhabitants) 51 12.1% 
 Medium provincial cities (25-100,000 inhabitants) 58 13.7% 
 Minor provincial cities (10-25,000 inhabitants) 33 7.8% 
 Tiny provincial cities (3-10,000 inhabitants) 25 5.9% 
 Rural (less than 3,000 inhabitants) 39 9.2% 
 Abroad 10 2.4% 
 Unknown 72 17.0% 
Area of living   
 Central Copenhagen  89 21.0% 
 Copenhagen upper class suburbs  132 31.0% 
 Copenhagen middle class suburbs  48 11.0% 
 Copenhagen working class suburbs  21 5.0% 
 Major provincial city (+100,000 inhabitants)  29 7.0% 
 Medium provincial city (25-100,000 inhabitants)  29 7.0% 
 Minor provincial city (10-25,000 inhabitants)  11 3.0% 
 Tiny provincial city (3-10,000 inhabitants)  17 4.0% 
 Rural (less than 3,000 inhabitants  22 5.0% 
 Abroad 10 2.0% 
 Unknown  15 4.0% 
   
Total 423 100% 
 
The homogeneity of the power elite is further strengthened by shared educational backgrounds. As 
seen in Table 6, almost seven out of ten power elite members have a university degree. However, only 
24 have attended the less prestigious Universities of Southern Denmark, Aalborg and Roskilde, whereas 
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249 out of the 296 with at least a higher degree have attended the two oldest universities in Denmark - 
the universities of Copenhagen and Aarhus – or the Technical University of Denmark or the 
Copenhagen Business School. Not only does it seem that access to the power elite is eased by enrolling 
in a high status university, but a few select programs of these universities dominate, with almost half of 
the members of the power elite (196 of the 423) having followed just eight programs. These are: 
economics (56 and 18); the law (38 and 10) or political science programs (13 and 22) of the University 
of Copenhagen or Aarhus University, business from Copenhagen Business School (32), or engineering 
at Technical University of Denmark (29). This highlights that few epistemic communities (cf. Haas 
1992) tied to the professions (Abbott 2005) and international fields of expertise tied to economy and 
law (cf. Dezalay and Garth 2002; Lebaron 2003) are able to hold a central position in the power elite. 
However, since the late 1970s when admission criteria were first introduced in Danish higher 
education, only the political science programs have been among the top 25 programs according to the 
grade-point average required for entry. These institutions do not exist solely for those with the highest 
grades, even if most of them primarily recruit students from the dominant part of the social space 
(Thomsen 2012). Furthermore, the programs in law, engineering and business in particular enroll 
thousands of students each year. Although a background in these programs most certainly appear to be 
an import prerequisite, it is certainly not in itself enough to enter the circles of the power elite. 
As seen in Table 7, almost a third of the power elite members come from a very privileged background 
in the upper classes. Furthermore, more than one in seven have parents who are mentioned among the 
8,000 in Kraks Blå Bog, the Danish equivalent of Who’s Who. Not only are a substantive majority from 
the absolute top of society, but only 6% have a known background in the working classes, which at the 
time of birth of most power elite members composed at least four-fifths of society. Becoming a 
member of the power elite is difficult for the children of the working class. If we make an imprecise 
odds ratio calculation we see that children of parents mentioned in Who's Who are more than 1,000 
times more likely to become members of the power elite than working class children. Even in one of 
the most egalitarian welfare states in the world, a head start is paramount. 
Some parts of the elite, however, are less closed than others. Unions – with the highest proportion 
coming from the working class in spite of almost two-thirds of their background unknown, and the 
only sector with no upper class recruits – are opposed to business and state and politics in particular, 
where 38% and 32% of known social background are from the upper class. Furthermore, at least 18 of 
the 38 businessmen or charity chairmen with parents in a managerial position were also part of the 
family controlling the corporation, most having inherited their current role. Adding to this, the five 
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members of the royal family also owe much of their position to the privileges of their family or in-laws, 
as do four of the eight children of landowners who, in addition to their positions in the farming 
organisation, still control the family estate. 
TABLE 6: EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE POWER ELITE 
    
  N PERCENT 
   
Highest Qualification   
 Doctorate 57 13.5% 
 Higher degree 239 56.5% 
 First degree 54 12.8% 
 Professional only 56 13.2% 
 None 5 1.2% 
 Unknown 12 2.8% 
   
Education Type   
 Economy 81 19.1% 
 Business 57 13.5% 
 Law 50 11.8% 
 Engineering 47 11.1% 
 Natural Science 37 8.7% 
 Political Science 36 8.5% 
 Humanities1 25 5.9% 
 Teachers, Nurses 15 3.5% 
 Trainee 16 3.8% 
 Vocational 32 7.6% 
 None 5 1.2% 
 Unknown 12 2.8% 
   
Educational Institution   
 University of Copenhagen 137 32.4% 
 Aarhus University 70 16.5% 
 Technical University of Denmark 29 6.9% 
 Copenhagen Business School 34 8.0% 
 Other Danish University 24 5.7% 
 Foreign University 7 1.7% 
 Other, None or Unknown 122 28.8% 
    
Total 423 100% 
1: Includes Arts and soft Social Sciences 
 
Although the upper class appears to be well represented, there are only weak indications that elite 
boarding schools or high schools are important institutions for elite reproduction. The three most-
attended high schools are all public and in the same northern upper-class Copenhagen suburbs. 
Øregaard Gymnasium has nine, Holte Gymnasium has seven and Rungsted Statsskole has six alumni,  
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TABLE 7: SOCIAL ORIGIN OF THE POWER ELITE1 
       
  N PERCENT OR2 
       
Upper Class 99  23%  46.9 
 Manager  46  11%  
 Politician3  13  3%  
 Principals, professors and leading doctors  13  3%  
 Senior civil servant4  12  3%  
 Landowner  9  2%  
 Royalty  3  1%  
 Supreme Court lawyer  3  1%  
       
Upper Middle Class 97  23%  8.7 
 Junior Manager  44  10%  
 Professions  19  5%  
 Engineer  16  4%  
 Academics  14  3%  
 Military officer  4  1%  
       
Lower Middle Class 90  21%  2.7 
 Small businessman or self-employed5  43  10%  
 Farmers5  19  5%  
 White collar or clerks  10  2%  
 Teacher  8  2%  
 Small farmers  4  1%  
 Salesmen  4  1%  
 Foreman  2  0%  
      
Working Class 24  6%  0.1 
 Skilled worker  12  3%  
 Unskilled worker  12  3%  
       
Unknown 113  27%  - 
Total 423  100%  - 
Indication of Parent in Who’s Who 63  15%  80.2 
1: Class of origin is defined through self-reported description either in Who’s Who or biographical articles. Since these are 
often just mentioned by title, their categorisation is somewhat inaccurate. To estimate odds ratios of entering the elite from 
different classes, social background has been coded in three classes with known occurrence in the parental generation of the 
power elite, c. 1955 (see Hansen 1964) – Upper Middle Class (5%), Lower Middle Class (14%) and Skilled and Unskilled 
Workers (81%). Furthermore, indicators of top positions, e.g. as Corporation Owner or Manager, Member of Parliament, or 
University Professors – position elevating one at least to the most resourceful 1% of society – have been distinguished in 
the ‘Upper Class’. 
2: Odds ratios are calculated using only the proportion of known social backgrounds against the proportions of the entire 
population mentioned above. There are approximately 8,000 biographies in Who’s Who. As these span at least two 
generations, probably no more than 4,000 individuals in each generation have parents mentioned in Who’s Who. If the power 
elite are seen as belonging to a single generation – or one-third of the population of 5,500,000 inhabitants – the probability 
within this generation of having parents mentioned in Who’s Who is around 0.0022. Because of the reliability of sources and 
estimations in the calculations, the odds ratios should be interpreted cautiously. 
3: Includes one union leader of the National Teachers Associations 
4: Includes one bishop and one high-ranking military officer. 
5: Many farmers and small businessmen may actually, depending on their number om employees, be part of the upper 
middle class.  
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or just over five per cent of all members of the power elite. This is because the majority of the elite are 
not born in Copenhagen. With around one-fourth of the population living in the Copenhagen area in 
1960 and 41% of the power elite born here, the power elite are certainly more often raised in the capital 
but in no way to the same extent as in the upper classes. 
Although the birthplace of the elite may be somewhat dispersed, the living patterns are not. Two-thirds 
(66%) live in Copenhagen or Copenhagen suburbs, with almost half of these concentrated in the up-
scale northern Copenhagen area. As seen in Figure 9, not only are the elite concentrated in certain 
areas, but other areas of Copenhagen, particularly the working-class western and south-western 
suburbs, are almost completely no-go, especially for the business elite. Furthermore, rural areas are also 
avoided by members of the power elite, especially those far from the three major provincial cities, 
notably the southern islands and the south, west and north of the Jutland peninsula. By zooming even 
further in we see that the power elite cluster around certain streets. Even within the same posh area we 
find clear patterns. It seems important to live on the ‘right side of the tracks’. This is seen by the divide 
across the major highway north of Copenhagen with the elite clustered along the coastline. 
The Danish power elite thus conform to the image of middle-aged white men. Furthermore, their 
homogeneity is strengthened by shared educational credentials and social background. Adding to this, a 
majority of the elite share very distinct housing patterns. Although there are differences in the social 
profile of the elite members, especially between unions and business, as a group they are quite 
homogeneous. 
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FIGURE 9: RESIDENCES OF THE POWER ELITE 
 
Known Danish residences in the entire country and the Copenhagen area for 398 of the 423 power elite members. Colors denote sector affiliation (see Figure 4). 
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The limits of the power elite 
The power elite are the by far the most well-connected group of people in Denmark, but this does not 
mean it includes only powerful individuals and organisations. More importantly, the network 
dominance of the power elite tells little about the efficiency of its influence. The Danish elite and 
Danish society are embedded in global structures, of which Denmark is a very small part. Even within 
Denmark there are forms of power that differ from those present in the elite networks, which may 
challenge and limit the influence of the power elite. These can be social movements, media and extreme 
wealth. 
With the growing importance of the European Union, a great number of ‘the decisions having major 
consequences’ (cf. Mills 1956:4) on issues such as monetary politics or environmental and import 
regulation are taken outside the power networks of Denmark. Top Danish politicians and bureaucrats 
may be heard, but also constitute a tiny minority of the interests that must be taken into account. 
Furthermore, within the post-Fordist workfare states (Jessop 1993), the politics of corporate taxation 
and working conditions are restricted by a competition between states that take part in a race to the 
bottom. Cross-national comparisons by international organisations such as the OECD on both primary 
and higher education have countries changing policies to perform better in these rankings. These and 
many other factors reduce the influence of national elites, and as a result, some elite members look to 
the international scene for influence. 
This internationalisation could lead to a disruption in the national power networks. Recent studies have 
shown both the fracturing of national corporate networks, either from the growing influence of foreign 
capital as in Switzerland (Bühlmann, David, and Mach 2013) or The Netherlands (Heemskerk and 
Fennema 2009), or as product of the lack of need for class action in the US (Mizruchi 2013). At the 
same time, a rise in both trans-European (Heemskerk 2013) and global interlocks (Carroll 2003, 2009; 
Carroll and Sapinski 2010) underlines that new transnational alliances are being forged. Only a few 
Danes take part in the major, informal transnational network and most of the participants here are also 
present or past members of the Danish power elite. 
Not all forms of power need to be connected, though. As argued by Jeffery Winters (2011), holders of 
extreme wealth may simply use intermediaries to exercise their influence or wealth defence. Thus, the 
members of the power elite do not need to be the actual holders of power resources, but their 
representatives. However, they are likely to be tied to the same sector as the oligarchs they represent. 
Others may not be interested in converting their capital, simply because they have a greater illusio (cf. 
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Bourdieu 1996:3) for their particular field than to achieve dominance within society at large. This could 
be the case for artists such as Lars von Trier or scientists like Ole Wæver, both internationally 
renowned within their field. Some may have a potential for converting their capital, but lack any interest 
in doing so. Often this could also be explained by the fact that the low conversion rate would lead to 
being seen as a sell-out or as corrupted, without gaining a much more central position in the network of 
the power elite. The fact that no former or current artists are part of the core of the power elite 
suggests that either all artists are disinterested in participating in power networks or that the possibilities 
of conversion are in fact minimal. 
Although interaction and network relations are of great importance, much insight can be gained by 
analysing the structural oppositions that can be identified within a Bourdieusian framework through 
multiple correspondence analysis (cf. De Nooy 2003). By using social background, educational profiles 
and career trajectories as indicators of the forms of capital structuring the field of power, the ‘objective’ 
relations can be identified, but this requires an even more elaborate prosopographical database on the 
members of power elite to yield valid results. Furthermore, in studying the integration of the power 
elite, it should be kept in mind that the elite network is also tied through former connections, informal 
ties, links through marriage and family, and career movements between sectors. Although this simply 
means that the level of integration is underestimated, it can also lead to an underestimation of the level 
of integration into the core of the power elite by groups tied primarily through these less formal 
connections. 
It may be argued that the implications of being integrated into this group are theoretically debatable. 
For instance, the proposed correlation between network centrality and the power of an individual could 
be deemed controversial. It could be argued that an individual could have vast influence without being 
central or even integrated into the elite network. Even with this reservation in mind, the empirically 
identified core of 423 individuals still constitute a highly integrated social group involving a large 
proportion of positions in Danish society. The composition of this group is interesting to cross-
national comparisons, even if it one argues that it does not contain all theoretically relevant elite 
individuals. Will the further developments of welfare-state retrenchment and neoliberal reforms in, for 
example, the UK or the US, be reflected in a different composition of the core of the elite? Will the 
role of the state differ in highly centralised countries such as France? And how about countries where 
oligarchs dominate, such as Italy under Berlusconi, Russia under Putin or Ukraine under Yanukovych 
(for more the last case, see Kostiuchenko 2011, 2012). These questions can be illuminated by cross-
national comparison of elite network cores. 
 275 
 
Concluding remarks: The cohesive power elite in the welfare state 
Even in Denmark, one of the exemplary cases of an egalitarian society, there is a vast difference in 
centrality, even within the 1% of Danes holding a position in the power network. Furthermore, central 
positions in one sector of this network also lead to central positions in the networks of other sectors. 
However, the primary brokers between these sectoral networks are a small, exclusive group. This power 
elite of 423 individuals can be identified in the core of the elite network. Judging by the occupation of 
core members, the strong position of business and business associations –52% of the power elite – 
implies that controllers of economic power are the dominant institutional order, even in a Scandinavian 
welfare state. Even if labour unions still hold a place, they are outnumbered and their most central 
representatives have adopted a corporate-friendly political line. The other key institutional orders 
present in the power elite are state and politics, joined by the leaders of the academic world. Thus, 
Mills’ notion of the power elite proves relevant in understanding the composition and integration of 
various elites in Denmark. Even in the egalitarian welfare state, the leaders from a select few 
organisations are interlocked into a tightly knit network. 
These institutional orders are connected through the governing bodies, advisory boards or official 
events that constitute the power network. The power elite are thus not just acquaintances. They are 
identified as the core of primary decision-making affiliations. By sharing decision-making 
responsibilities on boards, elite members are obligated to reach a common ground, and not just 
informally. In spite of the conflicts of interest in the institutional orders, they are tied not only through 
their shared memberships, but also by shared social background and demographics, lifestyle, and 
professional outlook from the same university programs. However, this power elite is far from 
omnipotent. Global developments limit both the reach and framing of the decisions made by this 
nationally based elite. Adding to this, internal challenges to the legitimacy of the power elite are made 
by social movements or the media. But these challenges face a cohesive group of interlocked 
institutional orders. The sectors represented in the power elite show the relative strength of the key 
institutional orders that got us to the Denmark of today. 
 276 
 
References 
Abbott, Andrew. 2005. “Linked Ecologies: States and Universities as Environments for Professions.” 
Sociological Theory 23(3):245–74. 
Alba, Richard D., and Gwen Moore. 1978. “Elite Social Circles.” Sociological Methods & Research 
7(2):167–88. 
Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez. 2013. “The Top 1 
Percent in International and Historical Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3):3–20. 
Aron, Raymond. 1950. “Social Structure and the Ruling Class: Part 1.” The British Journal of Sociology 
1(1):1–16. 
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 
56(4):947–52. 
Bell, Daniel. 1958. “The Power Elite-Reconsidered.” American Journal of Sociology 64(3):238–50. 
Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, Peter Munk Christiansen, and Helene Helboe Pedersen. 2014. “A 
Privileged Position? The Influence of Business Interests in Government Consultations.” Journal 
of Public Administration Research and Theory 24(4):879–96. 
Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, Peter Munk Christiansen, and Helene Helboe Pedersen. 2015. “Interest 
Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media.” Governance 28(1):95–112. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. “The Forms of Capital.” Pp. 241–58 in Handbook for Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, edited by John G. Richardson. New York: Greenwood. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. State Nobility - Elite Schools in the Field of Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bühlmann, Felix, Thomas David, and André Mach. 2013. “Cosmopolitan Capital and the 
Internationalization of the Field of Business Elites: Evidence from the Swiss Case.” Cultural 
Sociology 7(2):211–29. 
Burton, Michael G., and John Higley. 1987. “Elite Settlements.” American Sociological Review 52(3):295–
307. 
Burt, Ronald S. 2004. “Structural Holes and Good Ideas.” American Journal of Sociology 110(2):349–99. 
 277 
 
Campbell, John L., and John A. Hall. 2006. “Introduction: The State of Denmark.” Pp. 1–49 in National 
Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism – The Danish Experience, edited by John L. Campbell, John A. 
Hall, and Ove Kaj Pedersen. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing. 
Carroll, William K. 2003. “The Network of Global Corporations and Elite Policy Groups: A Structure 
for Transnational Capitalist Class Formation?” Global Networks 3(1):29–57. 
Carroll, William K. 2009. “Transnationalists and National Networkers in the Global Corporate Elite.” 
Global Networks 9(3):289–314. 
Carroll, William K., and Jean Philippe Sapinski. 2010. “The Global Corporate Elite and the 
Transnational Policy-Planning Network, 1996-2006.” International Sociology 25(4):501–38. 
Christiansen, Peter Munk, and Lise Togeby. 2007. “Elite Transformation in Denmark 1932-1999.” 
Comparative Social Research 23:35–54. 
Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2007. “Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging 
Markets.” International Organization 61(2):443–63. 
Clark, Gregory. 2014. The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Collins, Randall. 2004. Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1957. “The Concept of Power.” Behavioral Science 2(3):201–15. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1958. “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model.” The American Political Science Review 
52(2):463–69. 
Davies, James B., Susanna Sandström, Anthony B. Shorrocks, and Edward N. Wolff. 2009. The Level 
and Distribution of Global Household Wealth. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G. Garth. 2002. The Internationalization of Palace Wars. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Domhoff, G. William. 1975. “Social Clubs, Policy-Planning Groups, and Corporations: A Network 
Study of Ruling-Class Cohesiveness.” Insurgent Sociologist 5(3):173–84. 
 278 
 
Domhoff, G. William. 1978. Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books. 
Domhoff, G. William. 2007. “C. Wright Mills, Power Structure Research, and the Failures of 
Mainstream Political Science.” New Political Science 29(1):97–114. 
Domhoff, G. William. 2013. Who Rules America? The Triumph of the Corporate Rich. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Doreian, P., and K. L. Woodard. 1994. “Defining and Locating Cores and Boundaries of Social 
Networks.” Social Networks 16(4):267–93. 
Due, Jesper, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen, and Lars Kjerulf Petersen. 1994. The Survival 
of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining. 
Copenhagen: Djøf/Jurist-og Økonomforbundet. 
Elias, Norbert. 1983. The Court Society. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman, and Anton Grau Larsen. 2014. “Identifying Power Elites – a Social 
Network Analytic Approach.” Lausanne: Conference paper at Understanding the 
transformation of economic Elites in Europe. 
Ellersgaard, Christoph Houman, Anton Grau Larsen, and Martin D. Munk. 2013. “A Very Economic 
Elite: The Case of the Danish Top CEOs.” Sociology 47(6):1051–71. 
Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology.” American Journal of Sociology 
103(2):281–317. 
Faust, Katherine. 1997. “Centrality in Affiliation Networks.” Social Networks 19(2):157–91. 
Fligstein, Neil. 1996. “Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions.” 
American Sociological Review 61(4):656. 
Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.” Qualitative Inquiry 12(2):219–
45. 
Fourcade, Marion, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan. 2015. “The Superiority of Economists.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 29(1):89–114. 
 279 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Goffman, Erving. 1951. “Symbols of Class Status.” British Journal of Sociology 2(4):294–304. 
Haas, Peter. 1992. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” 
46(1):1–35. 
Hansen, Erik Jørgen. 1964. “De Administrerende Direktørers Sociale Oprindelse.” Sociologiske 
Meddelelser 9:95–124. 
Hartmann, Michael. 2010. “Elites and Power Structure.” Handbook of European Societies 291–323. 
Heemskerk, Eelke M. 2013. “The Rise of the European Corporate Elite: Evidence from the Network 
of Interlocking Directorates in 2005 and 2010.” Economy and Society 42(1):74–101. 
Heemskerk, Eelke M., and Meindert Fennema. 2009. “Network Dynamics of the Dutch Business 
Elite.” International Sociology 24(6):807–32. 
Higley, John, and Michael Burton. 2006. Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Higley, John, and Michael G. Burton. 1989. “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and 
Breakdowns.” American Sociological Review 54(1):17–32. 
Higley, John, Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Charles Kadushin, and Gwen Moore. 1991. “Elite Integration 
in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration.” European Sociological Review 7(1):35–53. 
Ibsen, Christian Lyhne. 2013. “Consensus or Coercion: Collective Bargaining Coordination and Third 
Party Intervention.” PhD Thesis, University of Copenhagen. 
Jensen, Carsten Strøby. 2012. Industrial Relations in Denmark: From Conflict-Based Concensus to Consensus-
Based Conflict. Copenhagen: Djøf/Jurist-og Økonomforbundet. 
Jessop, Bob. 1993. “Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist 
Political Economy.” Studies in Political Economy 40:7–39. 
Khan, Shamus. 2012. “The Sociology of Elites.” Annual Review of Sociology 38:361–77. 
 280 
 
Knoke, David. 1993. “Networks of Elite Structure and Decision Making.” Sociological Methods & Research 
22(1):23–45. 
Korpi, Walter. 2006. “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of 
Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists.” World 
Politics 58(2):167–206. 
Korpi, Walter, and Joakim Palme. 2003. “New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity 
and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95.” American Political Science 
Review 97(3):425–46. 
Kostiuchenko, Tetiana. 2011. “Central Actors and Groups in Political Elite: Advantages of Network 
Approach.” Polish Sociological Review (2 (174):195–204. 
Kostiuchenko, Tetiana. 2012. “Elite Continuity in Ukraine: When Networks Matter (?).” Historical Social 
Research/Historische Sozialforschung 14–25. 
Larsen, Anton Grau, and Christoph Houman Ellersgaard. 2012. “Status Og Integration På Magtens 
Felt for Danske Topdirektører.” Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk tidsskrift for kultur- og samfundsvidenskab 
2012(2-3):9–30. 
Laumann, Edward O., Peter V. Marsden, and David Prensky. 1983. “The Boundary Specification 
Problem in Network Analysis.” Pp. 18–34 in Applied Network Analysis: A Methodological 
Introduction, edited by Ronald S. Burt and Michael J. Minor. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Lebaron, Frederic. 2003. “Economists and the Economic Order: The Field of Economists and the 
Field of Power in France.” European Societies 3(1):91–110. 
Lebaron, Frédéric. 2008. “Central Bankers in the Contemporary Global Field of Power: A ‘social Space’ 
Approach.” The Sociological Review 56:121–44. 
Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan. 
Mare, Robert D. 2011. “A Multigenerational View of Inequality.” Demography 48(1):1–23. 
Michels, Roberto. 1949. First Lectures in Political Sociology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Mills, Charles Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 281 
 
Mintz, Beth A., and Michael Schwartz. 1985. The Power Structure of American Business. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Mizruchi, Mark S. 2013. The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Moore, Gwen. 1979. “The Structure of a National Elite Network.” American Sociological Review 
44(5):673–92. 
De Nooy, W. 2003. “Fields and Networks: Correspondence Analysis and Social Network Analysis in 
the Framework of Field Theory.” Poetics 31(5):305–27. 
Pareto, Vilfredo. 1991. The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Pedersen, Mogens N. 1976. Political Development and Elite Transformation in Denmark. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications. 
Pedersen, Ove Kaj. 2006. “Corporatism and Beyond: The Negotiated Economy.” Pp. 245–70 in 
National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism – The Danish Experience, edited by John L. Campbell, 
John A. Hall, and Ove Kaj Pedersen. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing. 
Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Savage, Mike, Alan Warde, and Fiona Devine. 2005. “Capitals, Assets, and Resources: Some Critical 
Issues.” The British Journal of Sociology 56(1):31–47. 
Seidman, Stephen B. 1983. “Network Structure and Minimum Degree.” Social Networks 5(3):269–87. 
Simmel, Georg. 1950. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. edited by Kurt H. Wolff. Glencoe: Free Press. 
Slaughter, Sheila, and Larry L. Leslie. 1997. Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial 
University. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Statens Offentliga Utredningar. 1990. Demokrati Och Makt I Sverige - Maktutredningens Huvudrapport. 
Stockholm: SOU. 
 282 
 
Thomsen, Jens Peter. 2012. “Exploring the Heterogeneity of Class in Higher Education: Social and 
Cultural Differentiation in Danish University Programmes.” British Journal of Sociology of Education 
33(4):565–85. 
Useem, Michael. 1984. The Inner Circle. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Vedres, Balázs, and David Stark. 2010. “Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping 
Groups.” American Journal of Sociology 115(4):1150–90. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1993. “From Ruling Class to Field of Power: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu 
on La Noblesse d’Etat.” Theory, Culture & Society 10(3):19–45. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2005. Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics. Cambridge: Polity. 
Winters, Jeffrey A. 2011. Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zeitlin, Maurice. 1974. “Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist 
Class.” The American Journal of Sociology 79(5):1073–1119. 
Zweigenhaft, Richard L., and G. William Domhoff. 1998. Diversity in the Power Elite: Have Women and 
Minorities Reached the Top?. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
 
